Title: ‘At the Edges of Citizenship’: Documenting Life Experiences of Syrian Displaced People with Biopolitical State Strategies of Hospitality and Security in Algeria

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Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.

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Sarra Menal

‘It is a tough job being Algerian’

Tahar Djaout * (quoted in Šukys, 2007: 14) (in Benrabah, 2013, p. vi)

Abstract

This thesis offers qualitative evidence for why post-colonial citizenship in Algeria retains its legal-constitutional, nationalistic, and societal norms and values when it comes to meeting the needs of the Syrian displaced community in Algeria. The history of resistance to colonial governance has meant a constant reinvention of the State's norms of exclusion and inclusion. Using Foucault's analysis of biopolitical governmentality, this thesis shows how the Algerian state's response, especially after the migrant emergency in Europe in 2015, has circumscribed the bounds of Algerianness in order to preserve the norms of citizenship from challenge. Unlike the European ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship in the context of a global refugee crisis, Algerian state norms and values have been shaped by three rationalities that have paradoxical outcomes. These rationalities are: *hospitality*, which is governed by rationalities of faith (Islam) and Pan-Arabism / Arabness; the state's political concern with *territorial security* that are governed by rationalities of nationalism and security; and the state's capacity to cope with the phenomenon of mass human movement in the 21st century (*humanitarian support*). Algeria's strategies manifest a power game between nationalism and security within the state's conceptions of Algerian citizenship and its openness towards non-citizens. This qualitative investigation uses sociological analysis to argue that the flow of Syrian refugees is managed according to these three rationalities of nationalism, security, pan-Arabism / Arabness and Islamic values.

Keywords: Algerianness / Algerian citizenship, Hospitality, Islam and Pan-Arabism / Arabness, Territorial security, Human movement, Biopolitical governmentality, Humanitarian support, Norms of inclusion and exclusion, Legal, social and nationalistic norms, Syrian displaced community.

List of Abbreviations

ADS : Agence de Développement Social / Social Development Agency

ANEM : Agence Nationale de l'Emploi / National Employment Agency

ANGEM : Agence Nationale de gestion du Micro-crédit / National Agency for Management of Microcredit

ANSEJ : Agence Nationale de Soutien à l'Emploi des Jeunes / National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment

APN : Assemblée Populaire Nationale / Popular National Assembly

AUMA : Association des Ulama Musulmans Algériens / Algerian Muslim Scholars Association

CASNOS : Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale des non-salariés / National Social Security Fund for the Self-Employed

CEDAW : Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

CEO: Chief Executive Officer

CNAC : Caisse Nationale d'Assurance-Chômage / National Unemployment Insurance Fund

CNAS : Caisse nationale des Assurances Sociales / National Social Insurance Fund

DAIP : Dispositif d'Aide à l'Insertion Professionnelle / Professional Integration Assistance System

ENA: *étoile nord-africaine* / the Star of North Africa

ETF: European Training Foundation

EU: European Union

FDA: Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

FIS : Front Islamique du Salut / Islamic Salvation Front

FLN : *Front de Libération Nationale* / National Liberation Front*)*

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé / Armed Islamic Group

HIV / AIDS: human immunodeficiency viruses / acquired immune deficiency syndrome

ID: Identification (document)

IOM: International Organization for Migrants

MENA: Middle Eastern and North African

MTLD: Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques / Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms

NASS: National Asylum Support Service

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGOs: non-governmental organisations

O.S: Organization secrete

ONS: Office National des Statistiques / The National Statistical Office

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

PNC: Palestinian National Council

PPA : Partie du Peuple Algerien / Algerian People's Party

UAE: United Arab Emirates

UDMA: Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien / Democratic Union for the Algerian Manifesto

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nation

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

USA: United States of America

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

WTO: World Trade Organisation

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Chapter One: Introduction and Research Context

1.1.'A Piece of 1962 that Settles in the Present'

After more than fifty-eight years of independence and over 170 years after the death of the most influential figures of the Algerian local resistance against brutal French colonisation, Algeria announced that it will formally and officially recover from France the body parts (skulls and remains) of twenty-four Algerian fighters and martyrs. The body parts belong to Cherif Boubaghla and Sheikh Ahmed Bouziane and their brothers that led the Zaatcha [oasis] anti-colonial uprising in 1849 among whom there was an Egyptian national who was in Algeria during his assassination by the French coloniser (Abdallah, 2020). This event reminds me of Boumedienne's era when the body of Algeria's well-known leader of anti-colonial resistance in the 19th century, El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, was returned from Damascus, Syria to Algeria and buried in Martyrs' cemetery "El Alia cemetery" in 1966. El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri was exiled by the French colonial regime in 1855 to Damascus, where he continued to live until his death. After Algeria's independence and in an emotional ceremony like his allies that were recovered from France in 2020, Abdu El-Kader's body was returned by the Syrian government in 1966 and welcomed by Algerians.

The Algerian fighters were completely dehumanised to the point that they were not given their proper names; instead, they were numbered. The skulls of twenty-four Algerian fighters had

been kept in the storage area at the "Musée de l'Homme" in France for decades after their death (Vives & Global Information Network, 2020). On the 3rd of July 2020 and after years of negotiations with the French government and political and bureaucratic obstacles, remains of the Algerian fighters were welcomed with an exceptional celebration ceremony led by Algeria's president, Abdelmadjid Tebboun, and national army forces. Despite the world pandemic situation and nationwide lockdown, Algerian people travelled from all over the country to salute their national martyrs and, in tears, pray for their souls. The remains of these national heroes of national anti-colonial resistance remained displayed for the public at "Palais de Culture" in Algiers until their final burial on the 5th of July 2020, Algeria's national Independence Day (Doudou, 2020). On the day of their arrival, the Algerian army chief, Said Chengriha delivered a speech saying:

'The valiant resistance fighters who refused the colonization of their country by imperial France were displayed immorally for decades, like vulgar objects of antiquity, without respect for their dignity, their memory. That is the monstrous face of colonization … Algeria is now living a special day today' (CGTN Africa, 2020).

The army chief of Algeria, Said Chengriha, started his speech by denouncing as criminal acts the actions of the French regime towards Algerian heroes of the Algerian anti-colonial resistance and finalised his speech by appreciating the moment of recovery of the remains of the Algerian anti-colonial fighters. Like Said Chengriha, Algeria's president Abdelmadjid Tebboun, in tears, argued:

‘They [fighters] have been deprived of their natural and human right to be buried for more than 170 years. Led by Cherif Boubaghla and Sheikh Ahmed Bouziane, the leader of the Zaatcha [oasis] uprising and their brothers, the remains include a skull of a young man who was younger than 18 years old’ (Abdallah, 2020).

Malika Rahal, a historian referred to this historical moment as ‘a piece of 1962 that settles …in 2020’ (“Algeria to recover…”, 2020). This event has delivered important messages regarding the nature of Algerianness as a political and a normative force, biopolitical and historical entity. The political significance of this event can be seen as a strong rejection of all kinds of colonisation and dehumanisation and constitutes an implicit confession by the French Republic of its crimes against Algerians during colonisation. The message of this event is that Algerianness still holds its normative force and the past remains a relatively safe repository of moral inspiration to base the nation’s dominant values. From a perspective of Foucault’s terminology of biopolitics, a political rationality which takes the administration of life and populations as its subject- the speeches of the Algerian state president and the army chief stated above remain a clear demonstration of a biopolitical state practice that cares for the well-being of the population. This biopolitical state practice also offers biopolitical rights to Algerian martyrs to be buried, with dignity, in their country for which they sacrificed their lives. The historical significance of this event shows that the Algerian state, to date, did not safely archive its colonial past with the French state.

The fact of chasing the French government for years to return the body parts of the Algerian anti-colonial fighters shows that Algeria’s past still colonises the present. Algerianness represents an image about the presence of the past in the present. The latter is the starting point of my thesis. This thesis explores the nature and conceptualisation of Algerianness and Algerian national identity and how it treats non-citizens including Syrians as displaced people. *Historically* Algerianness was too diffuse for a diverse nation to cohere around in resisting

French colonisation; these only came to be defined according to prominent nationalists such as: El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei'ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj, as the French Republic's assimilationist agenda of *violent* pacification in its North African colony began to fail. Given its colonial history and post-colonial present, this research reveals that Algerianness constitutes a contested field of collective identity where normative, nationalistic, biopolitical and political forces are mobilised by social actors. However, the question that arises in this thesis in relation to the discussion around human migration is: how do these forces / powers of Algerianness treat non-citizens that wish to belong in the age of mass migration in the 21st century? More specifically, how does this power game produce Syrians within Algeria? How does the conflict of powers construct Syrians as subjects that may boost the well-being of the Algerian population?

The nature of post-colonial Algerianness has been continuously questioned. For instance, during popular marches that took place in early 2019, Algerians critically questioned the old design of Algerianness including its welfare system (social rights), political and civil rights of citizenship. Societal and cultural aspects were based on the normative force of Algerianness that unifies all Algerians, and on nationalistic values that should appreciate the revolutionary war of 1st of November 1954 and the efforts of the Algerian martyrs and war fighters (el Moudjahidin) in attaining independence. In several European countries such as in the UK, Sweden, Greece, France, Hungary, citizens supported political and nationalistic parties with xenophobic, cultural racism and exclusionary attitudes to migrants that are considered as the 'other' or the 'outsider' who menace the collective representation of a national identity (Mafu, 2019, p. 03). In the western scenario, national collective identities have been constantly exclusive; in Germany, for example, and as a reaction to Merkel's immigration policies, Islamophobic, xenophobic and anti-migrant demonstrations took place in the German city of

Chemnitz in August 2018, leaving eighteen people injured ("Thousands protest…", 2018; "Eighteen injured…", 2018). However, interestingly, in Algeria the marches of February 22nd, 2019 did not act as a platform for xenophobia to grow against asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants as a major factor in rising unemployment in Algeria. Algerians, instead, criticised the social policy and its failure to achieve justice between different social classes in Algeria.

The primary objective of this study is to offer a sociological understanding of how the Algerian state has been managing the flow of Syrian displaced people to the country since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. It is worth stating that the Algerian scene is very different from that in the Western context. While many Western countries have legislated official refugee schemes through which states can study, approve or maybe decline the applications of asylum seekers, Algeria's immigration system still lacks this option and did not legislate an official law which could have organised the flow of war refugees to the country. Because there is no asylum official mechanism, by law, Syrians in Algeria are not legally recognised as asylum seekers or refugees, but they are recognised as either economic immigrants (long-residence permit holders) or as visitors / tourists (short-residence permit holders). Having said this, Algeria, compared to many of the Western countries, is still in its infancy when it comes to its experience in managing war refugees / displaced people. The main reason is that since the black decade in the 1990s, Algeria has had a reputation of being a dangerous place and an unsafe destination for either tourists or immigrants compared to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Morocco. From my experience, when I was applying for my ethical application in 2018, I was obliged to do a risk assessment as a part of the ethical procedures at Portsmouth University. The overall risk of Algeria determined by the Drum Cussac Global Risk Monitor has been *moderate to high at 3.75* (Drum Cussac.net). Although the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001 in the USA proved that all countries, without exceptions, are in a constant risk of facing international terrorism, a phenomenon which is not unique only to specific

countries, global reports and Western media still portray Algeria as an unsafe country. The latter is probably why Algeria has not had any previous experience with a significant flow of displaced people fleeing war before the arrival of Syrians in 2011. Apart from refugees of Western Sahara in the Southern region of Algeria, Tindouf, Syrians represent a significant fraction of displaced people in urban places in Algeria.

After the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, approximately fifty thousand Syrians decided to reside in Algeria. Because the distance to drive from Syria to Algeria is more than 10-hours long and a flight ticket that would cost more than 500 Euros per person, *most* Syrian families that entered Algeria originally belong to upper middle class or bourgeois classes in Syria. These Syrians have chosen to reside in Algeria and resume their lives in an Arab country that would unconditionally welcome them without a visa. *Many* Syrian males are businessmen who hold higher education qualifications and could easily resume their businesses and lives in Algiers, however this does not deny that there were *vulnerable* groups of Syrians that extremely needed financial support and shelter. Vulnerable Syrian people have been hosted in guest centres such as Sidi Feradj guest centre in Algiers. Research fieldwork revealed that *most* my Syrian participants that reside in Algiers were able to afford private accommodation and, for them, social integration was smooth because they did not face any socio-economic obstacles. Fateh, (39) a shop owner in Baba Hassan, clarified that, for him, most Syrians that came to Algeria were not in need for financial or humanitarian support. He stated

'… Syrians that were financially stable came to Algeria and easily started a new life; others that were in need for financial support did not even think about coming to Algeria. Instead, they have chosen to go to more neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Jordon, and Lebanon …' [… Souriyin li houn b Jazaei'ir mo'adamhom mayssourin lhal… ya'ani el chakhss souri li ando mochkila maliya fi souriya, ma fakar fi el jazaeir mn assassha, raho lal Irak, el ordon w lobnan ama li ahwalo moyassara maliyan, fa howa karar yji la jazaeir w ma yentzro ay mossaadat …].

For these reasons, the present thesis does not focus on post-traumatic stress experiences that Syrians have faced after they reached Algeria. In this thesis, I will rather focus on the state's strategies of rehabilitation and integration of the Syrian community in the capital, Algiers, and how these state strategies resulted in a feeling of marginality and uncertainty among Syrians in terms of their legal status in the country. From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, the present study provides an explanation of how the state strategies and discourses manifest the politics of care and exclusion. Although the state's strategies provided Syrians with access to welfare services, I argue that they have been designed to primarily care for the local population by preserving and boosting its homogenous national identity and normative feature of Algerian citizenship. By doing this, the present thesis will provide a new understanding of power within the Algerian context. Unlike Western studies that constructed a very narrow view of power in Algeria that is often referred to as a tool of authoritarianism and repression, the present thesis adopts a Foucauldian thinking of power in order to shed light on more positive types of power that regulate, administer, normalise and boost the well-being of the population. The present thesis will also critically reflect on the application of different types of power in real life situations. My research data revealed that Algerianness and Algerian citizenship are, now, adopting new evolving modalities in the age of mass migration namely: *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarianism*. The three state strategies and discourses of hospitality, security, being the raison d'état, and commitment to the provision of humanitarian support, were governed by rationalities of Algerian nationalism and were, in turn, interpreted in the following state technologies of biopolitical governmentality such as: closing borders, imposing visa on Syrians in 2015 prior to their arrival, restricting access to employment and health insurance and informally and exceptionally not allowing the legalisation of mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians.

These state rationalities are not randomly designed but they are historically related to the colonial past and post-colonial present of Algeria and are even designed in relation to the contemporary challenges of international terrorism in order to meet the state objectives. I argue that the biogovernmental norms of security and securitised humanitarianism can be seen as a reaction to the current challenges that Algeria has faced in the light of instability in the Sahel region due to the interventions of foreign military troops such as the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) at its land borders with Libya (Lenarz, 2012) and the French troops in Northern Mali. These regional uprisings inevitably affected both the Algerian society and the political scene in Algeria (Northey 2019, p. 04). Unconsciously, by securitising the country, it is as if the Algerian government is trying to protect the country and prevent any possible threats from the so called "Arab spring" or the scenario of the French naval forces invading the country, as happened in 1827 which was followed by France colonising Algeria for 132 years.

The biogovernmental norms of territorial security and humanitarianism contradict with the ethos of Islamic hospitality that the Prophet Mohamed appealed to by *unconditionally* hosting both believers and non-believers. They also contradict with the values of *unconditional* hospitality of El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei'ri when he hosted Christians in his palace in Damascus, Syria, because their lives were threatened during the sectarian riot in Syria and Lebanon in the 19th century (Wien, 2017). On the other hand, the state's rationality behind *conditional* biogovernmental norms of hospitality is again due to challenging threats that the state faces due to instability in its neighbouring countries namely Libya and Mali and the presence of terrorist groups at its borders. The state's securitisation of humanitarianism started since the black decade in the 1990s and continues to grow especially after the French government swapped 100 jihadists who were imprisoned in France for French hostages who

were detained in Mali ("Mali hostages…", 2020). This act can be seen as a form of biopolitical racism from France towards Africans, whose lives, according to the French regime, are "unvaluable", because the fact of releasing more than 100 Jihadists in Mali continues to feed into the circle of international terrorism in the Sahel region rather than combatting and preventing it.

Implicitly, the state's discourses of *hospitality* and *security* and their rationalities can be understood from a perspective of biopolitical governmentalities that aim at preserving the national identity of the Algerian population and enhancing its homogeneous features that do not necessarily match globalisation and multiculturalism. The integration of asylum seekers in the state capital, Algiers, is administered through the provision of social welfare, in healthcare, education, housing and employment. In terms of a biopolitical strategy, this project shows that the pastoral responsibility for war refugees, however, is implemented according to strict limits and conditions; the legal status of these men, women and children does not give them the right to attain Algerian citizenship. In this research, I will identify the key social factors among state and non-state actors in civil society that may or may not preclude Syrian displaced people from the Algerian national community.

This research is a qualitative study that investigates how legal and normative forces of Algerian citizenship and Algerianness are constituted of competing governmental discourses and state biopolitical strategies in the age of migration and during the flow of Syrian displaced people into Algeria in the 21st century. Using Foucauldian notions of biopolitics and governmental discourse, analysis is carried out at three main levels. The first level investigates the state's rationalities that lie behind the state's discourses / strategies of hospitality, security, and humanitarianism. By doing this, this level of analysis also looks at how the state has embodied

its rationalities since 2011 using different technologies of care and control. The second level of analysis investigates the state's modes of subjectivation and the production of the subject. Drawing on power-knowledge relations, the second level of analysis will depict the conflicting discourses over the production of Syrian displaced people as "guests", "potential threat to national security" and "brothers and sisters" and the meaning of circulated knowledge at different times. Within a state's biogovernmental framework, the third and last level of analysis will focus on how the state's welfare rationalities and technologies have been designed to achieve biopolitical aims of care for the Algerian population and of both care and exclusion for the Syrian population in Algeria.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with research participants from both Syrian and Algerian cohorts in the capital Algiers, regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, religion profession or their ethnic background. The Syrian cohort involved Syrian displaced people who moved to Algeria after the Syrian civil war in 2011. The Algerian cohort, on the other hand, involved Algerian state officials, staff members that deliver social welfare services to Syrians in healthcare, education, housing and employment and key members of charity organisations. The latter are not non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the sense that they are independent from the state and are committed to support refugees only, but they are charity organisations that have adopted religion (Islam) as their main rational. They adopted Islamic values and ethics of supporting and looking after people in need as their main task. 'Charity organisations such as: Jame'eyat Hiraae (organisation of Hiraae), Jame'eyat Akhawat el khayr (Organisation of Sisters' Good Deeds) and Jame'eyat el Irchad wa el Islah (Organisation of Guidance and Reform) are designed to provide support to everyone in need in Algeria including Algerians and Syrians … these organisations are very active in the capital, Algiers, and have their branches even outside the city … they are approved by the state … they receive financial support from both the state and independent donors including Algerian businessmen,

entrepreneurs and the like', Fatima, (39), an Algerian businesswoman, a key member and representative of charity organisations, added. The choice of participants from the Algerian cohort such as healthcare providers revealed how the state sets up strategies and how they were implemented according to different state rationalities.

1.2. Introduction and Background of the Study

Within the context of globalisation, topics of immigration, forced migration, and human mobility, in general, have been the timeliest research topics in the twenty-first century. These have always intertwined with concepts of citizenship, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, biopolitics and governmentality studies. Researchers across a variety of empirical research disciplines in social sciences such as sociology, politics, and geography have worked on issues of migration. From the perspective of the social sciences and immigration studies, for instance, human mobility simply means to move from place A to place B to seek better living conditions. Individuals can either move from rural to urban spheres or from one city to another within the same country (at the national level/ internal migration) in a context of urbanization or across countries (at the international level) within a context of external migration. People migrate for many different reasons: economic, political, environmental, and social; these are known as push-pull factors (De Hass, 2008). The displacement of people and international migration (voluntary or forced) challenges the validity and the sovereignty of a nation-state, its national security, borders' control, inclusiveness, and allegiance to the nation state.

The international law of migration precisely distinguishes between migrants and forced migrants (refugees). The first group of people voluntarily leave their home country to seek a

better life, better job opportunities and better life choices; the latter group involves people who leave their home country under unsafe conditions to seek security and peace (Armstrong, 2012, p. 223). The United Nation's charter of Human Rights was established in 1948 following mass migrations due to the World Wars that began in Europe. Article 13 in the UN charter of Human Rights declares that 'everyone is entitled to free movement and residence within the borders of each state; everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country' (United Nations, 2015, p. 28). However, the displacement of people and international migration (voluntary or forced) can be challenging to the sovereignty of a nation-state, its national security, loyalty and allegiance to the nation state, borders' control.

In this thesis, I will focus on international migration and more specifically on forced migration of Syrians that fled their home country due to war and instability since 2011 and decided to live in Algeria and more specifically in the capital, Algiers. Research data of the present thesis reveals that at a societal level, most Syrian participants did not face social exclusion or obstacles that would hinder their social integration or their integration into healthcare, education, and housing. However, they experienced major problems in terms of legal recognition and access to employment. Wafae (27), was working in a nursery school in Syria but could not resume her work in Algeria because of her legal status. By law, her short-residence permit does not allow her to work in state organisations in Algeria although she has been living in the country since 2016. Wafae narrated her experience:

'…In terms of employment, for instance, I tried to apply for a job in in a nursery school, but I could not be successful in my application because I do not have a long-residence permit or a working permit…' [min nahiyat

choghl ana matalan roht michan adaris bi madrassa lhadana lhokoumiya bas makdert, makablouni la ano ma andi la ikama da'ima, la rokhssat choghl la bitakat tachghil…].

Not only in the case of Syrian females, Ayman (40), previously a journalist in Syria, replied to my question about his view of Syrians' integration at both a societal level and a legal level:

'… the Algerian society is very kind and welcoming … it is a society that is highly influenced by faith: Islam, …. We do not have problems with the people … but our concerns are at a legal level … we do not have long-residence permits that would allow us to register our business on our names without the need for a long-residence holder or an Algerian citizen as a co-owner …' [cha'eb el djazaei'ir cha'eb tayib w cha'eb motaatir b din el islami ktir ma adna ay machakil ma'ou, bas adna mochkila ma'a el awrak .. ma adna ikamat la nkder nftah machari'e aw mahalat b asmaena el khassa bi doun chakhs ando ikama da'ima aw jinssiya jazaei'iriya]

Similarly, one of the strongest motives that encouraged Anas (39) and Mohamed (32) and their small families to quit UAE and Egypt, respectively, where they had legal status, and reside in Algeria was the level of hospitality and openness that their friends experienced among Algerians. However, the state's approach of hospitality and unconditional welcoming does not guarantee full and unconditional access of social welfare services.

As stated above, I will investigate the state's technologies and rationalities of power that have governed the Syrian displaced community in Algeria through discourses of *hospitality* which, at state and societal level, is shaped by faith (Islam) and a newly resurgent pan-Arabism. The state's approach of hospitality can be seen as a socio-political strategy to strengthen Algerianness in the collective imagination by advocating shared values of brotherhood with

the rest of the Arab world. Hospitality (*diyafa*) in Algeria is also religion-driven and it represents a crucial element in Algerian Islamic ethics and traditions. Its position in Islamic theology is manifested in the Prophet Mohamed's saying, 'there is no good in the one who is not hospitable' (in Siddiqui, 2016). In addition to hospitality, the state's geopolitical concerns over social unity and national *territorial security* have treated the Algerian national community, Algerianness, as its referent object that needs protection from a constant threat of international terrorism. However, this securitisation has resulted in a feeling of marginality among Syrian respondents. Wael (37), a van-driver, who was an electrician in Aleppo, Syria, before he entered Algeria in 2014, relates to marginality:

'… we are in a prison, a big prison. We have freedom inside, but once we leave Algeria, we cannot come back to it. [nahna n'ich b sijn; sijn kbir ma fina ntla'e meno'. [Netnakal dakhil el jazaei'ir bi kol horiya ma fi mchakil bas mata ma tla'ena menha mafina narja'e] (My translation from dialectal Arabic to English).

In addition to the main conflicting discourses and state strategies of *hospitality* and *security*, there is a historical obligation for the state to provide *humanitarian support* and to the Syrian community. Humanitarian aid can be seen as an extension of values of Arabo-Islamic hospitality that is driven by historical ties between Algerians and Syrians that started since 1855 when El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri was exiled in Damascus and this event has marked a strong kinship between both nations ever since. Most my participants such as: Fatima (39) a businesswoman and a representative of charity organisations from the Algerian cohort, and others from the Syrian cohort such as: Lara (45, a dressmaker), Nirmin (49, a housewife), Bachir (25, a business owner), Moataz (23, a shopkeeper), Amin (28, a shopkeeper), Amar (35, a shop owner), and Riyadh (37, a builder) shared the same view and expressed an emotional

charge of brotherhood in the name of kinship and historical ties between the Algerian and Syrian nations that started since the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri in Syria.

Despite all restrictions, Algerian authorities including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Algerian Red Crescent continue to collaborate with UNHCR branches in Algeria to provide support for displaced people and their families. The International Organization for Migrants (IOM) has collaborated with the Algerian Ministry of Health to seek better healthcare, treatment, and support services to both migrants and *harragas*. *Harraga,* 'the path burners', is a term of North African colloquial Arabic used to describe North African migrants that attempt to cross frontiers illegally and reach Europe (Sansal, 2014, p. 37). The Migration Policy Centre in the EU region (2013, p. 10) declares:

'Algeria has initiated ambitious reforms in its migration policy. The main objective of the new Algerian migration policy is to control irregular migration. This choice can be explained by a number of converging factors: increased EU engagement with Algeria on irregular migration; the proliferation of smuggling networks involved in cross-border crime; increase in regional terrorist activity; regional upheavals and consequent increases in population movements; and by the indignation of the public confronted by the drama of the ***harragas***… In addition to border controls, the Algerian government has also been involved in dealing with humanitarian crises on its borders, such as the displacement of people from Libya and Tunisia after the Arab Spring and the Malian refugee crisis that started in 2012, and has provided humanitarian aid, among other services, in such circumstances. It is also working with the UNHCR to address refugee issues within Algeria's borders'.

Due to constant threats from terrorist groups, smugglers, and drug traffickers, Algeria's approach to managing the movement of irregular migrants is a matter of effective border controls. At the same time, the Algerian state is still committed to providing humanitarian aid

to potentially displaced people coming from Mali, Libya and Tunisia. The state's paradoxical strategies and discourses of *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarian support* emerged as substitutes to an official legal mechanism of refugees in the country which would have managed the flow of Syrians and granted them rights, if it had been present in Algerian law. Although there is no legal forum for Syrians to claim their rights, my empirical investigation reveals that the Algerian social welfare system offered Syrians full and unconditional access to healthcare, education, housing, but only conditional and limited access to employment. One would ask: why would the state grant Syrians free unconditional access to healthcare, education, and housing, yet limit access to employment?

Using Foucault's concept of governmentality by which 'a population's conduct is directed, managed and controlled' (Bulley, 2014, p. 02) and focussing on the idea of biopolitics, I argue that the state strategies of *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarian support* are primarily biopolitical. This means that the practices adopted by the state to manage the flow of Syrians in Algeria, are primarily designed to govern the Algerian local population and enhance its prosperity and well-being. This is achieved by monitoring its level of openness towards foreigners by deciding who deserves entry and who does not, based on their capacities, abilities and skills to improve the well-being of the local population. This proves why the state facilitated the access of most Syrian businessmen to employment and granted them long-residence permits while it restricted and limited access of Syrians that belong to a lower and working classes. Hatem (42) a Syrian businessman in Baba Hassan explained:

'… I am not going to lie to you, I am a businessman and I have my own business, I have health insurance, I have a legal status which is my long-residence permit .. I do not have a problem, but short-residence permit holders and undocumented people cannot start their own businesses or apply for trade registers on their own names…' [choufi

ma rah akdeb aliki, ana andi amali khas fini w andi ikama w andi daman ijitimae'I yaani mafi mochkil bas fi nas ma andon ikamat maykdro ystakhrjo sijil tijari khas fihoun].

This, in turn, demonstrates that the state in Algeria still holds power over the design of Algerianness as a normative and societal force, as a nation's collective identity, and as a biopolitical entity. This socio-political scene also reflects the problematisation and conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship that has been governed by its colonial and post-colonial normative forces. My research data also uncovered that the normative force of Algerian citizenship remains highly dependent on nationalist discourses that have designed Algerianness as a religio-culturally and racially homogeneous phenomenon.

1.3. Research Aims and Research Questions

Given the lack of academic and general research that sheds light on Syrian displaced people in Algeria and the complexity and ambiguity around their situation in Algeria, and the absence of a national refugee / asylum mechanism in Algeria, this research aims at answering the following research questions:

a. ***What are the dominant state discourses in Algeria in relation to refugeeness? What are the state rationalities behind adopting these discourses? How do they function and what are their technologies?***

b. ***Within a framework of biopolitical governmentality: how are these state technologies designed to care or control both the local and the displaced community, Algerians and Syrians respectively?***
c. ***As far as the production of knowledge and modes of subjectivation are concerned: What is the status of Syrians in Algeria?***

    - ***What rights and responsibilities do they have and what are the legal and societal challenges that Syrians are facing within the Algerian setting?***
    - ***How do Syrians in Algeria position themselves within Algeria -both discursively and practically?***
    - ***How do these ways of positioning themselves respond to/ match/ challenge the ways in which the Algerian state produces Syrians (guests/ potential threat to national security/ brothers and sisters)?***

Question (a) aims at identifying the main discourses that dominate the state's politics of refugeeness and their technologies that were adopted in order to manage the flow of Syrians to the country. Identifying the state's technologies and the main discourses is crucial in this research because the state has not yet adopted a national refugee mechanism, which is supposed to explain how the state should respond to displaced people, how it works to integrate them into the Algerian context and how power shapes the self of the displaced community. The investigation of state's technologies is still possible and can be done through observing the state practices and its response to the influx of Syrians since 2011. State technologies have their underlying rationalities. In order to answer question (a), chapters 3 and 4 provide a critical analysis to colonial and post-colonial Algerian history which is crucial in understanding the nature of Algerian citizenship as both a political, normative, and a biopolitical entity.

Question (b) provides an understanding of how the Algerian state perceives Syrian displaced people differently at different times and under different circumstances. The Power-Knowledge relation is 'productive' of subjects who are positioned as having different characteristics and capacities for action (Li 2005, Ong 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 06). Power-Knowledge relations are important in critical analysis of how the state discourses address the Syrian displaced community. This will give an insight about how Algeria produces Syrian displaced people at different times as "guests / brothers in faith" or as "potential threats" and will reveal the state dominant discourse. As such, this will show more about their rights (including citizenship rights: legal, civil and political) and responsibilities towards both the state and the local population.

Question (c) This question is linked to ***question (b)*** as it identifies the struggles that Syrians faced in Algeria. Research revealed that not all Syrians have lived the same experience in terms of the state rationalities of welfare. In fact, their life experiences differ according to their legal status and the rights they enjoy accordingly. This shows that having legal documentation is a crucial part for Syrians to feel socially and legally integrated. As a result, this has resulted in producing different discourses of the self and modes of subjectivation among the Syrian community itself: some prefer to call themselves refugees or asylum seekers because they are registered with the UNHCR office in Algiers and feel protected by a world organisation; others would prefer to be called brothers and guests in Algeria because they are treated as a part of the Islamic Ummah / the Arab community and have received unlimited access to citizenship rights (employment, healthcare, education and housing) including long-term residence permits that are valid for two years and can be renewed. Another group of Syrians have stayed at the

edge of the previous categorisations: they are perceived as potential threats whose residence permit should be renewed every 45 days and enjoy limited rights of employment but free access to accommodation, healthcare, and education. Throughout this thesis I will use the term "displaced people" to cover all categories in the Syrian community including, undocumented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers.

1.4. Research Objectives

The main objective of the present research is to analyse and investigate the problematic conceptualisation of Algerianness that has demonstrated itself in citizenship and nationality laws. Algerianness and its norms of inclusion and exclusion can be legally and normatively observed through the state practices and strategies adopted to manage the flow of Syrian displaced people after the Syrian civil war in 2011. In the absence of a jurisdiction over the refugeehood in Algeria, the level of integration of asylum seekers and refugees can still be observed and investigated through the state practices and strategies of officialising the status of war refugees either by offering long-residence permits or citizenship status by naturalisation and, therefore, extending their rights to attain social equality and achieve social justice. In post-colonial contexts, decisions around subjects of migration are still influenced by the colonial past (Phil Hubbard, 2004 in Judge, 2010) and Algeria is no exception. Within the Algerian context and due to a complex history of re-shaping and re-designing Algerianness during and after the French colonisation, today's policies and state response to the phenomenon of migration reflect a complex struggle of powers at both national and international level. At a national level, we can observe the struggle between values of nationalism, Arabness / pan-Arabism and Islam, hospitality; the international level, on the other hand, manifests the struggle

of national security within the age of mass migration and globalisation. By investigating the struggle of power, this research will demonstrate how different institutional discourses of power are responsible for creating Algerianness and monitoring the openness of Algerian citizenship and to what extent they manage the diversity of the local population through including / excluding Syrians.

1.5. Structure of the Thesis

The following chapter (***chapter 2***) will discuss the theoretical foundation namely Foucault's conceptualisations of governmentality and biopolitics. In terms of power-knowledge relations, this chapter will illustrate the intimate relation between knowledge, power, and the subject. Chapter 2 also provides a new perspective of looking at Algerian citizenship and Algerianness as biogovernmental state's rationalities in the age of mass migration and international terrorism. As far as the originality and uniqueness of the present thesis, this chapter represents the gap in the existing literature, contribution of the thesis into fields of Algerian citizenship, Algerian identity, and refugee studies in Algeria and the social value of this thesis.

Chapter 3 reviews literature about the struggle of historical, social and political power that has played a determining role in shaping cultural and political nationalism during the French colonial occupation from 1832 to 1962. This chapter will investigate the nature and scope of French colonial discourse in Algeria through 'analyzing the political activity and organization that developed its own forms of knowledge as a part of its activities of domination and exploitation' (Young, 2001, p. 408). French colonial governmentality adopted discriminatory

citizenship laws and education curricula as its technologies that embodied different discourses and rationalities of the French civilizing mission as a "will to improve". These practices produced Algerian Muslims as a backward and uncivilized indigenous population in need of reform from French citizens. One cannot speak of Algerian governmentality during the colonization of Algeria because France annexed Algeria to its territory and imposed all administrative and governmental laws and left Algeria without an administration and without a government after independence.

Chapter 4 will continue to explore the Algerian past and will focus on the state processes of Algerianisation of the newly independent nation by re-establishing connections with the Arab world and fostering national pride through the project of Arabization and pan-Arabism. The latter along with Islam have contributed in setting boundaries of post-colonial Algerian citizenship which has continually been reinvented by the Algerian state's norms of inclusion and exclusion of the other through laws of citizenship. Additionally, this chapter will explore how post-colonial citizenship has been designed as a biopolitical project which produced Algerian citizens as Muslims and Arabs and managed the wealth of the independent state and fostered the well-being of Algerians by granting them free unconditional access to welfare services.

In ***chapter 5*** **(Methodology chapter)**, I will explain how the fieldwork for this research was carried out and how the process of data gathering was conducted. I will also provide the research design including research population, profile of participants, data collection, and data analysis. My research design offers an image of data analysis using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis in terms of biopolitical governmentality which identifies three levels of analysis. The first level of analysis investigates the state technologies that were adopted since 2011 until the

present (2021) to manage the influx of Syrians to the country in the absence of a national official refugee / asylum mechanism in Algerian law. From a perspective of Foucault's governmentality, the analysis of the state's technologies will explain the strategies behind these technologies and the state's rationalities. The second level of analysis will examine power-knowledge production and modes of subjectivity of Syrian displaced people in Algeria and the paradox of knowledge production around Syrians and their status: "guest" in contrast to "a potential source of threat". This analysis will identify dominant discourses of power. The third level of analysis will discuss state welfare rationalities, "État-providence," and how the welfare system offers different rights to different categories of Syrians according to their capacity to enhance the well-being of national citizens. By doing this, this level of analysis will highlight the state biopolitical practices of care and control. The methodological chapter will also discuss ethical obstacles and limitations that I have faced during the processes of data collection and the recruitment of participants. It will also shed light on the value of the research vis-à-vis the positionality of the researcher as both an insider, being an Algerian citizen, and outsider from the perspective of being non-Syrian.

Chapter 6 is an analysis chapter which sheds light on how the principles and values of Islam and pan Arabism that were fundamental in the process of Algerianising the independent nation of post-colonial Algeria have been governing the relationship between Algerians and Syrians. A group of Syrian displaced people were trapped between the Algerian-Moroccan land borders in April 2017 and were denied entry to both countries. In June 2017, Algeria granted them access and the head of the Algerian Red Crescent declares that these "suffering bodies", Syrians, are "worthy guests" and "not refugees" in Algeria that has always hosted them as their second country. The incorporation of humanitarian support and hospitality discourses and strategies, in Algeria, has promised a high level of dignity at a societal level and a positive

public opinion to the Syrian displaced community. Acts of hospitality and the state's commitment to provide humanitarian support contributed in facilitating legal procedures and responsibilities that Syrians are expected to perform in Algeria such as the renewal of their legal documents at the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib), respecting the Algerian national law such as road traffic codes, employment laws and the like. This chapter will also focus on how the Algerian state unconditionally welcomed and offered social rights such as healthcare, education and housing to Syrians as a symbol of brotherhood that can be traced back to historical ties which started during the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri in Damascus, Syria in 1855. This chapter will, therefore, discuss if Algerian hospitality towards Syrians is a moral duty or a gift relationship. However, from a biopolitical perspective, this chapter explains how the strategy and state discourse of hospitality has been designed as a biopolitical project of protecting, preserving, and controlling the diversity of the local population. This discourse has produced Syrian displaced people as "guest" yet precludes them from: health insurance, though healthcare is free, right to mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians, and right to naturalisation and attaining Algerian citizenship after a legal period of residency in Algeria. As such, the state discourse of hospitality is a good example of a practice of both care, inclusion and exclusion.

Chapter 7 is the second analysis chapter of this thesis which will focus on Algeria's geo-political concern of potential threats of national security in the time of international terrorism and international human migration. Algeria's constant threat of international terrorism that may come from unstable countries such as Libya and Mali, and the exploitation of displaced people by terrorist groups at the borders, have led the Algerian state to close borders and impose a visa prior to arrival in January 2015 for all Syrians wishing to reside in Algeria. Security as a biopolitical state strategy has been designed as a care policy for the security of the Algerian

local population through excluding displaced people that have been categorized as “potential threats” to the well-being of the Algerian population. This securitisation of migrancy also re-shaped the state’s discourse of hospitality as a biopolitical strategy that restricted access to employment imposed limitations in terms of mixed marriages. Looking at these practices from the lens of biopolitical governmentality, the restricting of access to employment and denying mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians, illustrates the state’s efforts to manage the diversity of Algerianness and preclude non-citizens from Algerian citizenship. The state discourse of security has produced the Syrian displaced community as “a potential source of threat”. These biopolitical practices protect the homogeneity of the Algerian national community. The state’s biopolitical practices are responsible for defining the status of Syrians within Algeria and illustrates the state’s capacity to include “valuable, loyal, worthy” and exclude “invaluable, suspicious / dangerous, unworthy” lives of refugees.

Chapter 8 will conclude the thesis by summarizing the answers to the research questions, drawing attention to the sociological development of Algerianness as a cultural and societal entity and Algerian citizenship as a political entity into a biopolitical practice adopted by the state. This chapter will also sum up how strategies of hospitality, security and humanitarian support have treated Syrians and managed their flow to the advantage of the well-being of the Algerian local population. It will also site the main ideas discussed in this thesis and suggest ideas for future research.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Foundation: Biopolitical Governmentality, Citizenship and Displacement

The introductory chapter provided an overview and background of the present study by focussing on how the state's rationalities of citizenship and Algerianness as both nationalistic and normative forces have governed the norms of inclusion and exclusion of non-citizens. In addition to the state's nationalistic norms, moral values of Islam and Pan-Arabism, and the state's concerns around territorial security, became main rationalities of biogovernmental practices of *hospitality*, *securitisation*, and *humanitarianism* in the age of mass migration in the 21st century. The current chapter will provide a theoretical conceptualisation of Foucault's understanding of power, governmentality and biopolitics and how they construct the subject. These theoretical concepts are widely used in the western context, but this chapter will demonstrate and justify how they are both implicitly and explicitly embedded within a non-European context such as the Algerian socio-political scene.

2.1. Algeria's Biopolitical Governmentality: Algerianness and Algerian Citizenship as Political Objects which Substitute a National Asylum / Refugee Law in the Country

2.1.1. Power, Knowledge, and the Subject

According to Foucault's thinking, there is an intimate relation between knowledge and power. They are inseparable and they are linked to the subject. In power-knowledge relations, if power is a way of influencing a system of thought, then it produces a specific knowledge about the subject and shapes their thoughts in a particular way. For instance, at schools, although power is invisible in modern societies, one can still observe it through the scientific knowledge that is disseminated as fact and in the thoughts that pupils construct about themselves in relation to these facts. This will produce pupils as both subjects and objects of power. In this case, pupils' thoughts and feelings are not free because they are still controlled by a certain type of power. This scene of power-knowledge relation creates a state of 'subjectivation', as Foucault would call it, which allows to construct and control the subject (Foucault, 1990b, p. 28). Different mechanisms of power produce different knowledge and the more knowledge we gain about the subject, the more power we can practice over them.

According to Foucault (2005), knowledge is not objective and universal, it is rather linked to history. In his book, *The Order of Things (2005)*, Foucault argues that different historical epochs in western Europe, for instance, such as the Renaissance, Classical and Modern ages

would produce different scientific knowledge and systems of thoughts which are governed by different 'epistemes' (Foucault, 2005, p. xxiv). In his book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972)*, Foucault defines the episteme as 'something like a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape' (Foucault, 1972, p. 191). The episteme is not knowledge (*connaissance*) (Foucault, 1972, p. 192, italics in original), it is rather a set of implicit and unconscious rules that 'govern what constitutes legitimate forms of knowledge for a particular cultural period' (O'Leary & Chia, n.d, p. 04). Every epoch has its corresponding episteme that governs techniques, values and how a society thinks (Foucault in O'Leary & Chia, nd). In his view of episteme, archaeology and knowledge, Foucault sees knowledge as a historical product that is governed by unconscious epistemes that influence how people of a certain society think and how their thinking, values, and logic changes throughout time in Europe (Foucault, 1972).

In order to identify epistemes and in terms of power-knowledge relations, Foucault (1972 / 1980) shifted from archaeology to genealogy using Nietzsche's term. He argued that new scientific knowledge is directly related to a change in power relations. For example, in biomedicine, it is those in power that determine if the person is ill and needs further therapeutic treatments or not. In genealogy, Foucault investigates how history has affected the way we think, the way we punish, the way we educate and the like. Genealogy is how history has shaped the present. For instance, a shift from a visible and repressive type of power to a less visible but normalising and regulating type of power illustrates how disciplinary power and biopower have shaped the modern subject, social, political, and economic regulations and the like (Foucault, 1972 / 1980). Foucault's power-knowledge genealogy answers questions like: 'who has power? How is it exercised? What are its effects?' (Shiner, 1982, p. 390).

In Foucault's books *History of Sexuality (1990), Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977),* his new thinking about power allows us to understand that power circulates everywhere even in places where we do not expect it to be such as at schools, universities, and even science and knowledge. Power is not always violent and 'repressive', but it can be 'normalizing' and 'productive' (Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 109). Foucault's insight of power shows how power has been changing throughout time and it involves three different modes: sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower (Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, pp. 107 & 108). These modes of powers are inevitable, and they may all co-exist and overlap in the same social setting.

Traditionally, sovereign power had always been perceived as 'a mechanism of deduction' and as an exercise of power carried out by the sovereign over his subjects and had been understood as 'the right to decide life and death' (Foucault, 1990a, pp. 135, 136). For instance, in Foucault's work about *the history of sexuality* (1990a), the father of the Roman family has the right to either 'dispose' or give life to his children or slaves (Foucault, 1990a, p. 135). This was an 'archaic model' of top-down power which was a matter of 'subjugation and seizure' (Foucault in Apatinga, 2017, p. 38). Sovereign power is repressive, and it is about punishment and violence through which power can be visible such as: the state's army, police, law / juridical power and its penal styles (Foucault, 1977). On the other hand, in disciplinary power, which is more *normalising*, the display and exercise of power is more important than physical violence. Disciplinary power is also the *surveillance* of society using rules and procedures that regulate and discipline individuals and shape their behaviours (Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, emphasis added) in different settings such as in schools, hospitals and the like. Having said that, disciplinary power is invisible because it is exercised through disciplinary means through institutions such as schools and prisons, but the objects / subjects on which power is

exercised are visible (Foucault, 1977). Undoubtedly, from a Foucauldian perspective, power is not understood as 'a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state' or a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule' (Foucault, 1990a, p. 92). Instead, Foucault (1990a, p. 138) affirmed that power has shifted from 'the right to *take* life or *let* death to the power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death'. He believed an analysis, in terms of power, should cover 'force relations', 'their aims and objectives' in a particular society (1990a, pp. 92, 95).

The production of subjects differs in each type of power. In sovereign power, the body is the major target of punishment and violence. Besides, only the sovereign has the right to 'seize' and end life (Hobbes in Taylor, 2011, p. 43). For example, under sovereign power, the criminal will be punished if they commit a crime and is likely to be condemned to death (Taylor, 2011). Disciplinary power, on the other hand, can be seen as a system of knowledge that shapes the individual as both an object of power 'to be known in relation to others who can be known' and a deviant subject that can be normalised and regulated with different instruments of power (Johnston, Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 109). In disciplinary power, a criminal is less likely to face death, but their behaviour will be watched and normalised in 'the prison' or 'psychiatric' clinic for therapeutic treatments (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). In this regard, Foucault used Bentham's 18th century idea of *'the panopticon'* to demonstrate how disciplinary power and its technologies can be exercised through techniques of *regulation* and *surveillance* in order to impact the human behaviour (Foucault, 1977, p. 201, emphasis added). The panopticon is a form of a prison in a circular shape with cells and a central observation tower in the middle of it. Prisoners are inside the cells but cannot see what is inside the tower. The theory is that individuals inside the cells are more likely to be normalised and disciplined if they believe they are being watched (Foucault, 1977, p. 201 & 202). Whether or not 'the inmate' is being constantly observed, the presence of the tower in the centre of the panopticon is enough to

impact their behaviour and make them regulate their conduct. By doing this, the individual becomes ‘a part of the disciplinary system’ (Sheridan, 2016, p. 02). This act of surveillance is a central point in Foucault’s understanding of power in modern societies. This act of control and governance of the people is what Foucault referred to as ‘self-governance’, ‘self-regulation’, and ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault in Dean, 2010, pp. 17-19). However, this type of power contradicts with principles of liberalism and has negative implications on individuals because it creates a monitored society of people that think and act the same way which opposes individual liberties and original ideas (Foucault, 1982). Additionally, in this context, people are not directly confronted with power or liberty (Foucault, 1982), but they are still a part of the power system. In its relation to knowledge, disciplinary power limits the knowledge everybody will construct about themselves. Within the context of a normalising power, the modern penal system was described by Foucault as a ‘subtle, calculated technology of subjection’ (Foucault in Heilker, 1994, p. 11).

Power can be positive in being no longer ‘deductive’ in the West, for instance, and in the way it is used to ‘incite, reinforce, control, monitors, optimize and organize the forces under it’ (Foucault, 1990a, p.136). This has later been referred to as biopower (Foucault, 1990a). In summary, ‘biopolitics marks the modern move from the sovereign power over death, to the sovereign power over life, which is bio-power’ (Muller, 2004, p. 52). Biopower is another mode of Foucault’s insight on power. In modern societies, biopower is moved from violently practicing power to psychologically enforcing it via the state’s techniques and technologies. Biopower ‘exposes the structures, relations, and practices by which political subjects are constituted and deployed, along with the forces that have shaped and continue to shape modernity’ (Cisney and Morar, 2016, p. 01). As an element in the development of capitalism, biopower refers to the subjugation of bodies and the control of population through various wide

disciplines such as education, public health, housing, training, migration and the like (Foucault, 1990a, pp. 140, 143). Biopower covers two main 'poles' namely: '*anatomo-politics of the human body'* and '*biopolitics of the population'* (Foucault, 1990a, p. 139). The first focusses on 'the body as a machine' which means that disciplinary power assures 'its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its force, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, and its integration into system of efficient and economic controls' (Foucault, 1990a, p. 139). In fact, biopower is another form of regulatory power that can still use 'the same tactics employed in disciplinary power' (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). However, unlike disciplinary power that focusses on the individual as a subject / object, biopower's focus shifts to the entire population as its object (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). Another difference between disciplinary power and biopower is that disciplinary power functions through institutions, but biopower functions at a state level although still 'involved in many institutions' (Taylor, 2011, p. 45). For example: in the hospital, the disciplinary type of power would focus on deviant individual bodies and regulate them to fit into the norms (Taylor, 2011). In biopower and biopolitics, the state is concerned with administering the biological processes of the whole population such as: 'birthrate, level of health, longevity, and public health life expectancy' (Foucault, 1990a, p. 139; Taylor, 2011, p. 45).

Biopolitics and governmentality or 'the analytics of government' as Dean (2010, p. 27) would call it, are linked in the way that both frameworks of analysis focus on the exercise and practice of power on the life of the population as its object through a number of disciplines including, for instance, 'economic, social, psychological or biological, and 'patterns of migration, housing' (Dean, 2010, pp. 27 & 117 &119). Foucault's insight on governmentality involves government's rationalities and technologies as core elements in discursive analysis of research data. Governmentality also gives an understanding of 'how the government forms its

objectives' (Foucault, 2007, pp. 1-3 in Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 10). The term governmentality was first coined by Michel Foucault in his observations about aspects of security, territory and population during his lectures at Collège de France between 1977 and 1978. The term governmentality can be divided into two main terms '*govern'* and '*mentality'*, therefore, the term refers to the mentality of governance (Dean, 2011 cited in Ettlinger, 2011, p. 538). The use of governmentality to explain relationships of power between stakeholders or political actors aims at investigating how both 'truths' is produced and how things are governed (Dean, 2010, p. 27; Rajas, 2014, p. 10). Foucault (2007, p. 116) argued that 'the study of governmentality should tackle the state and population'. In order to understand how governmentality studies conceptualise government, the government becomes a matter of promoting 'welfare or the common good of a population and the economy' (Rajas, 2014, p. 12). This is connected to the notion of biopolitics and biopower (Rajas, 2014, p. 12) where the biological existence of the human body is politicized. Biopolitics represents a critical element in governmentality: 'the relation between security, territory and population' (Muller, 2004, p. 52).

2.1.2. Why Biopolitical Governmentality in the Algerian Context?

Foucault's conceptualisation of governmentality and biopolitics have been widely used in the fields of International Relations and immigration in modern states and more specifically within the European context. Walters highlights aspects that can be analysed within the intersection of Foucault's concept of governmentality in migration studies:

‘Governmentality themes and concepts are being extended to the analysis of ever more aspects of ‘new migration worlds’ (Guiraudon/Joppke 2001). To mention just a few there is the role which technological practices, experts and industries are playing in the production of borders and the management of mobility (Jeandesboz 2011; Bigo 2002; 2008; Salter 2007); the use of cultural policy as a tool of minority representation and memorialization (van Baar 2011); the way in which love and marriage become instrumentalities in calculations about the validity of a migrant’s status (D’Aoust 2013); the bureaucratic regime that produces illegality as an uncertain object and status (Inda 2006); recent changes in the accommodation and detention of asylum-seekers (Gill 2009; Darling 2011); and the counter-conducts and counter-cartographies by which migration regimes are contested on a molecular scale (Tazzioli 2014) (in Walters, 2015, p. 02)’.

In its relation to immigration studies, adopting an analysis of framework of governmentality in immigration studies will provide and understanding of the effects of immigration policies and how immigrants are being perceived. More importantly, governmentality studies provide an understanding for why immigration policies are problematised and more politicised (Rajas, 2014).

Foucault’s new understanding of power originated from a European context and was widely applied in modern states in Western Europe. However, a little attention has been paid to non-European contexts such as the Algerian context. In a modern nation like Algeria, Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics, governmentality, power-knowledge relations and modes of subjectivation can still be investigated in relation to immigration and refugee studies. Very few studies have discussed governmentality in relation to the Algerian context such as Smail’s research (2018) that investigates how discourses of language and citizenship are intertwined in Algeria. His study reveals that ‘nationalist and neoliberal discourses and ideologies have always been competing within Algeria’s linguistic scene in order to invoke different

configurations of belonging to and exclusion from the Algerian national community' (Smail, 2018, p. 53). I believe the struggle of these discourses and many others still govern the legal and normative forces of Algerian citizenship when it comes to how the state deals with the status of the Syrian displaced community in Algeria.

The state can protect the biological existence and the emotional well-being of its local citizens through biopolitical immigration and anti-migration policies (Apatinga, 2017, p. 38; Mavelli, 2017, p. 809). 'The main idea of biopolitics is … to legitimize … homogeneous society by claiming its natural character and historical evolution' (Kristensen, 2013, p.09). My research will also demonstrate how aspects of biopolitics exist within state strategies and practices of explicitly managing the flow of refugees in order to implicitly improve the well-being of the population, ensure its security within the age of mass migration, and protect the homogenous feature of Algerianness by limiting Syrians' chances to obtain Algerian citizenship. Indeed, the notion of biopolitical governmentality will uncover the state rationalities behind the strategies / discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian aid adopted by the state to manage mass migration in the 21st century. This research will also illustrate the embodiment of these rationalities through technologies. The following chart best illustrates how research data displays Algeria's biopolitical governmentality including main discourses, rationalities and technologies adopted to govern the Syrian displaced community in Algeria and manage their flow in favour of the Algerian local population.



Chart 1: Algeria's biopolitical governmentality in the age of mass migration (idea inspired from Rajas, 2014, p. 26)

In order to best read and understand the chart above, I need to clarify the terms discourse, rationalities and technologies. Within the investigation of the '*problematics of government',* the Foucauldian term of governmentality 'draws attention to a way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of populations' (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 272). This means that in order to investigate a context in terms of governmentality studies and problematics of government, techniques and their rationalities should be analysed. In their understanding of technologies and their rationalities, Rose and Miller (2010, p. 273) argue that rationalities refer to 'the discursive field within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual,

military and familial sectors'. Technologies, on the other hand, 'the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions' (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 273). This means that every state discourse is driven by state rationalities. The embodiment of the latter can be realised through the state technologies. Having said this, the above chart demonstrates how discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarianism are directed by the state's biopolitical rationalities of national territorial security, nationalism, Algerian citizenship, and Algerianness. The state's rationalities, in turn, govern the state's decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of Syrian displaced people. These discourses, political programmes and their rationalities operate through technologies of closing borders, visa restrictions, banning mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians, bureaucratic procedures, guest centres, offering full and limited access to welfare services.

2.1.3. Why Biopolitics, Algerianness and Algerian Citizenship?

If biopolitics shows the state's capacity to include and exclude refugees, then the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are informed by biological and emotional well-being of the host community (Mavelli, 2017). Additionally, if the role of biopolitics is inventing citizenship in order to better manage the population (Rygiel cited in Nyyssonen, 2018), then the biopolitical regimen can also be informed by the national identity of the host community and the nation's collective identity and its conflicting discourses. In its relation to refugeeness, biopolitics politicises both the life of refugees and the state strategies adopted to manage them (Muller, 2004). We can see how through Foucault's terminology '*The biopolitics of otherness',* the immigrant body has become a source of inspiration for immigration policies (Fassin, 2001, p.

04, italics in original text). Within the Algerian context, biopolitical governmentality is informed by conflicting discourses of normative, nationalistic, and legal forces of Algerianness and their rationalities. It precludes ordinary Syrian displaced people from attaining citizenship by granting them conditional and limited access to social welfare. Businessmen and Syrians whose ancestors relate to the family of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri either by blood or marriage were either naturalised or received official status (long-residence permits) which allowed them to receive unconditional access to welfare services and freedom of movement. Kamal (35) a shop owner in Kouba, mentioned that well-known families like 'El Jazaei'ri, El Jazaei'rli, Aal Jazaei'ri, El Amayri, El Kadiri', in Syria, were lucky in both receiving high responsibility jobs in Syria after the death of their grandfather, El Amir Abdu El-Kader, and in enjoying their legitimate right of naturalisation and receiving Algerian citizenship by descent. Their children and spouses received Algerian citizenship as well. All they needed was an official document that proves they belong to the family of El-Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri.

From a biopolitical perspective, these Syrians of Algerian origins and Syrian businessmen have been granted official status and unconditional access to social rights due to their relation to one of Algeria's most influential anti-colonial fighters and leader and because they were skilful enough to contribute into the country's economy. However, biopolitical governmentality of the local population (Algerian society) excluded Syrians that did not belong to the stated categories of businessmen and kinship group. State biogovernmental rationalities and technologies restricted their mobility, and freedom of movement outside Algeria and their access to social rights. Instead, as a gesture of solidarity between Arabs and Muslims, these Syrians are categorised as "guests" with no official status but short-residence permits that should be renewed every 45 days.

In order to understand how Algerianness has been shaped as a biopolitical force that cares for the well-being of the Algerian population by including "valuable" lives and excluding "unworthy" lives during the age of mass migration and human movement, it is essential to review the complex historiography of Algerianness, the post-colonial design of Algerian citizenship and the conflicting discourses that often overlap and conflict in state decisions and rationalities. Reviewing Algerian history will, therefore, offer an overview about how Algerianness has been shaped and constructed during the colonial and post-colonial eras and how this design may or may not have changed during the age of mass-migration, globalisation and international terrorism and its capacity to accept and include the "other": in this case, the Syrian displaced community. I argue that the Algerian colonial past and post-colonial present is both consciously and implicitly embedded in Algeria's biopolitical governmentality of refugees.

In colonial Algeria, as a part of its civilising mission that can be seen as a "will to improve", the French colonial governmentality created two main groups: people with rights (Europeans and Jews in Algeria) and colonial subjects that are deprived of rights (Algerian Muslims). The governmentality of citizenship during the French colonisation in Algeria used religion, language and ethnicity as political objects and instruments of inclusion and exclusion. In order to biopolitically care for the French community in Algeria and improving its emotional and physical well-being, French citizenship was granted to Jews, people of European origins and to Algerians that would accept European values and renounce their Muslim personal status. Under Senatus-consulte (1865) a French citizen in colonial Algeria would have the right to social welfare compared to somebody who refused to quit their Muslim personal status for French citizenship. As a reaction to these programmes of the French "will to improve", nationalist and liberal movements started in Algeria with the most influential figures namely,

El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei'ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj. In anti-colonial movements of liberation and resistance in colonial Algeria, nationalist (cultural and religious) and political discourses contributed in the preservation of Algerianness as a normative force that rejects all forms of French imperialist values and promoted the construction of Algerian citizenship as a socio-political entity after independence. After independence, Algerian citizenship was designed as a reaction to French policy, namely, the obliteration of Islam and Arabic. Before removing conditions of discrimination based on religion and gender in 1970, post-colonial citizenship in 1963 was granted only to those whose father and grandfather held a Muslim personal status. During Bouteflika's era, Algerian citizens did not take part in re-shaping and re-defining the norms and values of Algerianness in post-1962 Algeria as the case of officialising the status of Tamazight without a national poll that would represent the opinion of most Algerians and whether they agree or disagree. The state has always held power to define Algerianness and its boundaries and it is a state's decision to include or exclude non-citizens wishing to belong. For these reasons, one cannot dissociate the present from its colonial past and post-colonial present. The Algerian response to the challenge of mass migration in the 21st century, like much else in public life, also typifies this.

2.1.4. Why Syrians in Algeria?

The field of migration and refugeehood is not widely researched in Algeria and very few research papers have shed light on this phenomenon. Mohamed Saïb Musette, a migrant himself who has been naturalised for his loyalty to the Algerian state, is a key contributor in the wider field of migration studies in Algeria. He argues that Algeria has always received economic migrants and humanitarian migrants and claims that around '40 nationalities are

present in Tamanrasset' in the southern part of Algeria (Musette, 2014, p. 47). About the whole migratory situation in the country, Musette confirms that although the Algerian state has adopted securitised strategies to control its large borders and organise the flow of displaced people to the country, it has been flexible in terms the provision of basic rights to displaced communities (Musette, 2014, pp. 47 & 48).

The Migration Policy Centre in the EU (2013) declares that the history of migration from and to Algeria was mainly related to its relation to France. By the start of the 21st century, Algeria has been receiving a considerable flow of migrants. For instance, Chinese workers entered Algeria as economic migrants, while people from Western Sahara (since 1975), Palestine, Mali, Niger, Yemen, and Syria entered Algeria as forced migrants that fled their countries due to foreign occupation, political instability or civil wars. The latter group took refuge in Algeria to seek humanitarian protection and security. A Significant number of displaced people belong to the Sahrawi community. The table below shows the number of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria during the first decade of the 21st century as provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (Qasmiyeh, 2011, p. 12)

2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
155,430	155,430	155,430	146,925	170,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000

Table 1: The number of refugees in Algeria between 2000 to 2010

As table (1) above illustrates, the number of forced migrants coming from Western Sahara to Algeria decreased remarkably between 2000- 2010. In 2005, the number of immigrants flowing to Algeria fell from more than 155,000 to less than 90,000. This may be because forced migrants consider Algeria as a transit point to find their way to Europe or may be because Algeria did not grant them legal status (refugee status) through which they could have claimed their rights. By the end of December 2017, the UNHCR reported that the number of Sahrawi displaced people exceeded '175.000' (UNHCR, 2018, p. 04). This number represents Sahrawi people residing in five main refugee camps in Tindouf namely: Awserd, Boujdour, Dakhla, Laayoune, and Smara camp (UNHCR, 2018, p. 04). UNHCR reports show that the Sahrawi in-camp population was given administration over the territory of these camps. Each camp resembles to a small *wilaya* (province) with its own administration, healthcare clinics, and education settings run by refugee volunteers (World Food Program, 2019, p. 06, italics in original). While most Sahrawi refugees are grouped in camps, my fieldwork revealed that most Syrians in Algiers have chosen to rent private properties with their own money rather than staying in guest centres. Similar to the situation of my Syrian participants, the Algerian welfare system grants Sahrawi war refugees free unconditional access to social rights such as: healthcare and education, but access to formal and legal labour market remains restricted and not guaranteed (WFP, 2019, p. 06). In relation to Foucault's governmentality, the questions that arise at this stage and will be answered in the analysis chapter (chapter 7) are: why does legal access to formal employment remain restricted by the state? Is it deliberate? What might be the state's rationalities behind these state's technologies and what they might tell us about the biogovernmental strategy of governing displaced communities in Algeria?

Since 2011 and until the present (2021), the Arab world has known wide waves of social and political changes which led to violent civil struggles and revolutions which came to be known

as the Arab Spring. The revolutionary struggles and violent civil protests led to the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia (in 2011); Ali Abdullah Salah in Yemen (in 2011); Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (in 2011) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (in 2011). In Syria, Bashar Al-Assad still struggles for his government and regime since 2011. The Syrian civil war is believed to be one of the deadliest civil wars in the 21st century. By 2012, the movement's space and dimensions grew and turned into a real crisis for the Syrian people. Syrians started a large movement externally and reached surrounding countries (Lebanon, Jordan), Europe and the Greater Maghreb countries. According to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), since the time Syrian crisis started its sixth year, approximately 13.5 million people urgently needed their lives to be saved. Additionally, more than 6.5 million people were internally displaced within Syria with 5.9 million people that still struggle with difficult conditions of survival since the start of civil unrest (UNHCR, 2016). However, others chose to flee their country; the UNHCR estimates about 5 million people have sought refuge in other countries including the Arab and the European world (UNHCR, 2016).

Algeria is one of the host countries that has opened its doors and welcomed Syrians to live within its territory. Algerian authorities and national press still dispute the exact number of Syrians that fled to Algeria since 2011. The associate protection officer in UNHCR's office in Algiers, Aline Fautsch (A, Fautsch, personal communication, April 25, 2017), argues that in 2017 around 40,000 Syrians have been registered at their office in Algiers. In 2019, the number of Syrian displaced people in Algeria reached 50,000 (UNHCR, 2019). Although Algeria is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol as well as the 1969 OAU Convention (UNHCR Global Appeal, 2010-2011, p. 08), it has not yet adopted a national asylum law that should have defined the status of refugees living within its territory and their distribution within the Algerian territory (UNHCR, 2019). Having said this, UNHCR (UNHCR

Global Appeal, 2013, p. 128) has identified experts since 2012 to collaborate with the Algerian government in drafting and adopting a national asylum / refugee system that is consistent with international standards. The UNHCR also shoulders the responsibility to register asylum claims of Syrians, but it is not responsible for determining the status of refugees in Algeria. The UNHCR provides humanitarian aid and protection against illegal deportation. A national refugee mechanism in the country will, therefore, determine the legal status of Syrians in Algeria and their rights.

In my answer to why the present thesis focusses on the Syrian displaced community is to investigate what Musette considers as contradictory and complex. He states that the majority of foreign communities in Algeria enjoy legal status including political refugees because states where they come from are either in conflict, or groups are in conflict on their territory and they are supported by the UN (in Benfodil, 2017, 02). This means that these people's legal status is well defined, and they have international protection and receive international donations. Besides, Palestinians in Algeria enjoy a special protection which is not necessarily under the UN protection (Musette in Benfodil, 2017, p. 02). However, he claims that the case of Syrians is, indeed, vague and complicated. In this respect, Musette added (in Benfodil, 2017, p. 02) :

'Maintenant, si on regarde les nouvelles vagues de personnes qui arrivent et qui réclament le statut de réfugié, de quelle manière va-t-on s'y prendre ? La donne se complique davantage avec les Syriens. L'Algérie a pris une position vis-à-vis de ce problème en disant que c'est une solution politique qui réglera le conflit en Syrie, et que les opérations militaires ne peuvent qu'aggraver la situation. Est-ce que l'Algérie peut leur octroyer le statut de réfugiés ?'

'Now if we look at the waves of people arriving and claiming refugee status, how are we going to do it? The situation becomes complex with Syrians. Algeria has taken a stand that the Syrian situation is political and should

be resolved with a political solution and not military operations that will only worsen the situation. Can Algeria grant these Syrians refugee status?' (my translation from French into English).

Having said that, the present thesis starts from the question of Musette and uses Foucault's biopolitical governmentality to argue that Syrians are trapped 'at the edges of citizenship' which made them both insiders and outsiders within Algeria (Hepworth, 2015, p. 09). This is manifested in different modes of labelling Syrians as 'guest', 'brothers and sisters' and 'potential danger of national security'. These state's labels are not innocent, but they are themselves paradoxical state's strategies of camouflage for a gap in the Algerian law which could have governed Syrian displaced people in the country and identified their legal status vis-à-vis citizens (Algerians) and vis-à-vis other displaced communities in Algeria. These labels are also strategies of care and exclusion according to the state's biopolitical rationalities and practices that produced different modalities of citizenship in the Age of mass migration in Algeria.

Communities of different nationalities sought refuge in Algeria for several reasons. While for instance, Sahrawi and Palestinians fled their home countries due to occupation from foreign forces namely: Moroccan military and Israel, Syrians did not flee for the same reasons because their home country was not occupied by foreign forces but witnessed a civil war as a continuation of a wave of the so called Arab Spring which ended up with foreign interventions in the country. Although Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh provided significant research about the Sahrawi community in Algeria, I believe secondary literature about displaced people in Algeria still lacks a socio-political approach that looks at how, in the absence of a refugee law, the Algerian state has been managing the flow of war refugees. By doing this, one is not only journalistically reporting data, but they are critically questioning the state's strategies, their technologies, and their impact on the life experiences of displaced communities. For these

reasons, the present thesis has adopted a Foucauldian theoretical foundation to look at the state's governmentality of refugees and depict the rationalities behind choosing paradoxical strategies in dealing with the Syrian displaced community.

Due to the unresolved situation in their home country and the delay of decolonisation process, the displaced community from Western Sahara that sought refuge in Algeria remain dependent on the state's assistance that is delivered by the Algerian Red Crescent, and on international assistance and financial support from the UNHCR and NGOs. This has designed them as typical war refugees that are most vulnerable and in need for humanitarian support within their host state, however this was not widely reported by most participants of the Syrian cohort I interviewed. Most of them did not primarily express the need for humanitarian support, but most importantly they criticised the state's approaches that positioned them at the edges of Algerian citizenship. They demonstrated a high level of self-awareness around the identity crisis they developed, which was caused by their unknown legal status. Although the decision to grant Algerian citizenship to non-citizens is a state's decision, these Syrians rejected the fact that the Algerian state adopted exceptional restrictions which have precluded them from obtaining well-defined legal status either by naturalisation (after 7 years of continuous residence in Algeria) or by long-residence permits that are renewed every 2 years, travel documents and the freedom of mobility outside Algeria. Besides, while the state adopts one main technology of hosting the Sahrawi displaced community in five refugee camps in Tindouf, 'Syrians were hosted in guest centres and not refugee camps', Asma, an Algerian state official at the Foreigner Office in central Algiers clarified. Refusal to label Syrians as legitimate refugees tells a lot about how the state define them and what type of knowledge the state disseminates around these people. For these reasons, conducting a research with the Syrian community provides an interesting socio-political scene where the state has adopted exceptional strategies to manage the flow of Syrians according to different state rationalities

that cared and excluded them at the same time. The questions that could be asked here are: why does the state adopt a different strategy and technology to host displaced Syrian people? What might be the state's rationality behind this policy? What might be the privilege that the Syrian community enjoy in Algeria? And what can this tell us about the exercise of power and the knowledge produced around people of the Syrian community? In terms of power-knowledge relations, how does the state's strategies and technologies construct Syrians as governed subjects within the Algerian context, and how do these strategies define and shape the way Syrians construct knowledge about themselves? If these subjects are governed according to a specific power, then what could be their position within the Algerian context? What would the state's technologies and strategies say about the nature of Algerian citizenship and its norms of inclusion and exclusion in relation to citizenship rights?

The Algerian context is totally different from the western context when it comes to dealing with refugeeness and displacement of people in a number of points including colonial and post-colonial history that affects the present state decisions, state rationalities of liberalism and neo-liberalism, state technologies, state strategies and discourses around refugees. Because there is no national asylum / refugee law that would have been used to analyse the situation in Algeria, I will investigate biopolitical governmentalities through a set of relations between subjects, practices, rationalities and discourses of the Algerian state in dealing with the flow of Syrians and their life experiences. The official journal of the Algerian Republic states the following article regarding refugees' entry to Algeria and classifies them as foreigners:

Chapitre II Art.7- Sous réserve des accords internationaux ratifiés par l'état algérien, relatifs aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, tout étranger arrivant sur le territoire algérien est tenu de se présenter aux autorités compétentes, chargées du contrôle aux postes frontières, muni d'un passeport délivré par l'Etat dont il est ressortissant, ou de tout autre document en cours de validité reconnu par l'Etat algérien comme titre de voyage en cours de validité et

assorti, le cas échéant, du visa exigible délivré par les autorités compétentes et d'un carnet de santé conformément à la règlementation sanitaire international (Loi n° 08-11 du 25 juin 2008. - Relative aux conditions d'entrée, de séjour et de circulation des étrangers en Algérie - JO N° 36 du 02 Juillet 2008. Pp. 4-10).

Chapter II Art. 7. Subject to international agreements ratified by the Algerian state, relating to refugees and Stateless persons, all foreigners arriving in Algerian territory shall be required to submit to the competent authorities, control posts at frontier posts, equipped with a Passport issued by the State of which they are national, or any other document in the process of validity recognized by the Algerian state as a valid travel document and with, where applicable, the visa required to be issued by competent authorities and a health booklet in accordance with international health regulations (My translation from French to English).

Principally, Article 7 in chapter II states refugees' compliance as they enter the Algerian territory, however their status and their rights are not detailed. Due to the gap in Algeria's national law (UNHCR, 2019), Algeria adopted different strategies to welcome and manage Syrians in the country. As a result of this, their status remains subject to controversial debate among Syrians and Algerian state officials. A very important question that should be raised at this point, is: what is the status of Syrians in Algerian law? Lister used the terminology of exclusions from 'without' to describe immigration policies i.e., immigration policies are measurements of excluding foreigners from national membership (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p.126). Indeed, immigration policies tend to exclude the other from the us: the 'other' being the non-citizen and the 'us' being the national citizens (Anderson, 2013). The exclusionary immigration mechanism may be based on class, gender, and/or ethnic group.

By definition, asylum seekers and refugees are unable to return to their home countries as long as they are not safe and secure enough for them to return to and live in. When they arrive at

their host states, they need to establish a good rapport not only with the state but with the local community as well. Syrians living in Algeria are not recognized as citizens of the Algerian state; therefore, their rights are limited, and they are expected to have certain responsibilities towards the state and the Algerian local community. For instance, as non-legally recognized citizens, they do not participate in the political life of the Algerian state such as voting or taking part in elections. The question that should be asked is: what is the status of Syrians in Algeria and what rights and duties do they have accordingly?

Unlike the Sahrawi displaced people that are given more attention at both national and international levels compared to other displaced communities, this research has chosen the Syrian displaced community that has been living in the capital Algiers, since 2011 as its target research population and a main source of data whose presence and influence within the Algerian context had been simplified, if not marginalised. A significant number of Syrians who have been living and working in Algiers reside and work in different provinces such as Baba Hassan, Dali Ibrahim, Bir Khadem, Kouba, Bab El Zouar, Staouali, and Sidi Yahia. Another reason of choosing the Syrian community is although their significant number in Algeria (more than 50,000), they have been given less attention among social researchers and experts who are interested in immigration and refugee studies. The level of attention given to Syrians in Algeria is subject to different explanations: it is either because they have been successfully integrated within the Algerian local community to the point that they may not have faced any major challenges, social exclusion or racism or because there may be controversial practices and strategies adopted by the state in the absence of a national asylum / refugee mechanism in the country that does not allow Syrians to claim their rights in Algeria. Another reason can be deduced from the viewpoint of my Algerian participant at the level of the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) in central Algiers, Asma (50) who was previously a lawyer, who argued

that the Algerian state has deliberately protected Syrians from being exploited or involved in any hidden foreign political agendas. However, I believe that the Syrian community will significantly enrich the field of migration and refugee studies in Algeria especially because my fieldwork revealed that the state's biogovernmental strategies of managing the flow of Syrian displaced people consciously and unconsciously led to an identity crisis among them.

2.2. Research Significance, Gap, and Contribution of the Thesis to Knowledge

Before stating the contribution of my research, it is important to draw your attention on the quote with which I opened my thesis. The quote is by Tahar Djaout, an Algerian writer who was assassinated during the Algerian civil war in 1990s. He said: 'it is a tough job being Algerian' (Tahar Djaout * (quoted in Šukys, 2007: 14) in Benrabah, 2013, p. vi); my experience taught me that it is even harder being an Algerian *social researcher who is conducting sociological research in Algeria*. The main reason why I mentioned this was due to the obstacles I faced during my fieldwork and the difficulties I experienced due to the unfamiliarity of sociological research works that involve the local society in Algeria. Additionally, my data collection journey was not easy because of the difficulties I encountered to gain the trust of the Algerian cohort despite the fact of being Algerian myself (see chapter 5 for further details). My data collection journey taught me that the Algerian context as a space for sociological research is a securitised space that is heavily impacted by bureaucratic obstacles. Interviewing Algerian state officials gave me the impression that even the data around displaced people and the state's security measures are highly securitised. By contrast, my experience with the Syrian cohort in

Algeria did not reveal that the Syrian community is securitised or highly censored by the state. Even my Syrian participants that held expired Syrian passports and stopped renewing their Algerian residence permits experienced liberty of speech, thoughts and freedom of movement within the Algerian territory. This group of Syrians could still access employment, though illegal and restricted. Additionally, and most importantly, the quote reflects my literature review journey that was widely impacted by the lack of resources especially those written by Algerians. Having said that, many of literature review works I used were written by European and American scholars. Very few were written by Algerian sociologists that lived in Algeria whose writings reflect the history of Algeria without being driven by linguistic or political agendas.

The present thesis contributes to the evolution of an Algerian sociology as a broad field by specifically providing a qualitative evidence about the experience of a partially integrated minority within the Algerian context. Faradji (2015) argues that there is still a lack of social research projects that involve civil society and political power together to analyse a social phenomenon. Research in the social sciences is always dependent on and monitored by the Algerian state itself. He further stated that:

'The State defines not only research subjects according to their expectations and interests of time, usually from a utilitarian perspective, but also closely monitoring production areas: universities, institutes, research centres ... in addition, the dissemination of knowledge, because the books and are edited by domestic companies under the direction of policy makers, is closely monitored.' (Faradji, 2015, p. 355).

As far as this study is concerned, it gains a considerable significance as it investigates and sheds light on a neglected sociological aspect of Algerian contemporary studies, which is the field of

immigration and refugeehood, rather than just journalistically reporting the phenomena and reacting to events (Gouldner, 1973). By pursuing the problem, exploring and recording life-experiences and the inner nature of people and societies (D'Alton, 1971), this research provides an understanding of the situation of Syrian displaced people in Algeria and how the state has been managing their flow since their arrival to the country in 2011. This study is also an opportunity for future research to emerge in the field of refugeeness and migration about unfamiliar groups and diverse moralities (Gouldner, 1973).

Examining the voice of Syrians will offer what is missing in sociological research in Algeria, as Faradji (2015) argues. Syrians' voices will bridge the gap between theoretical language, social reality and the state power that monitors the relation between state practices and their implications in real-life situations. The significance of citizenship as a constitutional / social process is used to figure out the types of relationships that exist between the Syrian displaced community and both the state and people in Algeria. It will also reflect on challenges of social inclusion or exclusion that Syrians have faced as non-citizens in Algeria. The responses of Syrian displaced people, their reactions and experiences offer an interpretation of the factors that lead to either inclusion or exclusion of foreigners from the Algerian community.

2.2.1. Contribution to the Algerian Contemporary Studies

The subjects of Algerian nationalism and Algerian national identity have always been interesting to numerous Francophone, Arabophone, and Anglophone authors such as Benjamin Stora, Hugh Roberts, Jonathan Hill, Mouloud Mammeri, Ahmed Ben Noàman, Assia Djebbar,

Farhat Abbas, Malika Rahal, James McDougall and many others. The majority of Algerian studies have adopted political, cultural-historical orientations or literature-based approaches. Specialists in literature, history, anthropology as well as nationalist ideologues have discussed the presence of Algerianness (*Algérianité*) in Algerian literary texts and Algerian nationalism that evolved during the twentieth century. Specialists also focus on the notion of Algerian identity that was built as a reaction to the French orientalist policy and the French civilising mission (mission civilisatrice) which tended to obliterate all constituents of Algerianness such as the Arabic language and Islam.

In her work about the culture of being Algerian entitled 'The nation's 'unknowing other': three intellectuals and the culture(s) of being Algerian, or the impossibility of subaltern studies in Algeria' published in 2003, Fanny Colonna claims that as descriptions by state makers of nationhood, the state's description of Algerianness is imaginary, however, Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri, and Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah have attempted to explain Algerianness differently by reflecting on 'the questions of nation, society, history and culture' (Colonna, 2003, p. 158). Mostefa Lacheraf, for example, a diplomat and constitutional theorist of the Algerian regime, interpreted Algerianness as a cultural entity from a social and a historical perspective. Colonna (2003, p. 159) argues that Lacheraf's works entitled *L'Algérie, nation et société* and *Des Noms et des Lieux: Mémoires d'une Algérie oubliée* written in 1965 and 1998, respectively, reflect his experience as a *socially and historically situated person and not merely as a political voice'* (Colonna, 2003, p. 159, emphasis in original text). Another important literary text by Lacheraf is *Les Temps Modernes which*, to Colonna, represents

'… a model of penetrative understanding on localised Algerian societies and their capacity for self-direction', their consciousness of ends and means; on 'spoken languages which are more than dialects', on the 'disconcerting totality of individual cases' which constitutes village culture; and on this very culture, which, under colonialism,

'retrenches and which only, henceforward, religious tradition, itself vulnerable, appears to defend'- all this speaks all too eloquently to researchers who have gone to study these societies at first hand (Colonna, 2003, p. 159)'.

According to Colonna, the full human reference for Algerian historicity is only possible in the defensive mode, i.e. only religion offers the people a recuperative mode of existence under colonialism. What Lacheraf did, was a study of his own society at first by focussing on his languages, different local dialects, culture, religion, historical places and reflecting on his own experiences without socially studying how the state imagination of Algerianness is designed and manifested in Algerian society.

Mouloud Mammeri, an Algerian novelist and a linguist from Kabylia region (Djurjura), focusses on the 'Berber question' by reflecting on his cultural heritage: the Tamazight dialect and grammar in his novels and linguistic works (Colonna, 2003, p. 161). In his works, Mammeri aims to show that 'the assumptions about Berbérité as an archaic, immobile, self-reproducing peasant culture should disappear' (Colonna, 2003, p. 161). Instead, he always believed that Berbérité is a cultural heritage of the Algerian national identity. Mammeri's lecture in Tamazight language entitled: *Poèmes kabyles anciens* was banned in March 1980 in Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia region in Algeria (Maas, 2014, p. 149, italics in original text). His lectures were claimed to be 'threatening to the public order' (Maas, 2014, p. 149) and the event of his ban marked the start of a Berber spring in Algeria. The Berber spring in Algeria was a reaction to the policy of Arabisation and was a strong political and civil claim that the essence of Algerianness is Berbérité or at least should be Arabité and Berbérité. Maas confirms that the Berber spring was 'a redefinition of Berber self-identification in relation to the Algerian state (2014, p. 149)'. Following the Berber spring, the Tamazight language gained its national status within the Algerian context in 2002. This decision of approving Tamazight language as a

national language signifies the approval of Berbérité as a component of Algerianness along with Arabité.

Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah, on the other hand, is an Algerian official *salafi* historian influenced by a Badissian thinking and his reformist organisation, the Association des Ulama Musulmans Algériens: AUMA (Algerian Muslim Scholars Association). He published a number of articles in several volumes in the Algerian official press such as *'Cultural History of Algeria' (Ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir al-thaqafi)* in 1970, in which he discusses the cultural patrimony of Algeria: the Arab and Islamic heritage. Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah criticised the viewpoints of Mostefa Lacheraf and Mouloud Mammeri because to him, Algeria is an Arab and a Muslim nation. His appreciation of Arabic language and Islamic heritage is clear in his critique of Lacheraf and Mammeri and his accusation to both of being westernised in the following quote:

'As for those Algerians who received a uniquely French education [and no doubt he means precisely our two other authors], they separated themselves, or almost, from their roots and their origins, losing all contact with Arabic documents and manuscripts, and even with their genealogical tables, all of them established in Arabic throughout the different periods of the country's history. *Such kinds of Algerians were therefore in no sense fit to write the cultural history of their country* (Colonna, 2003, p. 165, italics in original text)'.

The literary works of Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah represent a strong political and cross-cultural conflict. In his critique of Lacheraf and Mammeri, Sa'adallah stated that Islam and Arabic are religious and cultural identities for every Algerian. Sa'adallah's work can still be classified as anti-colonial literature of nationalism and it can still be considered a reaction to colonial violence that was practiced over Algerians and particularly

Muslims and Arabs through France's citizenship laws in Algeria. In this respect, Frantz Fanon (1965, p. 67 in Young, 2001, p. 302) describes the importance of violence in movements of freedom especially in Algeria by claiming that 'the colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence'. However, in Mammeri's works, the feeling of subjection to violence continues even after Algeria's independence. His appreciation of the Berber identity is a strong reaction to the policy of Arabisation which shaped the politics of Algerianness in Islam and Arabité only. Cultural and ethnic solidarity among Berbers saved the socio-cultural crisis in Algeria and has today resulted in recognising Berbérité as an element equal in status to Arabité in the national identity of Algeria.

The politics of Algerianness still lie between the axis of tradition and modernity. The traditional side signifies the anti-colonial attitude of nationalism and the modern side is the post-colonial feature of Algerianness which is still not decolonised from its past. The works of the three writers: Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah, show how the absence of a sociological aspect in their literary works signifies a partial decolonisation of the self. In this regard, Colonna (2003, pp. 158 &168) argues that it is still difficult to answer the question: 'what is being Algerian?' 'from inside Algeria' although the legitimacy of literary works published by Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu'l Qasim Sa'adallah is undeniable. The three authors' works can still be criticised for being subjective in interpreting cultural history and the cultural patrimony of Algerianness (*Algérianité*) because each one of them interpreted the meaning of Algerianness as a personal experience according to their personal racial / ethnic, cultural, linguistic, political and ideological orientations.

Despite an extensive survey of views about the meaning of Algerianness, Rahal (2012) still claims that there is a limited access to modern Algerian national history. The contemporary socio-cultural fragmentation of *Algérianité* remains unresolved. Few researchers in post-colonial studies have attempted a systematic analysis of contemporary Algeria by examining the structural impact of socio-cultural ideas but no work has studied Algerianness as a normative and a political entity and its capacity to include or exclude foreigners through the lens of outsiders and through the perception of non-citizens, who live in Algeria. An explanation of boundaries of Algerianness is overdue. In the present thesis, I am offering a sociological interpretation to the meaning of Algerianness based on social and constitutional challenges of inclusion / exclusion that the Syrian displaced community has faced in Algeria.

2.2.2. Contribution to Refugee Studies and Citizenship Studies

The present research provides an insight into the study of refugeehood, in general, and more specifically into refugeehood within the Algerian context which is marginalised in academic research and mainly in the field of social sciences. The extremely limited number of published research, if none that have dealt with Syrian refugees in Algeria, proves that the aspect of human migration in Algeria is undiscovered by both Algerian and foreign researchers. Additionally, this shows that their impact on society, politics, and economy is underestimated. This research will, therefore, contribute to the field of refugee studies by shedding light on the experience of Syrians in Algeria who found themselves at the intersection of paradoxical state strategies and discourses: hospitality, security, and humanitarian support. Discourses of liberalism or neo-liberalism govern state policy in Europe, America, Australia, and other white

majority nations. These discourses did not appear in the Algerian context. However, Algeria's strongest relation to its past and its heroic war of liberation continues to dominate public debate.

The conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship is different from the Western model of citizenship. Unlike the Western model of citizenship that, until very recently, has adopted values of cosmopolitanism, the Algerian modal is nationalistic, if not patriotic, and is still dependent on Algeria's colonial past. The state official at the level of Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib), Asma, expressed a normative but ambiguous requirement of patriotic sentiment for Algerian citizenship holders. She stated that an ideal Algerian citizen should always be ready to fight for the state's security against external threats as their ancestors (*el Moudjahidin*) did during the French occupation in Algeria and the Algerian revolutionary war [… el jazaei'ri lazem ykoun dayman msta'ad ano yafdi blado b roho mitl ma amlo jdoudna el mudjahidin ayam el isti'emar el Faranci w tawra el jazaei'riya…]. This dimension of Algerian citizenship fits in what Carens calls a psychological dimension of citizenship in which the feeling of belonging 'is connected through one's sense of emotional attachment, identification and loyalty' (Carens, 2000 in Weil, 2011, p. 616). For instance, on August 25th, 2020 and by presidential decree, the Algerian state decided to grant Pierre Audin the Algerian citizenship (Le Journal officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2020, p. 22). Pierre Audin is the son of Maurice Audin, a teacher of mathematics at the University of Algiers and a French activist who was a victim of a state crime committed by the French colonial regime. Maurice was tortured and murdered by French soldiers at the age of 25 in 1957 in Algeria just because he fought for justice and independence from colonial rule. Until now, his dead body is never found ("My father was tortured…", 2018). To pay tribute and express gratitude for Maurice Audin after Algeria's independence, "La Place Maurice Audin" in central of Algiers is a place that holds his name as an honour to his soul after his death for Algeria.

Additionally, Algeria's gesture of granting citizenship to Maurice's son, Pierre, signifies that Algerian citizenship is often considered as a privilege, as opposed to a right, granted to those who showed support and loyalty to Algeria in the revolutionary war against France. Granting Algerian citizenship to Pierre Audin also reveals that the nature of Algerian citizenship is not about just being an Arab or a Muslim, it is rather about loyalty and sacrifices for Algeria as a nation. Thus, non-Muslims and non-Arabs can still enjoy citizenship, as in the case of Audin's son.

Having argued that Algeria's citizenship is seen as a privilege, Algeria's conceptualisation of citizenship gives limited chances for non-citizens to acquire it. This makes Algerian citizenship different in nature from projects of cosmopolitan European citizenship (moral or political) that emerged around the 2000s as a 'post-nationalist' tradition of 'global distributive justice' in the age of globalisation (Kamminga, 2017, p. 01). The cosmopolitan model of citizenship does not necessarily fit into the Algerian context. Cosmopolitan Europe advocates 'developing international law, advocating democracy and human rights, providing global financial aid and humanitarian assistance, and boosting global climate policy' (Kamminga, 2017, p. 01). When it comes to issues related to citizenship and refugees, cosmopolitan egalitarianism theorists adopt the idea of open borders and non-exclusion to outsiders since they believe in equality, dignity, sharing interests and benefits within a moral framework between citizens and non-citizens *despite the considerable inequalities at the economic, political, social or environmental levels.* This underpins the free movement of people and ideas within the context of globalisation. Because the concept of egalitarian rights makes the individual belong not only to their local communities but to the world / global community, egalitarian theorists claim that people should learn to co-exist peacefully in the world. A cosmopolitan perspective rejects the politics of the nation-state system and argues that borders are unjust, arbitrary and artificial.

This leads to the conclusion that all citizens are citizens within the world and within their national communities (Held, 2010).

From a minimalist lens, the conception of human rights and global justice is more problematic during the age of globalization in the contemporary world than ever before. Global justice is when people get enough, not the minimum, and come to lead their life in dignity. If people share the same resources even if they are enjoying a decent minimum, the minimalist approach tells us that this is not enough, and it is unjust. The minimalist approach is all about securing at least the basic rights and standards of living for everyone within individual societies and states and not within the global community (Armstrong, 2012, p. 37). In terms of citizenship rights, minimalist proponents suggest that citizens should enjoy equal national citizenship within their nation-states but does not necessarily guarantee that they would enjoy global citizenship equally (Armstrong, 2012).

Brown (in Kamminga, 2017, p. 02) criticises the cosmopolitan project of the EU: both morally or politically, the project is still 'inconsistent with application of the freedoms of cosmopolitan right and the laws of hospitality to non-EU citizens and its outward human rights policies [are] distorted by dubious economic behaviour'. Moral cosmopolitanism entails strong commitments to egalitarian principles at the level of the world's community such as justice, openness, and the recognition of others' cultural identities (Nussambaum, 1996 in Kamminga, 2017). Nagel (2015, p. 119 in Kamminga, 2017, p. 04) states that political cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, accounts for the fact that 'the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty'.

Cosmopolitanism often conflicts with the phenomenon of statelessness. People who are stateless belong to no state in terms of legal formal relations with a nation-state, they have no documentation of their legality as recognised citizens of a particular state, and they have no civic or political engagement and identification. In her book, Abrahamian (2015, p. 16) shows different cases of stateless people, known as 'bidoon', and how their status had been dealt with as a matter of business and trade. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), decided to buy bidoon people Comorian citizenship and passports. However, problems that arise in the light of this practice: why did not the UAE grant bidoon people Emirati citizenship instead of buying them Comorian citizenship? More importantly, how can the bidoon accept citizenship of a state that they do not know, do not belong to and have no relation with? What about the sense of belonging, loyalty to nation- state and nationalism? Abrahamian shows how all these points melted in the global trade of citizenship (2015). I believe that the idea of cosmopolitanism along with globalisation are theoretically acceptable in the sense that individuals represent the core unit of moral concerns rather than states and they are subject to international law. However, these utopian ideas are impossible because citizens are directly governed by nation-states and they have to comply with the national law in their day-to-day practice rather than referring to international law.

Unlike supporters of cosmopolitanism, I agree with Kamminga (2017, pp 01, 02) that the project of making the EU a cosmopolitan order and polity in the age of globalisation is no more than a utopian and an idealist idea which is not likely to be realised due to different reasons and the subject of hospitality of non-EU citizens should be discussed among EU members. The main reason is that the conceptualisation of cosmopolitan Europe is limited to the EU region and to EU citizens. The main goal of the EU is 'global peace and security of Europeans in a broad sense, rather than global distributive justice' as a conventional cosmopolitan concept

(Kamminga, 2017, p. 02). From an insider point of view, for the EU citizen, 'Europe is perceived as a protector of human rights'; however, from a perspective of an outsider, of a non-EU citizen such as an African citizen, Europe is seen as a 'fortress' (Schlenker 2013, pp. 30, 34–35; Baban 2013, pp. 227, 231 in Kamminga, 2017, p. 07). In fact, the EU principles of cosmopolitan democracy and distributive justice are declining, and the EU is dominated by resurgent nationalism. Based on the reaction of EU state elites to the phenomenon of human movement and the flow of non-EU refugees, one can arguably characterise even the minimalist accommodation of asylum as essentially unjust, exclusive, and still limited to people within the EU territorial space. This is the case especially after European states decided to 'strengthen their immigration policies and tighten borders towards people coming from 3rd world countries' (Kamminga, 2017, pp. 07).

This study unveils how Algerian citizenship and immigration policies have adopted nationalism and security as state rationalities to protect the Algerian national community when adopting a formal policy / strategy of accepting and integrating displaced Syrians since 2011. When civil conflict first ignited in Syria, Algeria adopted a welcoming approach of *hospitality* that granted access to Syrians unconditionally and without a visa prior to arrival. In the power-knowledge relation, the production of the refugee body is subject to different binary images. For example, the Algerian *hospitality* approach produced Syrians as "guests". Although the "guest" status is not official, it offered eligibility to unconditional social rights. By the start of 2015, however, Algeria changed its approach and closed its borders due to a constant threat of terrorist groups from neighbouring countries such as Mali and Libya. The Algerian minister of Foreign Affairs, Sabri Bougadoum, has recently stated that Algeria's national security is a part of Libya's national security and the national unity of its neighbouring countries (Rédaction AE, 2020). Incidents such as the terrorist attack in Ain Amenas gas plant in Teguentourine in south-

eastern part of Algeria in 2013 and the discovery of a spying network led by undocumented migrants in Ghardaia province in 2017 have contributed to the Algerian state's adoption of restrictive regulations when it comes to granting access to displaced people. As such, Syrians became subject to investigation before gaining their entry visa.

2.3. Social Value of the Thesis

This research does not offer a model of a national mechanism of asylum / refugees for Algeria, instead, it bridges the gap between the state's intentions and practices in an attempt to explore the societal situation of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Benrabah (2013, p. xiii) claimed that Algerians developed chauvinism and xenophobia towards others because of the socio-political ideologies that tended to create a homogeneous society through the process of Arabisation of the state which lately gave birth to Islamic fundamentalism and the Black decade (civil war in 1990s). However, Ayman, a Syrian who has been living in Algeria since 2011, states that the majority of Syrian displaced people did not experience any acts of discrimination, social exclusion or any behaviour that would threaten their human dignity and security at a societal level. As an activist and a previous journalist who took part in the civil and political opposition against the Syrian regime in 2011, Ayman believed that people in Algeria have more freedom of speech compared to people in Syria. Therefore, the present research can be considered as a research that documents Syrians' voices about the legal challenges, they have been facing in Algeria due to an absence of a refugee national mechanism in the country.

Chapter Three: French Colonial Discourse in Algeria: Historical, Social and Political Power Games

'Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European people and culture' (Said, 1985, p. 07).

'France made little efforts to convert Muslims of Algeria to Christianity, but she did try to replace their language by her own, and she did so hastily and without bestowing to real citizenship in exchange' (Amin Maalouf, 2003: 133 in Benrabah, 2013, p. 21)

'Algeria our country, Islam is our religion, Arabic our language' (Abd-el Hamid Ibn Badiss in Vince, 2015, p. 44)

Algerianness (*Algérianité*) has been a special subject of investigation in Third World studies of nationalism, as Frantz Fanon's call for decolonisation of Africa in the twentieth century shows. During the colonial era (1830-1962), Algerianness, as a normative force was formed as a reaction to the French orientalist policy (cultural, religious, linguistic, educational, legal and administrative) that reflected the Republic's ideal of enacting the French civilising mission (la mission civilisatrice). According to French orientalist thinking, the recognisably modern form of the civilising mission was to be implemented for a backward people through education, efficient administration, and citizenship laws. The slogan of the French mission was "*Algérie française" (French Algeria).* These initiatives can be related to the *"will to improve*". I have to say that one cannot speak about Algerian governmentality during the French colonial period because colonial Algeria, unlike Morocco and Tunisia during colonisation, was annexed to France and therefore left without a choice to elect its proper government or set up its administration. However, we can talk about acts of resistance against French colonial governmentality in terms of movements of nationalism (political, cultural and armed). This means the French presence in Algeria was a brutal colonisation, while Tunisia and Morocco were considered as 'protectorates' of the French regime (Cogneau, Dupraz, Mesplé-Somps, 2019, p. 04).

In the world of development, the 'will to improve' is when a group of people are in charge of the development of another group in terms of their welfare, social, economic and political

policies and relations (Li, 2007, p. 04). Li referred to this group as 'trustees' that can be planners, administrators, state officials, politicians (Li, 2007, p.04). Undoubtedly, this can be observed in colonial times when French authorities intervened in the life of the colonised, native population, and produced all kinds of control, discipline and even contradictions (Li, 2007). Within the Algerian context, French colonial policies cared for Europeans and Jews in Algeria and favoured their wellbeing over Muslims that were completely marginalised. Li (2007, p. 07) argues that in order to operationalise the 'will to improve', the first procedure that is involved is what Foucault called in his concept of governmentality, 'problematization', which is to identify a problem to be solved. The second stage which she (Li, 2007, p. 07) called 'rendering technical' involves designing a technical matrix in which that problem can be observed and identified. The third stage involves designing a plan in order to solve the identified problem in the interests of the wellbeing of the population (Li, 2007). These programs cannot be vague, but they must be translated into programmes that can be implemented in aspects of life. The French civilising mission in Algeria can also be referred to as a form of disciplinary power that was exercised through militaries, educational systems, administrative, legal and civil laws, prisons and the like. This demonstrates the relation between power and knowledge by which the French regime created manipulated Algerian subjects / objects. The reason why I used both subjects and objects in describing Algerians in the French colonial policy is because, first, the colonial power had to study the Algerian society as its object to know more about it by sending sociologists and anthropologists to the country. After fulfilling the task of defining the object, the French regime had to design a disciplinary system under which the Algerian society can be subjected, manipulated and controlled. The educational system or French schools as means of disciplinary power, for instance, disseminated their knowledge that Algeria is a French territory and Algerians should be westernised by all means. As such, the French colonial practices manifested themselves in:

banning Arabic language at schools, religious schools and administrations, suppressing the practice of Islam by punishing religious leaders, and finally turning indigenous Arab and Muslim people into French subjects in contrast to the Algerian Jewish community that gained legal recognition as citizens through naturalisation. The outcome of French colonial governmentality created unsettled indigenous people and resulted in religious fears and ethnic struggles that still exist in post-colonial present times. My research data reveals that Algerian citizenship and nationality and the state practices in dealing with non-citizens in the 21st century are still shaped by the Algerian colonial past. Having said this, the present chapter provides a critical account for how Algerianness was culturally and politically re-formed during the colonial period and describes how Algerianness was shaped as a reaction to the French scheme of colonial power by focussing on the contribution of three main figures that have a formative place in national consciousness: El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, Messali Hadj and Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss. Resisting the discipline of French regime, these men's efforts provided a defining background for political, cultural and religious ideologies that have since defined the boundaries of Algerianness when it comes to religion, language and Arab ethnicity.

A simple way of defining nationalism would be the possession of any sentiments of loyalty to a particular nation (Kaplan & Herb, 2008). However, a more concrete definition in the interests of analysis is that nationalism can be defined as a set of doctrines, ideas and sentiments which could be oriented either by economic, political or socio-cultural principles (Breuilly, 1993, p. ix; Hill, 2009; Özkırımlı, 2010). Breuilly argues that 'one nationalist doctrine may assert that the nation is a matter of active, subjective commitment while another may insist that the nation is a racial or linguistic or religious community constituted independently of the opinions of its members (Breuilly in Balakrishnan 1996, p. 148-149)'. Whilst nationalism is arbitrary and natural, it should not be taken for granted. Instead, modern nations and nationalism are the

products of modern processes such as capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularism, and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic states (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 72).

Algeria's modern nation has been continually built as a reaction to French colonialism since the 19th century. The "fly-whisk incident" has been considered a turning point in the history of Algeria; this episode formed the pretext for occupation lasting a hundred and thirty-two years. Its history can be traced back to the time when the French Consul Pierre Deval met Dey Hussein in Algiers in April 1827 (Toperich, Boukaila, Roberts, 2019). After Dey Hussein sent an invoice to King Charles X to negotiate the situation in which France was deep in debt to Algeria, to the tune of fourteen million francs (Shillington, 2005), the French Consul refused to discuss the matter. According to a popular myth, Dey Hussein lost his temper and struck the French Consul with a fly-whisk (Tarvin, 2009; Hashmi, 2012). After this diplomatic incident, the French naval force responded by blockading the port of Sidi Fredj in Algiers for three years. By June 1830, the French troops started expanding from the coast to the southern areas that marked the start of a brutal colonisation to Algeria.

Algerian people have always had a sense of belonging to a nation, but it came late (Heggoy, 1968) because the notion of modern nationalism moved beyond culture and language and adopted a political ideology as its primary engine especially after the two World Wars. Algerians waited until political nationalistic movements started in the 20th century. The Algerian modern nation, as with many other nationalisms, emerged due to the efforts of elites that shaped the boundaries of Algerianness. Heggoy (1968) claims that the idea of an Algerian nation with united inhabitants did not exist before the French conquest; during Ottoman rule, Algerian society was a traditional Muslim society of Arab and Berber tribes that were respected

and ‘governed by Muslim rulers’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 567). Unlike the Ottoman era, during the French occupation, Algerian dwellers emigrated to Tunisia and other Muslim lands because to an Algerian, being governed by a non-Muslim ruler is an aberration from the ideals of the faith (Heggoy, 1968).

Generally, the Ottomans’ approach of influencing and challenging local cultural, political and societal certainties of Algerians were based on ‘containment and domestication, flattery and appreciation of elites and scholars’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, pp. 567-568). This approach also assisted Ottomans in gaining a ‘good relationship with cultured Algerians and elites’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 567). However, during the era of French occupation, people’s local cultural, religious and political spheres were approached with brutality, exclusion, ban of religious schools and the weakening of their legitimacy, the deprivation of rights, and the oppression and exile of Algerian scholars and elites. Having said this, it can be argued that the collective national identity, Algerianness, was primarily governed by Islam as its legitimating narrative. As long as Islam was respected and its status within the state and society was protected, Algerianness was preserved. This is how Algerianness was kept homogeneous and how social and religious bounds were not broken. Indeed, ‘the initiative of respecting religious authority and legality provided the Ottomans with a strong foothold in Algeria’ and made them achieve their ‘interests in the region’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 567).

After the French invasion, native Algerians started sporadic native uprisings and local resistance since the 19th century which did not provide a recognisably political form of nationalism to popular discontent with the French political and administrative rule; instead, it encouraged future intellectuals towards resistance and opposition to French colonisation. El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri had a prominent role in shaping the religious content of

Algerian nationalism and he acted as a source of inspiration for nationalists that would come afterwards. To him, *Jihad* or the holy war was neither a matter of making Christians convert into Islam nor harming them; it was rather a mission of defending Islam and Muslims, Algeria and Algerians against the outsiders: the French (Marston, 2013).

To Abdu El-Kader, a good governance, is after all, subject to God's words as shown in his holy books namely: 'Torah, the Psalms, the Gospels and the Koran' and as shown in Sunna which is the Prophet's Mohammed's sayings (Kiser, n.d, p. 01). To Abdu El-Kader, the art of governance should cover three main areas: the first can be described as self-governance or self-mastery that encompasses intellectuality, good morality, and respect. The second form covers governing his community while the third form of governance aims at creating a caliphate by federating independent-minded tribes under law (Kiser, n.d, pp. 4-5). Abdu El-Kader established the cultural attributes which would act as a social power for modern nationalists. Naima Mouhleb argues that two main elements: Islam and Arabic, played a significant role in unifying Algerians in the age of the French occupation

'Algeria had no royal family or previous ruler to rally around during the colonial occupation. A unifying element was found in the religion and language that denied Algerians a place in French Algeria, namely Islam and Arabic' (Mouhleb, 2005, p.87 in Benrabah 2013, p. 21).

For Paulin Djiteé 'nowhere else in Africa has the language issue been as central in the fight against colonialism as Algeria' (Djiteé in Benrabah 2013, p. 21). Language and religion were the two most vital of human cultural forms to foster solidarity against an alienating colonial policy. They were also essential markers of nationhood and the main patterns of national identity during the nationalists' movements in the era of global rights in the twentieth century.

For instance, doctrines of assimilation and association in political, economic and judicial structures and institutions, the policy of Frenchification and the mission to evangelise and promote civilisation indirectly influenced both Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss to establish the Algerian Muslim Ulama's- -scholars- association (AUMA Association des Ulama Musulmans Algériens) in 1931 and Messali Hadj to be the first to claim total cultural, political and administrative independence. During French colonisation, politicisation was limited to a minority of the middle-class Muslims who supported assimilation and equality with French citizens (Barclay, Ann Chopin & Evans, 2018). By 1946, French Algeria witnessed Muslim political movements that not only demanded equal rights but also called for total independence from French cultural influence (Barclay et al, 2018).

Uprisings were motivated by the idea of a modern nation-state bound by its united geographical territory (Heggoy, 1968, p. 128). Indeed, modern Algerian nationalism already had the linguistic, cultural, and religious resource to lead anti-colonial movements. Therefore, reformers, such as Messali Hadj, needed to adopt ideological and political doctrines in order to establish a strong background for Algerian modern nationalism to emerge and stand against French policy. Hadj and Ibn Badiss strongly advocated ideas of liberalism and national independence and resisted the ideas of imperialism and assimilation. Within the Algerian context and as a resistance for the French colonial power, solidarity, desire and the will to fight for liberty against the French remained the main aspects of cultural scholars, namely, Ibn Badiss and nationalist leaders. During his nationalist revival, Ibn Badiss focused on Arab Islamic culture as a symbol of solidarity and unity between Algerian Muslims. Right from the start of their occupation, the French colonisers imposed their western, oriental and imperialist culture on Algerians. Therefore, as a reaction to the French projects, the AUMA organization played the role of raising people's awareness to Islamic culture. Abd- El Hamid Ibn Badiss's

stand remained clear; he disagreed with Algerian assimilationists such as Farhat Abbas and argued instead:

‘We have examined the past and the present and have found that the Algerian nation has taken shape and exists. This nation has its history marked by deeds of the highest order. It possesses its culture, its traditions, and its characteristics, good and bad, so as do all the nations of the earth. We maintain further that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not wish to be France’ (Clark, 1960, p. 17).

At the end of the Second World War, a massive wave of nationalist movements spread in the world and in Algeria. This took place in different regions in Algeria; Sétif, Kharata and Guelma by Algerian Muslims claiming their freedom and social justice as they were promised by the French. A display of the Algerian flag on May 8th, 1945 led to a massacre of around 40 and 45 thousand victims according to PPA (Algerian People's Party) statistics and the consulate of the USA in Algiers (Golsan, 2000). The French army and police turned the peaceful nationalist march into a bloody tragedy. The Algerian people recognised that independence would not be granted by peaceful actions; they started forming an army which would ignite the independence war (Behr, 1961).

Abbas had an assimilationist orientation when it came to integrating Algeria and Algerians into the French state and European values with equality and cultural pluralism, justice and respect to different races and religions. He drafted the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto U.D.M.A (*Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien)* in 1946 which represented a turning point in his political life. The programme of the Algerian manifesto focussed on the fulfilment of political equality as a sovereign nation and self-governance, the right of Algerians to elect

their representatives in the national assembly which was monopolized by the French only. The manifesto established a federated republic of Algeria, provided Algerians received Algerian citizenship and Algerians in France receive French citizenship (Abun-Nasr, 1987). Abbas recognised that assimilation was no longer a viable proposition because, to the French policy, Algerians that wished to belong needed to forsake their Algerianness and accept Frenchness as their identity. Abbas's new-formed political party strongly supported the foundation of an independent Algerian state. Abbas's stand with the Muslims that took part in the Second World War marked the first stirrings of his nationalist sentiment and made him one of the prominent nationalists in Algeria:

'Algerians agree to take part in a war for the people's liberation, provided this be carried out without racial or religious discrimination; provided that- despite past sacrifices and past promises- they should not be deprived of their freedom and essential liberties; and provided a congress of elected representatives of all Moslem organisations be convened to draft a political, economic and social statute' (cited in Behr 1961, p. 50).

The Algerian resistance to French colonial power was also supported by a taking up of arms. In 1947, a group of young nationalists formed the O.S (Organisation Spéciale) in order to prepare a strong army that could take part in the war of independence. The main figures of the organization were Ahmed Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed Hocine, Mohamed Boudiaf, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal and Abd El-Hafidh Boussouf. Although the O.S was smashed by France, underground preparations still took place. In 1954, the FLN (National Liberation Front; in French: *Front de Libération Nationale*) was formed with its national army (National Liberation Army). The FLN's main objectives were inspired by previous political and social/cultural nationalists. It called for the restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state, within the framework of Islamic principles (Behr, 1961).

Despite a poorly equipped army, the FLN started the war on November 1st, 1954 by launching several attacks in more than twenty regions in Algeria. In an attempt to make the Arab world and the whole world know about the Algerian war of independence and to tighten the diplomatic relations with other nations, the Algerian provisional government was founded in Cairo in 1958 headed by Farhat Abbas. In a two-year period, most of the Arab world and nations from Asia (Vietnam, Northern Korea, China, and Indonesia) recognised the legitimacy and the existence of an Algerian nation-state. On the other hand, on October 17th, 1961, Algerian immigrant workers in Paris and its surroundings prepared carefully for a peaceful protest against racist practices, segregation and the restriction of political freedom by De Gaulle's government. The FLN designed nationalistic slogans supporting national independence: "Algeria is Algerian", "independence to Algeria" to be held during demonstrations that took place on the 17th of October. The demonstration of Algerian immigrants in France, unfortunately, had a tragic ending. In order to paralyze the Algerian movement, the French police headed by Maurice Papon as a prefect reacted brutally. The night of October the 17th ended up with a large number of individuals from the Algerian community killed, beaten and dumped into the Seine River (House & MacMaster, 2006). Therefore, October 17th, 1961 massacres remain a black spot in the history of France. During that time, the FLN obtained support from international opinion and De Gaulle was compelled to sign the Evian Accords in March 18th, 1962. The main negotiators in this treaty were the provisional government and the FLN and the French Republic. The formal agreement established a cease fire in Algeria, prisoners of war were released, and the French granted the Algerian nation its independence and sovereignty on July 5th, 1962 (House & MacMaster, 2006). The number of martyrs is agreed to be 1.5 million during the period 1954-1962.

3.1. Practices of the French Colonial Power against Islam and Arabic Language through Education and Citizenship Laws

3.1.1. Enforcing Assimilation through a National Educational System

The French strategy of colonisation adopted a policy of racial and geographical expansion. The orientalist project during the nineteenth century was a dream of conquest into the interior by a superior administrative power (Said, 1985). Leory-Beaulieu argues that the power of colonisation lies in the invasion of space and the reproduction of people in order to blur their language, customs, ideas, and laws (in Said, 1985). Indeed, Cressaty and Senator Paul Doumer argued 'if France was to continue to prevent 'le retour de l'Islam', it had better take hold of the Orient' (in Said, 1985, p. 225). The Napoleonic plan for Egypt demonstrated a double feature:

> He [Edward Said] tells us how a team of scientists, geographers, historians, and archaeologists compiled, catalogued, and made available a knowledge that was deemed essential for invading and placing Egypt under the imperial gaze. This operation was generally civilizing at 'home' and 'orientalising' in the colony' (Marrouchi, 2012, p. 94).

The Napoleonic technique of colonisation used classical historical texts as knowledge that was spread by cultural practices of French scientists in order to control the colonised population with military troops. The Napoleonic strategy in Algeria was to expand an assertive civilising mission in geographical space, race, culture, policy and language. Urging the profit motive, the French strategy aimed at weakening the indigenous economy of Algeria and to engage in a

defensive war against Arab and Muslim identity. French colonisers believed that mixed marriages between French and Algerians would easily make indigenous Algerians convert to Christianity (Chabou, 1969 in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016). In 1848, around 3389 Jews and Christians immigrated to the country to join around three million indigenous Algerian Muslims with French military advances. This early wave of colonisation was characterised by the arrival of both military officers and civilian administrators (Lorcin, 1995, p. 1).

It is very important to shed light on the intellectual situation in Algeria before the French colonisation and the impact of the French governmentality and its strategy at the level of education. In 1833 and just a year after the French occupation of Algeria, 'illiteracy did not exceed 14% while it reached 53% in France at that time' (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 575). Additionally, in 1837 the number of students in higher learning institutions of Constantine *alone* reached approximately seven hundred, while in 1850 the number dropped to sixty students, General Beidou revealed (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p.573, emphasis added).

During the Ottoman era, the majority of Algerians were capable of writing and reading in Arabic. Algerians were not deprived of rights such as the right to education at Islamic schools, their right to learn Arabic. Local elites and scholars, for instance, gained 'administrative and judiciary positions' and were not completely excluded as was the case during the French occupation (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 568). However, during French colonisation mosques were replaced by churches (Fontaine, 2016) and most Muslim traditional education at religious schools had been banned and replaced by French education (Laaredj-Campbell, 2016). Weakening intellectual institutions in Algeria aimed at 'producing a new generation of Algerians steeped in ignorance and illiteracy' (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 574). Consequently,

by 1901, the level of illiteracy among Algerians climbed to' 92.2%' (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 574). During Ottoman rule, Islamic establishments namely 'Qur'an Schools (al-Kuttāb)', 'Zāwiyahs, 'The Madrasah', and 'Higher Education institutions' played a prominent role in preserving Algerian national identity via the fields of religion, education, politics, social work (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 573). During the French occupation, French policy makers adopted 'a policy of Christianisation' (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 572) and closed all Islamic institutions. Both girls and boys were recruited at French schools in Algiers, Constantine, Blida, Oran, Bône (present-day Annaba) and Mostaganem (Chabou, 1969 in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016).

Speaking of education and schooling, the French educational system aimed at changing the social composition and structure of Algerian society starting with pupils at schools. Allix Eugénie Luce, a French teacher and a headmaster of girls' school in Algiers, believed in the fusion of races and explicitly delivered her objectives to members of the -Conseil d'administration- on January 31st, 1846

'These girls … would become our guarantee of the country's submission to our authority as well as the unimpeachable pledge of its future assimilation (cited by Rogers, 2011, p. 734 & Rogers, 2013, p. 65)'.

In this respect, 'the French viewed their language and culture as superior over that of Algerians' (Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 96). Algerian cultural and linguistic backgrounds would have needed to be completely disregarded in the pedagogical programme as the French director of schools in Paris Ferdi and Buisson argued

‘The Arab child would be distracted at any moment by a single word, a phrase, a playful reference to facts, or a traditional custom while reading the content of a French school book, which would otherwise be completely comprehensible to us. He looks at the text with his great wide eyes, sparkling with intelligence, and is filled with despair and because there is no proper way to reach him, he slowly withdraws. Truly no impression can be more painful than this’ (Chabou, 1969, p. 86 in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 97).

Marrouchi’s viewpoint also confirms that scholarly works such as ‘Jacques Berque’s translations and interpretations of manuscripts and religious texts helped the administrative and the military missions of building the French Empire in Algeria (2004, p. 94-95)’. ‘The number of historical and literary works that were written during the colonial era documented the socio-cultural life of Algerians and shaped the European imaginations of Muslim Algerians as rude and uncivilised, largely the result of successful Ottoman and Algerian military expeditions in Europe’ (Ladjal and Bensaid, 2014, p. 579). As a part of the Orientalist policy, Edward Said (1985) focused on the connection between scientific, civilising practices and national pride for the colonisers. The interrelationship between orientalism, empiricism, society, scientific practices and national benefit lay with establishing the scope of a commercial geography. It is important to say that the scientific practices of orientalists acted as symbols for political dominance and imperial expansion. Similarly, Withers (1997, p. 23) argued that chorography, which is not only the act of describing or mapping a region but is also a ‘political practice to establish authority over space and situate a particular population historically’. It is also a strategy of human production that encourages the development of an inductive and public spirit in the human sciences. Thus, the orientalist projects took advantage of the discipline of geography in order maintain the sense of self-identity and patriotism among European people. In this regard, the French Minister of Education, Jules Ferry, declared

‘Keep them (the Algerians) in the schools until they reach the age of 14. That is enough, more than adequate. We do not intend to integrate them into our fine public-school programs because we do not plan to teach them too much history or geography, just French, above all French, French and nothing else’. (Cited in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 96).

Ferry’s declaration, on the other hand, reflects the intentions of the ideology of Orientalism that aimed to make Algerian society an object of French policy in order to destroy any potential for unity amongst the indigenous population. This policy had to be comprehensive enough to absorb the whole of society which involves culture, religion and language. Said (1985) reveals how important geographical knowledge was in the orientalists’ civilising missions. He claims that the motivation for the French conquest was to take possession of more geographical spaces to satisfy France’s national pastime and interests. His general observation lies behind the fact that France promoted the knowledge of scientific geography which later paved the way for commercial practices such as travelling ‘how-to-travel’ and ‘how-to-see’, as Withers explains (1995). Having a clear understanding in scientific geography had been a means of establishing empirical knowledge about the peoples of Algeria in order to establish a political regime to control the territory of the colony.

The reason behind the deliberate omission of history and geography from the pedagogical programme is that the history and geography of Algeria would make people aware of the Algerian nation which had existed before the French occupation. The science of geography was the key in France taking control over Algerian territory by dividing and mapping the territory into provinces or departments: the department of Oran, department of Algiers, department of Constantine, and territories of the South. The division of the Algerian territory was advantageous for the French government to control the economic power which was largely

based on agriculture. With commerce dominating industry, Algerian villages were converted into pools of reserve labour (Prochaska, 2004).

3.1.2. Citizenship: A Practice of Exclusion and Ethnic Division

As metropolitan France continued to grow as a great European power in the 19th century, it annexed its largest colony, Algeria, to its territory. As such, Algeria was declared an integral part of the French Republic, according to Article 109 (French Constitution, November 4th, 1848), and was divided into multiple administrative units. The French discriminative policy started by dividing Algerian society into citizens and subjects by imposing unfair laws on Algerians such as citizenship and nationality laws (Lorcin, 1995). Although Algeria was considered a part of France, 'Sénatus-consulte on July 14th, 1865' represented a French policy of alienation between citizens and non-citizens or subjects in colonial Algeria (Vince, 2020, p. 07). According to Sénatus-consulte, "indigenous Muslims" were named French and thus were obliged to serve in military service and join the civil service. However, one would not receive French citizenship by naturalisation and enjoy citizenship rights unless they renounced their 'Muslim personal status' (Vince, 2020, p. 07). The latter was not about being a Muslim only, but about adopting Islamic rule in all aspects of life such as: family law, inheritance, marriage, and the like. Therefore, the Muslim personal status can be understood as an 'ethnic-legal' categorisation designed by the French regime to determine political rights of citizenship (Vince, 2020, pp. 07, 197). The Sénatus-consulte did not allow Algerians of Muslim personal status to receive full access to their social, civil or political rights unless they were naturalised after they renounced their Muslim personal status and accepted French citizenship. The process of full naturalisation into French citizenship was introduced as a possibility only for Algerian

elites, intellectuals or ‘war veterans’ but at a cost: they would have renounced their Muslim personal status and adopted French culture under the judicial law of Jonnart (*la loi de Jonnart*) on February 9th, 1919 (Vince, 2020, p. 25). Approximately ‘425,000’ Algerian men could enjoy their voting rights at the level of local and regional elections but still could not elect their political representatives or deputies at the French parliament (Vince, 2020, p. 25). Exceptionally, in 1936 the Blum Violette project granted full citizenship rights including political and parliamentary rights to around ‘25,000’ Algerian ‘war veterans, students, elected officials and trade union leaders’ without being obliged to renounce their Muslim personal status (Vince, 2020, p.38).

Those who chose not to give up on their Muslim personal status were later governed by the Code de l'indigénat which was issued in 1881 (Vince, 2020, p. 09). Code de l'indigénat is often translated as ‘the Native Code’ which is ‘‘a regime of exception’ based on rule by decree, enacted in often arbitrary and sometimes spectacular punishments and concerned primarily with asserting administrative power’ (Mann, 2009, p. 333 & 335). Code de l'indigénat can be seen as a disciplinary power which is exercised through ‘colonial tribunals where French *commandants* could jail, fine or bind people’ (Mann, 2009, p. 333, italics in original text). Regime of indigénat was an act of animalisation, as Doho (2017) would call it, that turned Algerians of Muslim personal status into colonial subjects that were inferior as opposed to superior citizens with rights. Under Sénatus-consulte, Algerian Jews also had the opportunity to receive full citizenship rights in case they renounce their Jewish personal status (Vince, 2020, p. 08). Algerian Jews were later legally declared ‘Europeans’ and received full French citizenship under Crémieux decree (*Décret crémieux*) on October 24th, 1870 (Taieb-Carlen, 2010 & Parolin, 2013). Crémieux decree declared (Abitbol, 2003):

‘The Government of National Defence

Decrees:

The Israelites native to the departments of Algeria are declared French citizens; consequently, their real status and their personal status shall be, dating from the promulgation of the present decree, regulated by French law, with all rights acquired until this day inviolable.

All contrary legislative dispositions, sénatus-consults, decrees, rulings, or ordinances are abolished.

At Tours, October 24, 1870

Signed: Ad. Crémieux, L. Gambetta, Al. Glais-Bisoin, L. Fourichin'.

It can be argued that French citizenship in French Algeria was both assimilationists, racist, conditional and selective. Within the context of colonial politics, granting Algerians full French citizenship and full citizenship rights with conditions to certain groups aims at proving that the process of assimilation designed by French politicians was based on ethnic-religious personal status of individuals. By excluding a group of people, such as Algerians of Muslim personal status, from citizenship and full citizenship rights while including others, such as Jews, the colonial power expanded in Algeria through 'governmentality and surveillance' (Roberts, 2017, p.16 & 19). The Biggest reform in citizenship law was in 1958 when the French citizenship was granted to majority of the Muslim population. However, this was still rejected by anti-assimilationist figures such as Ibn Badiss and his association because by declaring Algerians 'French of North African Origin' (Vince, 2020, p. 09), the French colonial governmentality was still formally and officially denying their Algérianité.

Poverty, mass illiteracy and economic backwardness were allowed to continue with the absence of political and civic status for the Arab masses. In an attempt to solve the issue, the colonial administration started reforms at the levels of finance, education, judicial systems, and the

political regime by assimilating institutions and administrative organizations of the colony to those in France. This assimilation led to the exclusion of the indigenous population from power (Lorcin, 1995, p. 172). In 1881, the indigenous population had no national representatives; however, the French population had a 'National Assembly' that was represented by senators and deputies (Lorcin, 1995, p. 09). In this respect, Ernest Gellner argues that there are a number of ways in which the nationalist principles or rights can be violated: 'the political boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non- nationals' (2006, p. 01).

Algerian society was a traditional Muslim society that was based on tribal factionalism. The French policy tended to dismantle this society and break it down into small ethnic groups. The French conquest divided the Algerian nation into two ethno-cultural categories: Arabs were considered as inferiors and Kabyle as superiors (Lorcin, 1995). In fact, Berbers of Algeria refer to a large ethnic group which consists of Chaouia (in Aures Mountain), Kabyles (in Great Kabylia –Djurjura now-), Mozabites (in Northern Sahara-) and Touareg (in central and South Sahara). The Berbers of Algeria speak different varieties of Berber language which differs from one region to another (Lorcin, 1995, p. 04). In addition to an ethno-cultural dichotomy, a non-accurate socio-geographic division was set up: the Arabs were plain-nomadic residents and Berbers were mountain- sedentary residents. Eugene Bordichon, a French physician who lived in Algeria at the time, looked forward to taking advantage of these ethnic divisions. He argues in 1845 that

'Without breaking the laws of moral and international rights, we will be able to defeat our African enemies with gunpowder and steel, which will lead them to starve and through the use of alcohol, bribes, and decay we will provoke inner conflicts between the Arabs and the Kabyle Berbers, between the tribes of the Tell and those of the

Sahara. Now it is the easiest thing in the world. Without spilling blood, we can decimate them every year by taking possession of their subsistence and confiscating their food, blocking their way until even the fig trees and cacti flee' (Chabou, 1969, p. 63 cited in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 94).

The French conquest increased in size and power and dominated the intellectual, social, political and religious levels. From the very start, piéds-noirs settlers were protected by the Republic's conscript army; however, the image of 'bad Arabs' and 'good Kabyle' became a colonial norm in society. There was no need of a formal policy due to the fact that the Kabyle people were more likely to convert and assimilate into French colonial society, they could appear to the rest of the ethnic populations to have a privilege over Arabs.

Charles-Robert Ageron, a historian of colonial ideologies, refers to this dichotomy as the 'Kabyle Myth' (Lorcin, 1995, p. 11). However, in colonial Algeria the *Salafi* reformist movement's argument was that Kabyle people should be united with Arabs within the same nation. Arab and Berber historiography tells us about the advantage of Islam in the Maghribi region (North Africa) in creating a spiritual kinship between both ethnic groups. For instance, during Tariq Ibn Ziyad's successful conquest of Spain, Arabs and Berbers created a strong army during battles. McDougall (2006) argued that the *Salafi* socio-cultural reformist program, which drew the Arab language and Islam as signifiers of Algerian nationalism, had inevitably urged a conflict between the Arab and the Berbers which lasted even after independence. The socio-political movement known as the *Berber spring* in 1980s in Algeria is evidence of his argument. This is when the Berbers claimed official recognition of their language and culture in modern Algeria (McDougall, 2003b).

On the other hand, Kabyles had been a favourite case study for most French ethnographers, anthropologists and sociologists during the twentieth century (Scheele, 2009). In this respect and in the light of this theory of race and nationhood, Ernest Renan (1873, pp. 193, 140 in Scheele, 2009, p. 25) argues that 'the Berber race has now not only incontestably gained acceptance in the world of anthropology; henceforth, it is the object of a science'.

'The five things that constitute the essential attribute of race and allow us to speak of it as a distinctive unit within the human species, are language, literature, religion, history and legislation (Ernest Renan, 1873, p. 104; in Scheele, 2009, p. 25)'.

In the colonial imagination, Kabyles were remote from the essentially Arab national identity. In contrast to McDougall's argument discussed above regarding the movement of *Salafis*, I believe that colonial writers, in their writings, brought up and fostered the propaganda of 'good Kabyle' and 'bad Arab' in order to ignite an inner conflict within the Algerian society by projecting the image that Arabs and Kabyles are different (linguistic and cultural differences) and that they need to claim legitimacy as a Kabyle nation and maintain their Berber identity that is different from the Arab nation. This sociological ideology was designed by French rulers in order to divide and rule under the *conquer-strategy* (in Latin*; dīvide et īmpera)* which aims at dismantling and breaking up the power of society in order to consolidate the cultural, administrative military, and political dominance and power in Algeria. After issuing the nationality and citizenship laws, Kabyles recognized their marginalization along with Arabs. In 1871 France received 'a stab in the back' by dwellers of Kabylia that rebelled against French rule and its racist paradigm (Lorcin, 1995, p. 07). Lorcin (1995) argues that this insurrection took place because Kabyles hoped that France would offer them a special privilege and legal status over Arabs, but it did not.

Depriving Algerian Muslims from citizenship and citizenship rights in colonial Algeria was a punitive measure of the French administration for those that chose not to give up on their religious identity in Islam. Having said that, it can be said that the citizenship laws designed by the French occupier in colonial Algeria were a disciplinary device which was subject to numerous limitations such as race, ethnicity and religion. As such, it included European immigrants and Algerian Jews and excluded Algerian Muslims. Similarly, the French educational system played a role of exclusion through cultural assimilation. The French curriculum completely excluded Algerian culture, including language (Arabic) and religion (Islam). Just like citizenship and nationality laws enacted by the French administrators in colonial Algeria, the educational system was another dimension of racial and ethnic colonial governmentalities in Algeria. Matereke (2011) argues that in order to understand how governmentalities operate within a colonial context, a distinction between power and dominance is crucial for the understanding of how the colonial power, citizens and colonial subjects are produced as categories in a colonial state.

3.2. Resistance to Colonial Power and Colonial Governmentalities: Algerian Nationalist Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries

According to Breuilly (1993), nationalism refers to the idea of the nation as an independent group of citizens. He further argues that nationalism is ‘political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’ (Breuilly, 2001, p. 32 in Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 84):

‘A nationalist argument in turn is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:

1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least attainment of political sovereignty’ (Breuilly, 1993, p. 2 in Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 84).

Colonial governmentality can be understood in terms of the operations of colonial power and how natives responded to them (Matereke, 2011, p. 13). The Algerian response to French colonial governmentality can be divided into the following main technologies: cultural and religious, political, and armed responses. The Algerian response to French governmentality took the form primarily of an Algerian nationalist movement. Algerian nationalism was gradually developed by Muslim elites, scholars, teachers, writers and others. This ideology addressed issues of radical change, total independence and an Algerian nation-state (Behr, 1961). Intellectuals played a prominent role during the twentieth century in reforming the sovereign national identity of Algerians (McDougall, 2006). Three main figures of Algerian nationalism during the colonial period are El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in the 19th century, Messali Hadj and Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss in the 20th century. The choice of these three protagonists in the Algerian history of resistance has a rationale; El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri is considered as the first leader of the Algerian resistance movement against French colonialism; Messali Hadj is considered the father of Algerian nationalism (*Abu el Wataniya*) and is the leader of political nationalism in colonial Algeria; Ibn Badiss played a crucial role in preserving the normative force of the Algerian identity / Algerianness through culturally and religiously contributing to Algerian nationalism. It is worth mentioning that by focussing on these three men, the present thesis does not promote anti or pro-FLN ideologies or politics. Instead, these men were widely mentioned by my research participants especially Amir Abdu

El-Kader and Ibn Badiss. Messali Hadj, on the other hand, was mentioned once in order to refer to nationalists that were living in France but had never forsaken their Algerian identity. In terms of solidarity between Syria and Algeria, El Amir Abdu El-Kader gained a good reputation among the Syrian community as a role model of solidarity, hospitality and humanity. His exile in Syria contributed in building strong ties between both nations. The contribution of Houari Boumedienne to strengthen bonds between Algeria and Syria within the framework of pan-Arabism was implicitly referred to by my Syrian participants such as Ayman who argued that Algerians provide a special treatment to Syrians, Iraqi and Palestinians. The three figures namely: Abdu El-Kader, Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj, shared the same vision about Algerianness in the sense that it is completely independent from Frenchness and should not assimilate into the French values as French citizenship laws intended to construct 'the ideal citizen' in colonial Algeria. While Amir Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss created a solid normative foundation of Algerianness based on religion, language and social values, Messali Hadj provided a political base of Algerianness. Messali's vision of Algerianness can be interpreted as the enjoyment of civil, social and legal rights of citizenship in a modern state. The conceptualisations of these three men were later embodied through citizenship laws in post-colonial Algeria. The visions of the three men on Algerianness and the value of being Algerian has later governed the levels of openness of Algerians towards non-citizens in post-colonial Algeria.

After the military expeditions in Algeria, French troops took possession of several lands in the eastern and western parts of the colony, Algerian resistance to French colonisation was galvanised under the leadership of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri (1832- 1847). El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri was born in 1808 in Mascara. His full name is Abdu El-Kader ibn Muḥyi el-Din ibn Musṭafa el-Ḥasani el-Jazaei'ri. He belonged to a very conservative and

religious Islamic family. He received his religious education at the religious schools. His father, Muhyi el Din was an influential figure in his region. Abdu El- Kader expanded his knowledge in Islamic law, mathematics, Greek philosophy, geography, astronomy, veterinary science and plant pharmacology during his trips to Tunisia, Tripoli (in Libya), Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (Faruqi, 2012). Abdu el-Kader's nationalistic and patriotic resistance against the French occupation made him one of the most famous iconic figures in Algerian historiography. He succeeded in uniting the volunteers who became patriot-soldiers in the nineteenth century. Abdu El-Kader's sense of humanitarianism did not reach only Muslims, but all people of the book, Christians and Jews included. During his exile in Damascus, he had been known for his efforts in achieving peace and protection for the Christian minority during the massacres of 1860 in Syria (Kiser, 2013). The incident marked strong historical ties between Algeria and Syria. It was also widely narrated by my Syrian participants that argued that El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri remains an influential figure for both Algerians and Syrians. Amar, for instance, stated:

'…despite major differences between middle eastern countries such as Syria and the countries of the great Maghreb such as Algeria in terms of dialectal Arabic, lifestyle, culture, food, customs and traditions, there are two main similarities: '… in addition to being Muslims, Algerians and Syrians share the same history: Syria supported the Algerian revolutionary war against the French colonial regime when the Algerian leader El Amir Abdu El-Kader lived in Syria…' […fi ikhtilaf kbir min nahiyat logha, l adat, takalid, tarikat el hayat, lmakla bin takafa charkiya w takafa el magharibiya … lakin el mojtamae el jazaei'iri tkabalna nahna ka souriyin la ano awalan muslimin w nokta el aham hya tarikhiya … ayamat El Amir Abdu El-Kader .. souriya saedat el jzaei'ir awkat el istiemar el faransi …].

My research data revealed that the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri in Damascus, Syria, has played a major role in uniting Syrians and Algerians since the 19th century until now. Abdu El-Kader's moral values of humanitarianism and hospitality have contributed in

achieving unconditional inclusion of Syrians at a societal level. It was also one of the major motives, in addition to work opportunities, Islam and Arabness, that made some Syrian participants choose Algeria as a country of refuge rather than other Arab countries. Mohamed, for instance, replied to my question about "what made him choose Algeria and leave Egypt?" as: '… because Algerians and Syrians share a history since the times of El Amir Abdu El-Kader … [… la ano bin el jazaei'riyin wa souriyin tarikh kbir min ayam Abdu El-Kader …]'. However, at a legal and a state level, these moral values were not too promising for most of my Syrian participants in Algiers. Most Syrians criticised their exclusion at a legal level and at the level of employment and mentioned how the grandchildren of El Amir Abdu El-Kader received privileges in terms of citizenship and employment in Syria while the Algerian state did not offer even a legal status to Syrians which will pave the way to legal employment, freedom of mobility outside Algeria and national insurance. I argue that the Algerian biogovernmentality securiticised humanitarianism and hospitality and turned them into strategies of care and exclusion from legal status. This idea will be investigated in detail in the analysis chapter (chapter 6).

Abdu El-Kader is the first leader who rebelled against the French Republic's unfair laws that led to geographic, social, and political expansions and divisions in Algeria. He is considered the leader of the nationalist movement in the 19th century (Hill, 2009). Abdu El-Kader led armed resistance in order to liberate the western and the eastern regions of Algeria, namely Oran and Constantine (Marston 2013, Kiser 2008). At educational religious schools known as Zawiyah, Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri spread the concepts of independence and nationalism to the people, Algerian Arabs and Berbers alike; Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri played a vital role in raising awareness against French rule and fostering the sense of national identity.

After more than fifteen years of stubborn resistance and struggle against the French, Abdu El-Kader successfully recovered control over two-thirds of the Algerian territory. Algerian Arabs and Berbers both refused to surrender or give up on their identity, nationality, religion, language, rights, customs and they collaborated with Amir Abdu El-Kader in all the battles against French commanders namely Desmichels in February 1834, Maréchal Clauzel in 1836, Maréchal Valée and Trézol (Hill, 2009). At the time, Abdu El-Kader took advantage of the defeat of the French commanders because of the instability of France in Europe, this era sees the fall of Napoleon. It was marked by the violence of revolution and counter-revolution; for instance, in 1848 there was an abolition of the National Workshops; a Coup d'état in 1851 and in 1870 during which Alsace-Lorraine were occupied by the Germans (Lorcin, 1995). Abdu el-Kader failed to get support from Britain, USA, Spain and Morocco in a battle against Bugeaud and consequently he was vanquished in 1847. After his defeat, Abdu El-Kader was exiled in 1848 to France and then to Damascus (Kiser, 2008 & Marston, 2013).

Ernest Gellner (2006) defines nationalism as a sentiment or a political movement which can be considered as a reaction to the violation of rights and principles of a particular nation. Sentiments of nationalism will grow stronger if the violated rights and principles are satisfied. Gellner (2006, p. 01) points out

‘If the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety. This can occur either through the incorporation of the national territory in a larger empire, or by the local domination of an alien group’.

As a strong believer in a political ideology to Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj was the first Algerian intellectual who sought to sustain total national independence and for Algerians to exercise complete sovereignty over their territory. Messali Hadj was born on May 16th, 1898 in Tlemcen (Western Algeria). He received his education at religious schools and French civil schools in Tlemcen. He was forced to do military service in the French army and to participate in WW1 in 1918 in France. Messali Hadj married Émilie Busquant, a French anti-colonialist who strongly believed in the independence of Algerians and who always supported Messali Hadj during his political resistance. He then joined the French communist party's central committee and headed 'the Star of North Africa' (ENA; in French *étoile nord-africaine*) that he founded in 1926. Knowing that Messali Hadj was an activist and a politician who propagated a Communist ideology, the French regime had menaced his life and imprisoned him for his opposition against the integration and assimilation of Algerians into French culture. Messali passed away on June 3rd, 1974. (Stora, 1986; Behr, 1961).

Messali's organization was banned by the French government in 1929 but it remained secretly active until its activities were completely barred after 1933. For Messali Hadj, the nationalist political movement was at a difficult phase of actualisation because it was a reaction against the violation of principles by a stranger group (French rule). After completely shutting down the "Star of North Africa", a new association known as PPA (Algerian People's Party, in French; *Parti du Peuple Algerien*) had emerged in 1937. The new organization had the same objectives as the former one aiming at peacefully protesting against the coloniser and the violation of rights. The Blum-Viollette proposal, which did not pass, (1936) would have allowed nearly 30,000 of Algeria's elites and those who served in the French army to attain French citizenship without abandoning their Muslim identity (Chamberline, 1998). Messali

Hadj disagreed with the Blum-Violette proposal, with the Vichy regime and the administrative integration of Algeria in France. Instead, he called for a totally free nation (Stora, 2005).

On the other hand, Ibn Badiss's organizations: "the Islamic Reform Movement in Algeria" and "the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama" (AUMA) contradicted the law of Jonnart (*la loi de Jonnart*) in 1919 which was introduced as an attempt to obliterate Arab and Muslim features of Algerian identity. As an Islamic reformer, Ibn Badiss has a prominent role in promoting the sense of nationalism as a socio-cultural feature that would implicitly serve political purposes (McDougall, 2006 & Lorcin, 1995). Unlike Messali Hadj, Abd-el Hamid Ibn Badiss adopted a religious orientation and declared 'Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language' (Vince, 2015, p. 44). His work did not aim at spreading a political ideology as a primary objective (Hill, 2009). As a scholar and a religious leader, Abd El -Hamid Ibn Badiss sought to establish a nation with a strong cultural and religious identity. As a revolt against the French policy of Christianity and the orientalist development of the natives, his organization, AUMA, assumed responsibility to define 'the true religion' of Algeria that is Islam and resurrect the Algerian Muslim society (McDougall, 2006, p. 14). Nationalism to Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss and his followers is a linguistic, religious, social, and cultural ideology which in turn represents a system of 'ideas, signs, associations, and ways of behaving and communicating' (Gellner, 2006, p. 06).

Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss further claims in 1936 that independence is the natural right of all peoples (Horne, 2012). In other words, he clearly criticised the thinking in Farhat Abbas after he shared his opinion in public denying the existence of a nation-state for Algerians. Farhat Abbas's quote states that, for him, it is possible to be French and Muslim. He declares

‘If I had encountered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and, as such, would have nothing to be ashamed of. Men who have died for a patriotic ideal are honoured and respected every day. My life is worth no more than theirs. And yet I will not die for the Algerian fatherland, for this fatherland does not exist. I have not encountered it. I have questioned history. I have questioned the quick and the dead. I have visited cemeteries. No one has spoken to me of such a thing …. You cannot build on wind. We have eliminated all fogginess and vain imaginings to link our future once and for all of that of French endeavour in this country’ (Clark 1960, p. 17).

As a part of its primary objectives, ‘AUMA created a network of schools, madrassa, and intellectual societies and issued its own magazines such as ‘*Al Shihab, Al Basair* and *El Sharia al Mutahhara*’ in order to enable every Muslim to read and write Arabic’ (Hill, 2009, p. 45). Magazine articles tackled several subjects: sermons of Muslim scholars on the Prophet Mohamed’s life and death; poems praising the Prophet; the existence of the Algerian nation before French colonisation with its own language, culture and identity. Indeed, the AUMA had a defining role in shaping Algerian nationalism by focussing on Islam as the religion of the nation and Arabic as its language. For instance, El-Mountakid magazine published in 1925 defines the cultural and the religious orientations and principles for Algerians. For instance, in page 5 it is stated:

‘We are Algerian Muslims, living within the colony of the French Republic. As we are Muslims, we do our best to preserve and maintain the principles of our religion that involves humanity, equality and brotherhood among nations and all people [Nahnou kawmoun moslimoun jaza’riyoun fi nitak mosta’amarat el jomohoriya faranssiya. Fa li anana moslimoun na’malo ana ala al mohafada ala takalid dinina aladi tada’aou ila kamal insani wa toharido ala el okhoua wa salam bayna cho’oub]’ (My ransliteration from source language -Arabic- / My translation from Arabic into English; source: El-Montakid, 1925, p. 05).

Both El Amir Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss gained a significant appreciation among the Syrian community in Algiers that seemed very knowledgeable in the history of the Algerian

nationalist movements and the main figures of these anti-colonial movements. Most of my Syrian participants remembered learning about these Algerian men at Syrian schools as being loyal nationalists that devoted their lives for Islam and the Arab Umma by promoting religious-based ethics and values within their society, sacrificed for their nation and country and fought against religious extremism at all levels. Both values of Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss of humanity, acceptance of the other, Arabness and Islam contributed in developing a welcoming atmosphere for Syrians within the Algerian society. Fatima, from the Algerian cohort, whose education was a mixture of Qur'anic schools and the state's schools, is a member of three national charity organisations in Algiers that provide Qur'anic / Islamic lessons for both Algerian and Syrian children, claimed that:

'… Algerians are very kind to others …. Souriyin ikhwatna regardless their religion … we learnt these values from our religion and our ancestors such as Ibn Badiss that always taught us how to be proud of our Arabness and Islam … [el cha'eb el jazaei'iri cha'eb tayib … ta'alamna had lkiyam mn dina el hanif w aydan mn jdoudna kima cheickh el alama Ibn Badiss]'.

Being emotionally charged, Fatima expressed Algeria's obligation to unconditionally support Syrian war refugees, and further argued:

'…while many of the Arab countries totally closed their borders in the face of Algerians during the Algerian civil war and accused Algeria of being a source of terrorism in the world, Algerians did not turn their backs to their Syrian brothers during the Arab spring…' [nahna fi wakt el irhab el alam kolo kan did contre el jazaei'ir hata boldan moslima tahmet el jazaei'ir anaha Masdar irhab lakin nahna lama ikhwatna souriyin rahom fi mihna li fotna aliha nahna sa'adnahom w nsa'edo ay wahed yahtaj el mosa'ada].

Fatima, surely, meant the Kingdom of Morocco that accused Algeria of being responsible of Marrakech terrorist attacks in 1994 and other Gulf countries that implicitly may have added fuel into fire by 'financially supporting Islamists in Algeria', as Sidaoui claimed (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 232). A year after I met Fatima in 2018, in 2019 during the Algerian movement "Hirak" against Bouteflika's regime, Algerians presented posters with different slogans: 'No to foreign intervention', 'No Emirates in the land of the Martyrs', 'No to France, No to the UAE' to express their refusal of foreign intervention into Algeria's internal affairs (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2020, p. 26). The sensitiveness of Algerians towards foreign interference is due to their colonial past with the French coloniser (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2020, p. 26) and post-colonial experience with terrorist groups during the black decade in 1990s.

3.3. Conclusion

'We are not allowed to assume the task of governance by reason of ambition, pride, or love of power, but to fight for the cause of God to prevent fratricidal bloodletting among Muslims, to protect their properties and pacify the country as required by the fervor of faith and patriotism' (El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri; in Kiser, 2008, p. 68).

A few lines in El Amir Abdu El-Kader's sermon show how his faith stimulated his national sentiment. His efforts in building an Islamic nation are undeniable. In order to achieve unity among Algerians, Abdu El-Kader acted as an example of good morals, rectitude, incorruptibility, education and reform. He used to remind Algerians of the main source of strength that is Islam. His certainty of the main element that made a good governor was to be able to ensure equality and social justice, was inspired by the divine law in Quran, the Sunna,

Hadith, the different legal traditions and the wisdom of the prophets (Kiser, 2008). During the process of raising national consciousness, El Amir Abdu El-Kader planned to solve three problems notably: creating a central administration, financing the administration, enforcing the payment of taxes and building an army. His army was financed by the taxes collected from people and was faithful and very determined to fight against the French coloniser. After his defeat by Abdu El-Kader, General Camille Alphonse Trézel wrote:

'In this deadly struggle, I saw the hopes I considered reasonable evaporate. I need victory for them to be realized. Obviously, I overestimated our own forces and underestimated those of the Arabs (Kiser, 2008, p. 85)'.

The central objective of Abdu El-Kader's divine mission was to unify Algerians. The words of the Prophet Mohamed were often on his lips 'Muslims are like a body. If an eye suffers, the whole body suffers with it …' (Kiser, 2008, p. 97). It can be said that the nationalist movement started with Abdu El-Kader's local resistance during the 19th century. His efforts in establishing social power and the characteristics of an Algerian national identity shaped the future movements of nationalism in Algeria. His thoughts were driven by strong national cultural and religious values; he demonstrated a political wisdom and power of persuasion (Marston, 2013).

The Algerian nation was culturally and politically equipped enough to search for and build the modern nation rather than just imitating or accepting assimilation with a foreign orientalist culture. This is what Algerian nationalists in the 20th century focussed on as a continuation of Abdu El-Kader's distinctive beliefs. In the twentieth century, the nationalist movement started with Messali Hadj. His organizations included ENA (L'étoile Nord-Africaine) in 1926, the PPA (Algerian People's Party; in French Parti du Peuple Algérien) in 1937, the MTLD (Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques) in 1946. He had been a political

activist from 1926 to 1962 during which he focused on total independence for the Greater Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) from foreign occupation. Unity and solidarity between the countries of the Greater Maghreb were his main claims and objectives. Benjamin Stora argues that Messali Hadj is a pioneer of Algerian nationalism in the 20th century with his discourse entitled 'this land - Algeria - is not for sale' (cette terre n'est pas à vendre) delivered on August 2nd, 1936 in Algiers. This is one of the most influential discourses in the history of modern Algerian nationalism in the 20th century.

Messali's discourse was engraved on Algerians' minds; indeed, they realised that there is a need for a radical change along with a political and civil separation from the French nation. In his discourse, Messali calls for a revolution: 'we will take back this land' (Messali Hadj on August 2nd, 1936). Messali's discourse is divided into two parts; the first is a greeting in Arabic to all Algerians in the name of his organization (ENA) and in the name of 200, 000 North African immigrants living in France. He shows that despite his exile, neither his Algerian Muslim identity nor his mother tongue (Arabic) changed. After the greetings comes the call to nationalism which was delivered in French. The reason for stating these principles in French, I believe that Messali wanted to transfer his message not only to Algerians or North Africans but to the French audience who were against colonisation. Messali ended his discourse by saying 'No to the indigenous code, no to the racial policy and hatred among races; long life to the Algerian people and to ENA' (Messali, 1936).

Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, on the other hand, followed a cultural and religious orientation. By establishing the AUMA organization in 1931, scholars contributed to Algerian nationalism by defending the culture. Their slogan for cultural nationalism was 'Algeria is our country, Islam

is our religion, and Arabic is our language' (Berger, 2002, p. 03). They implicitly focused on the political doctrines of nation, people, and homeland. They took a strong opposing stand against the orientalist project of civilization. Islamic schools known as madrasa or zawiyah, magazines, newspapers and sermons in mosques aimed for social reformation, protection of the original purity of Islam (policy of Islah) and unity between Algerians in the name of brotherhood in Islam (the Umma).

In addition to religion, the focus on cultural aspects did not prevent Ibn Badiss and his followers from raising consciousness among the national community and make Algerians more passionate about liberty. In his study, Abd el- Aziz Filali shows how Ibn Badiss supported the revolutionary movements. As published in Dahleb publishing and printing house in Algiers, Ibn Badiss called the Algerian people and elites

'…O' scholars, now Allah (God) has blessed you with his support in order for you to be able to assume responsibility with your ultimate courage and sacrifice. On this day, I would like to say that there is no chance; you either die fighting for your country (Algeria) or surrender or leave it to your enemy (France)…' (Nacer, 2010; My translation from Standard Arabic to English).

Similar to El Amir Abdu El-Kader, the reformist discourses of Ibn Badiss were inspired by the Quran and the Prophet Mohamed's saying and this narrative covered different aspects of life. In this respect, the Malaysian journal of Islamic sciences (USIM's journal) published Bey Zekkoub's work in Arabic in 2015. An explanatory study based on descriptive and analytical methods and the inductive historical approach indicates how Ibn Badiss called to the use of Qur'an and Sunnah, the understanding and straight action, the reform of souls, to the

brotherhood, to the unity of Muslims, to system and the Shūrā Council (*Shūrā* in Islam means to ask every member of their opinions before making a final decision). He enjoined upon Algerians, his people, to seek right knowledge, to think clearly, to face realism and adopt gradual change, and to practice modesty in language and writing. He strongly focused on Algerian nationalism, and stability in principles (against apostasy in Islam).

As Özkırımlı (2005) argues, it is a failure to define nationalism either by culture or politics. Nationalist movements led by El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj were important in raising consciousness, for creating a desire for liberty and independence, and instilling a sense of nationalism in every Algerian's mind and soul. Together, these ideologues give power to nationalism and its discursive claims. El Amir Abdu El-Kader was the first who started the resistance against the French coloniser. His resistance was not based on creating political organisations, but it was based on fighting in battles to liberate Algeria. Alloula (1987) argues that the nationalist movements that were purely political started in the twentieth century. Indeed, the wave of Algerian nationalism started when Messali Hadj took a political stance when he was exiled in France. Additionally, Ibn Badiss added faith to the Algerian soul by educating and reforming society. Finally, I argue that each of the nationalist figures stated above provided a significant contribution to the twenty-first century sense of the Algerian nation.

Chapter Four: Who Counts as an Algerian? Algerianisation of the Nation, Conflicting Governmentalities and Power Discourses in Post-Colonial Algeria

'The long French attempt to crush anything but French culture in Algeria, culminating in a murderous war that finally brought independence, surely contributed to the extremist tendencies seen there today' (Edward H. Thomas, 1999: 27 in Benrabah, 2013, p. xi)

The narratives of the three pioneers of Algerian nationalism and national belonging: El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj, provided a solid foundation for post-colonial Algerian nation to grow within the Republic's Islamic ethos. The following few lines from Ibn Badiss's poem summarise the foundation of the *Algerianising mission* that came as a reaction to the assimilationist mission of the French regime:

'The People of Algeria are Muslim, and they lay claim to the Arab nation

Whoever says the Algerian people is far from its origins or has lost its life is uttering lies.

And whoever seeks to 'assimilate' it into some other nation Seeks an impossible goal to achieve…'

(Ibn Badiss in Alghailani, 2011, p. 61).

By the start of the Algerian revolutionary war, the statement of 1st of November 1954 interpreted in words the visions of the three pioneers by refusing all acts of French governmental imperialism, achieving full independence, recovery of territorial sovereignty and achieving unity between Muslim countries through the following main objectives:

- 'Total independence of Algeria by setting up Algerian citizenship and achieving territorial independence by rejecting the annexation of Algeria to the French territory.
- Establishing Algeria as a People's Democratic Republic State within an Arabo-Islamic ethos.
- Respect and recognition of different ethnic and religious groups in Algeria.
- Unity of the Great Maghreb countries in North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco under same principles of Islam and Arabism' (Statement of 1st of November 1954; My translation from classical Arabic to English).

Not only did the statement of 1st of November 1954 aim at achieving full political, cultural and economic independence to Algeria but it focussed on re-uniting the Great Maghreb countries to end the French civilising mission in North Africa. By achieving this, France would have lost its linguistic, cultural and economic dominance over the countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. However, this has not happened, and France still dominates the linguistic and economic terrain of the three countries and the dream of uniting of the Maghreb countries sooner collapsed after the Algerian and Moroccan conflict during the Sands war in 1963 and the closure of the Algerian-Moroccan land borders in 1990's following the accusation of Morocco to Algeria of being responsible of terrorist attacks in Marrakech in 1994 (Lounnas & Messari, 2018, pp. 06, 09).

In this chapter, I will elaborate how the principles of statement of 1st of November were implemented through the state's biogovernmental policies of *Algerianisation* after its independence in July 1962. The main state strategies that the present chapter will discuss are Islamisation, Arabisation and re-connection with the rest of the Arab world, and enacting citizenship laws and social welfare policies based on egalitarianism and their administrations. These post-colonial state's biogovernmental strategies came as a strong reaction to what the French tended to eradicate through sénatus-consulte in 1865. The state biogovernmental policies of *Algerianisation* aimed at promoting and protecting nationalistic values of the Algerian nation, and had, in turn, *unconsciously* and *implicitly* influenced the openness of Algerianness towards "the other": Syrian displaced people in this case. These unconscious rules that are governing the state's openness towards "the other" can be observed through *new evolving modalities* of Algerianness / citizenship namely: *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarianism* in the age of human migration in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In the Algerian case, not only has hospitality been securitised since the start of 2015, but also humanitarianism has been securitised since the black decade (1990s) in the way described in Mark Duffield's book *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (2014) as *new* or *political humanitarianism* that offers conditional assistance to displaced people (Duffield, 2014, p. 75, emphasis added). Algeria's securitisation of humanitarianism was not seen as a necessity by some of my Syrian participants 'because Algeria already experienced a civil war in the 90s and is now safe [el balad halae aman … el jazaei'ir achat min kabl el irhab wa el harb el ahliya bi tiss'inat]' (Mohamed). Kamal, an Arab and Sunni Muslim, expressed the same viewpoint as Mohamed but added that:

'… unlike in Syria, in Algeria we do not see many different ethnic or religious groups that are constantly in a conflict … in Syria for instance, we have kurds, Arabs, Druzes, Yazidis, Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shias, Jewish

people …' [nahna b souriya adna ktir tawa'if diniya … adna kord, el arab, drouz, el yazidiyin, w adna ktir diyanat mitl souna, Shia, el yahoud,w lmassih … ama bi el jazaei'r ma fi ktir tawa'if w ma fi khilafat ktir ….].

While some Syrians did not find strong reasons for the state's securitisation of humanitarianism and hospitality, others, such as, Fateh, tried to find excuses for these state's strategies. He added:

'…Algeria has had a long history with terrorism during the black decade and these state decisions aim at efficiently securitising Algeria's borders against terrorist groups or migrant smuggling especially from the Algerian-Libyan land borders or even a wave of the Arab spring… I understand it is Algeria's right to protect its borders…' […ana bzon ano el dawla min hakha t amane hodoudha w khassatan anou el jazaei'ir achat fatra s'iba ma'a el irhab w hala'e ma'a tahrib wa irhab w rabie el arabi…]'.

Analysing what Mohamed, Kamal and Fateh argued about the state's securitisation refers to Foucault's conceptualisation of power. While Mohamed and Kamal criticised the state's practice of security power and perceived it as negative and more controlling, Fateh, on the other hand, saw the state's power as positive because it aimed at protecting the security of the population against terrorist threats. Indeed, Fateh's viewpoint leads us to the idea of biopolitics.

The previous chapter critically reviews literature of colonial Algerian history by focussing on the French civilising mission which can be observed as "the will to improve" adopted by a colonial power to boost the wellbeing of the French settlers and Algerian Jews in Algeria. Within the educational setting the French policy excluded Islamic studies and Arabic language from the school curriculum. Likewise, by excluding Algerian Muslims from citizenship rights

in colonial Algeria, French colonial governmentality and its policies and practices resulted in language, ethnicity and faith-based conflicts that continued to exist in post-colonial Algeria. The present chapter explains how colonial governmentalities shaped Algeria's post-colonial decisions in citizenship and education. These two state policies were responsible of shaping Algerianness and fostering Algerian national pride in post-colonial Algeria. This statecraft produced an "ideal Algerian citizen" in the collective imagination and in an indirect way, also help set up boundaries between who deserves inclusion into the Algerian community and who does not.

'If the history of metropolitan Europe in the last century and a half has been a struggle to establish statehood for nationalities, Europe left Africa at independence with states looking for nations', writes Appiah (1992, p. 262 in Adamson, 1998, p. 87). Appiah's quote shows that the challenge of nation building in Africa is principally a reaction to European occupation. McDougall (2003a) argues that nation is the unifying norm that determines a shared history, culture, and political belonging for any population. Nationalism is the sentiment of belonging to a certain nation whose community members share the same history, values, culture and political destiny. Ernest Renan views the fact of 'I am French' does not make sense unless it is associated with notions that add meaning to the status of being French (in Breuilly, 1993, p. 06). In this chapter, I discuss how the meaning of being Algerian has been shaped by state practices after independence.

Adamson (1998) argues that the search for an Algerian nation, for example, started with different written and oral discourses since 1930s during the French occupation. During colonial Algeria, cultural and political discourses of Algerian nationalism were led by Ibn Badiss

'Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, and Arabic is our language' (Berger, 2002, p. 03) and Messali Hadj by claiming full independence during colonial Algeria. After a 132 year-period of French brutality and occupation, turmoil ended, and Algeria gained total independence in July 1962. The next challenge after gaining full independence would be to embark on a nation- building process that would re-establish Algeria's diplomatic status at an international level.

The name of the new independent state is the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and Ahmed Ben Bella was the first president of the state in 1962. His presidency did not last long because he had to face a bloodless coup d'état led by the minister of national defence, Houari Boumedienne on June 19th, 1965. Algeria's first National Charter had been adopted under the FLN ideology that rejected cultural assimilation of Algerians into western culture, French imperialism, and it supported political, cultural and economic independence. The process of framing Algeria as an Arab-Muslim nation-state and Algerians as Arabs and Muslims successfully occurred during Boumedienne's era through adopting different national reformation policies such as national language policies (Arabisation), citizenship and nationality laws, industrial and land reforming policies and the like. In the rise of a nation-state, Sassen (2006) argues that the three capabilities or assemblages of territory, authority and rights (TAR) should exist in all complex organizational forms and may change and vary in the ages of nation-state and globalisation and internationalism. In the case of Algeria, during decolonisation, Algerianisation had been a long process in nation-state building which was shaped by a certain social and political order based on the historical past of Algeria and based on rejecting the western values and western imperialism that the French enacted. After gaining full independence, Algeria gained power, exclusive authority and sovereignty over its own

territory and its natural resources such as ‘mines’ and ‘all banks and foreign firms’ (nationalisation of hydrocarbon industry in Sahara) (Layachi, 1998, p. 12).

Referring to independent Algeria, Choueiri (2000, p. 02) adds that ‘the birth of the nation-state announces and solidifies uniformity in political organization, economic activity and cultural growth’. In this regard, during Boumedienne’s rule, Algeria witnessed a significant growth in the national economy and moved into a phase of industrialization and agrarian revolutions along with a cultural redefinition of Algeria (Naylor, 2015, p. 196) as a part of economic decolonisation from French dependency. Culturally, Algeria chose Arabic as its only official language and Islam as the official state’s religion. Economically, modern Algeria had been established a socialist state and its principal economic sector, oil and gas, were nationalised in 1971 (Adamson, 1998). Since then, oil and gas have played a prominent role in Algeria’s economic revival. Algeria, then, succeeded in setting up rights for people by establishing social justice that was based on an egalitarian philosophy of distributing the state’s wealth among the population (Crowley, 2017) and making sure that all citizens enjoy equal rights and duties. In June 19th, 1975, Boumedienne introduced a new ‘National Charter’ with ‘a new constitution’, a ‘new parliament’, APN (Assemblée Populaire Nationale / Popular National Assembly), and a ‘presidential political system’ and new economic ideologies (Layachi, 1998, p. 12). Adamson argues that the national Charter aimed at introducing three main ideological objectives

‘… to assert and consolidate Algerian national identity and promote all forms of cultural development; to raise continuously the level of education and technical skills; to adopt a way of life which is in harmony with the principles of the Socialist Revolution as defined in the present charter’ (1998, p. 69).

The previous chapter discussed different definitions and conceptualisations of Algerianness during colonial rule (1830 to 1962). This chapter continues to explore the state's process of framing and reshaping Algerianness after independence (post-1962) from a perspective of Foucault's concept of governmentality. This chapter will focus on how post-colonial Algerianness has been re-defined through conflicting discourses of laws of citizenship, Arabisation, Islamisation and the Berber civil movement in 1980s. In this respect, it will focus on how post-colonial state of Algeria has used the social rights of citizenship, such as education, to foster national pride and shape Algerianness by Arabising the community and re-establishing ties with the rest of the Arab world through teacher exchange programmes with countries such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Algeria's re-connection with the Arab world cannot be limited only to Arabization programmes that were adopted in educational and administration settings, but it can be observed in Algeria's military support during the Arab war against Israeli forces in 1967 and 1973 when the Algerian military backed up Syria and Egypt. Since then, Algeria continued its unconditional support to Palestine and the Algerian-Israeli relations never crystallised into official diplomatic and political relations between both countries and people. The state's approach to re-connect post-colonial Algeria with the rest of the Arab world shaped Algerians' openness towards the Arab nations. This point was articulated by my Syrian participant, Ayman, for instance stated that: '…generally, Algerians are not very open towards people from Gulf countries, but they offer a special treatment and hospitality towards Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqi people … [Chaeb el Jazaei'iri chaeb tayib lakin andhom I'etibarat okhra maa souriyin, falasstiniyin wa irakiyin yorahibouna bihom aktar min cho'oub el okhra ou mitl nas min boldan el khalij …]. This reflects Algeria's policy during the era of Boumedienne to boost the sense of nationalism and belonging to the Ummah within a framework of pan-Arabism by supporting nationalist states and their armies. Surely, Ayman's viewpoint and his assessment of the treatment and the level of openness of Algerians towards

Syrians, Iraqi and Palestinians intended to reflect how post-colonial Algerianness was designed as a nationalistic force that is unconditionally open to Algeria's brothers-in-arms and nationalistic nations in Syria, Iraq and in Egypt that fought for their independence against imperialism compared to the Gulf monarchies.

The sequence of events that took place in post-1962 Algeria reveals that Algerianness is a real image of a complex struggle of four main state discourses namely: political, cultural, religious and nationalistic values that have always defined the "ideal Algerian citizen" and have shaped and defined the nature of Algerian citizenship and automatically set up norms and values of inclusion and exclusion of non-citizens including refugees. This chapter will also demonstrate how a Badissian view of 'Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, and Arabic is our language' (Vince, 2015, p. 44) has promoted and framed Algerianness and in particular, how this species of modern nationhood can be viewed in terms of governmentality that reproduces the power-knowledge relation in post-1962 Algeria. This has revealed that Algerian citizenship has been governed by three main powerful technologies, the state's territorial sovereignty, religion and language. The state technologies will automatically interfere in how the state responds to a flow of non-citizens to its national territory.

4.1. Different Discourses of Algerianisation in Post-colonial Algeria and the Production of the "Ideal Citizen"

4.1.1. Arabisation and Pan-Arabism

Following Badissian cultural nationalism, the first decision taken by the independent state of Algeria was to agree on the status of Islam as the only official and national religion of the state. In order to promote Islamisation, mosques that were converted into Christian churches and cathedrals during the French occupation, were reconverted into mosques, as was the case of 'La mosquée de Ketchaoua', the oldest mosque in Algiers (Entelis, 1986, p. 80). Politically, the presidency remained the source of power and decision-making and the FLN was the only legal political party. The reason why the FLN has gained a high status in Algeria even after adopting multi-party politics is because the sense of paying tribute to the revolutionary war, martyrs and Algerian nationalism have always been embedded into the sense of legal and social norms of Algerianness. In this regard, Algerianness has been strongly designed as a nationalistic and a patriotic community of values. Indeed, Layachi (1998, p. 11) confirms that after Ben Bella's short presidency (from 1963 to 1965), 'Boumedienne used nationalism to unify the Algerians'.

Culturally and linguistically, Arabisation was obtained as an ideology of decolonising Algeria's linguistic heritage from the linguistic history and dominance of France. Although having different ethnic minorities in Algeria, including non-Arabs whose first language is not

Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic (the type of Arabic used in the Qu'ran) was agreed to be the only official language of Algeria. The Berber language, however, gained national status in 2002 and a status of second official language in 2016. I believe that the reason why the decision to give an official and a national status to the Berber language came late, after 40 years of independence, is because Algeria's first mission after independence was to redefine identity by creating a unified society after being dismantled by the French linguistic and cultural policies and practices of division during colonisation. The policy of Arabisation aimed at creating a homogeneous nationalist society composed of people that share the same language and the same ethnicity. Although Arabisation started in Ben Bella's period when he announced after independence that 'Algeria is an Arabo-Muslim country' (Cheref, 2015, p. 40), the policy boosted during Houari Boumedienne's rule.

During Boumedienne's presidency, Algerian society and the conceptualisation of Algerianness, in general, have been designed as Islamic and Arab within a socialist state framework. This has resulted in a nation-state that is very proud of its history of revolutionary war against the French and proud of its martyrs that participated in attaining full independence of Algeria. Silverstein (2004, p. 70) claims that Boumedienne's ideology of Arabisation considered the Berber identity as 'backwards'.

President Houari Boumedienne was a strong believer in pan-Arabism and Arab unity as a cultural policy and a political ideology that entirely rejects western imperialism and revolts against the Israeli colonising policies. In addition to the application of Arabisation in educational settings and the project of Algerian programmes of teachers exchange with Iraq, Egypt and Syria, Algeria's contribution during the Arab Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 is undeniable. Its attitude towards Palestine remains unchangeable since the day Houari

Boumedienne declared that Algeria will always stand by the side of Palestine. The Algerian-Palestinian alliance has remained strong and Algeria, to date, has not established diplomatic relations with Israel as an act of solidarity with Palestinians and as a rejection to the Israeli project of modern colonialism in Palestine. Prior to that, Algeria retained strong relationship with Syria where Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, the significant leader of the Algerian resistance during the 19th century, was exiled by the French coloniser. As a devout Sufi, a scholar and a promoter of openness and tolerance among religious faiths, Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri gained an international reputation especially after he protected Christians in his palace in Damascus until he achieved reconciliation after the sectarian riot in Syria and Lebanon in 1860 (Wien, 2017, p. 08). This is similar to the most compelling story of unconditional hospitality and protection for vulnerable lives in the Islamic history (Kidwai, 2017). The story started when followers of Prophet Mohamed were forced to leave Makkah and they sought refuge in the land of 'Abyssinia' (Kidwai, 2017, p. 175). Although not a Muslim land, the king of Abyssinia offered unconditional welcome, generosity and protection to Muslims among his Christian community (Kidwai, 2017, p. 175). Abdu El-Kader's act of hospitality, openness and solidarity with 'the other' remains a vital aspect in Algeria's response during the displacement of Arab populations such as the Syrian displaced community that sought refuge to Algeria after the Syrian civil war.

Within the educational setting, education has been free for Algerians and nearly 35% of the state's budget was devoted to the education and professional training during Boumedienne's era (Layachi, 1998, p. 11). In order for the process of Arabisation to be successful, during Boumedienne's era, Algeria was supplied with Arabic teachers from Arab countries namely Egypt and Syria for its new education system right after the independence (Benrabah, 2013). Surprisingly, the policy of Arabisation was challenging for Arabophones rather than for

Francophones who carried out their educational and professional training in French. Although all subjects came to be taught in Arabic, the French language lost its status and has been classified as a foreign language, the job market still required, at that time, people to master French (Benrabah, 2013, p. 63).

4.1.2. Arabisation and Berberism

After Boumedienne's death in 1978, the image of a utopian Algeria started to be questioned (Crowley, 2017, p. 6) and all genres of tribalism and regionalism started to emerge. This means that the Algerian community of values might be re-shaped in the coming years. During Chadli's presidency, the Boumediennist doctrine started to change and was re-oriented; relations between the state, the government and the population were redefined (Stone, 1997). This has allowed public opinion and the opposition to strengthen and Algeria has moved to liberalism in several sectors; politics, economy, press and media (Stone, 1997).

As an opposition to Boumedienne's National Charter, Chadli designed a new Charter in January 1986 (Stone, 1997). The new National Charter rejected socialism and adopted capitalism and went towards free markets. As it was during Boumedienne's era, Chadli's era also witnessed an acceleration in the programme of Arabisation of the judiciary and the press. This even affected the linguistic landscape of Algeria and many French names in street signs were replaced by Arabic ones (Stone, 1997).

The questioning of the existing community of values started during Chadli's era when the Berberist movement commenced by university students in Tizi Ouzou in March and April

1980. This came as a reaction to banning Mouloud Mammeri from presenting his works in Berber by the Algerian authorities (Crowley, 2017). The state authorities, in turn, responded violently to student protests and strikes. The uprising and demonstrations challenged the regime's ideology of shaping the Algerian community of values through educational, religious and linguistic policies that marginalised and did not grant the Berber language any status (Entelis, 1986). Popular protests defending human rights were almost impossible during Boumedienne's presidency when freedom of speech was curtailed by the executive authority that was the only source of power and decision making (Crowley, 2017; Naylor, 2015). It was only in April 1987 that the Algerian government officially approved the first Human Rights league in Algeria. Consequently, 'the Berberist movement has largely given way to liberal-democratic movement agitating on the issue of human rights', Roberts adds (2003, p. 29).

The Algerian programme of Arabisation had been welcomed by the Arabophones yet rejected by Kabyle people and the Francophones that have chosen to hold an opposing stand to Boumedienne's ideology. In other words, they rejected the Algerian community of values, Algerianness, designed by Boumedienne's government. Although not being excluded from citizenship and entitlement to legal, social and civil rights, Kabyles looked forward to redefining Algerianness by adding Berberism as a fundamental element, like Islamism and Arabism, claiming that the origins of the Algerian people are Amazigh (Berbers). However, social unrest and protests among Berber activists did not have a strong platform to rely on during the 1980s because Algeria was still, at that time, adopting a one-party politics -FLN-. Stone (1997), on the other hand, argues that the Berber spring, referring to popular uprising in the region of Kabylia, was one of the stimuli that pushed Chadli's regime towards liberalism and towards a multi-party system of politics.

After Algeria adopted liberalism during Chadli's government, a series of demonstrations during the 1980s, led by Berber civil society and Berber activists, continued until Bouteflika's government (1999- 2019) approved their proposal by introducing the Berber language into the Algerian national parliament. In 2002, the question of Berber identity that adopted ethnic, cultural and linguistic affiliations was revived and was stronger than before because Algeria has opened doors to democracy and paved the way to multiple political parties to operate since 1988. As a result, the Berber language has been recognised in the constitution as a second national language, after classical Arabic, in 2002 and as a second official language in 2016. After making the Berber language official, it started to be taught in schools. It even started to appear in Algeria's linguistic landscape as a second language after Arabic, that has always dominated the Algerian context as a first official language. Interestingly, the decision to formalise the status of Berber and approve it as a national and official language during Bouteflika's presidency was taken without a popular agreement of the majority or a national opinion poll of Algerians. This means that the state has always monopolised power over the design of the Algerianness as a social / normative force since independence in 1962.

Following the historical changes of post-colonial Algeria, Algerianness has implicitly been composed of three main elements namely Islam, Arabism, and Berberism because the Algerian citizenship did not exclude Berbers from legal, social or civil rights. However, it is worth mentioning that this has explicitly been approved only when the Berber language and culture were legally recognised by the Algerian constitution in 2002. Algerianness has always been a struggle of legal and normative powers. Both legal and normative forces are inseparable.

4.1.3. Islamisation and Security Issues in Post-colonial Algeria

Benrabah (2013, p. 63) argued that the intensive process of Arabisation, rather than a gradual shift, resulted in economic inequalities that created social differentiations among social classes. He further argues that the ideology of Arabisation in late 1960s and early 1970s resulted the spread of 'Islamic fundamentalism, xenophobia, chauvinism and obscurantism' and, therefore, contributed to the cause of the civil war -the black decade- between a secular state and Islamic extremists in Algeria in the early 1990s (Benrabah, 2013, p. xiii). The civil war was a critical phase for Algeria which affected its economy, politics and all echelons of society. Similarly, Stone claims that 'language in Algeria is still a political, ideological, social and a psychological issue in Algeria' (1997, p. 18). Along with language, the focus on maintaining Islam as modern Algeria's religion has contributed to the triggers which led to the civil war (Stone, 1997).

Society and culture in Algeria had gone through fundamental changes during the 1980s (Entelis, 1986, p. 69), but it is Islam that succeeded in maintaining unity among Algerians and preventing social chaos from happening despite their societal and cultural differences. Indeed, I agree with Sidaoui that 'one cannot speak of radical or fundamentalist movements before 1980s,' during Boumedienne's era (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 225). This is because the conflict between the state and Islamic extremists (FIS- Front Islamique du Salut / Islamic Salvation Front- & GIA- Groupe Islamique Armé / Armed Islamic Group-) was primarily and strongly driven by political, social and economic factors rather than linguistic or religious ones.

The first stirrings of the Algerian crisis (civil war) emerged when a series of strikes and protests in different places started in 1985 due to the failure of social policy to cover and manage a significant baby boom, drop of oil prices that led to high rate of unemployment, housing crisis (Stone, 1997; Crowley, 2017) and most importantly the rise of social inequalities. Sudden eruption of riots in October 1988, known as Black October, in Algiers protestors attacked government offices and organisation which later spread to the western and eastern parts of the country (Stone, 1997). As a result, more than 200 were killed and at least 3,500 protestors were arrested (Stone, 1997, p. 64). The social discontent was exploited by Islamic extremists and, indeed, on October 10th, 1988 in central Algiers, Ali Belhadj, cofounder with Abbassi Madani of the FIS, gathered more than 100 protesters for his first sermon (Crowley, 2017; Stone, 1997, p. 64). The gathering ended up with a massacre as the Algerian authorities reacted violently to the gathering. The state still considered the gathering as an illegal Islamist and extremist gathering and consequently, the sermon was banned, and the ensuing riot left approximately 40 people killed (Stone, 1997, pp. 64-65). Following a series of traumatic riots in October 1988 that had shaken Chadli's regime, social justice and the sense of egalitarianism, which were achieved during Boumedienne's era, had disappeared. Stone further (1997, p. 66) gave an example of the social gap that became wider than before between state officials, elites and tycoons that were able to 'fill their swimming pools' as opposed to ordinary citizens that were suffering from water and food shortages.

As an attempt to solve the deteriorated social situation Algerians witnessed during the 1980s, Chadli started reforming his regime to be based on full democracy and introduced a new constitution by the end of 1989. Yet, the new constitution did not do much to fulfil social justice or focus on ameliorating the social conditions at that time. Instead, it only omitted the terms 'socialist' in the end and replaced it with the slogan of 'popular democratic' (Entelis, 1986, p.

81). Due to catastrophic social conditions, FLN lost the trust of people and Chadli's regime customized the nature of Algerian politics by ending single-party politics and projecting political pluralism. The new constitution offered the chance to several political parties to operate legally in provisional and municipal elections organised in 1990 and 1991 that were the first elections to take place after adopting multi-party politics in Algeria. Despite all parties taking place in elections, the state regime and army forces gambled on the FLN winning but the majority of people in Algeria hoped that FIS, as an Islamic party, would resolve the disastrous social situation the FLN's government led the country to. The FLN became less popular, and the FIS won a majority of seats ('853 out of 1539') during the first and the second rounds of provincial and municipal elections (Stone, 1997, p. 72; Crowley, 2017).

FIS, led by Abassi Madani, won a majority of seats and could practice power to promote changes in the political agenda of the state. Abassi Madani claimed his Islamic party to be the legitimate ruler of Algeria and was looking forward to winning the presidential elections planned in 1993 (Stone, 1997, p. 72). The programme of reform designed by the FIS party had a poorly defined idea of Algeria's real economic and social circumstances during the 1980s and barely any of the political scene and how Algeria's national power as an independent state was still weak at an international level. Their programme of Islamisation also isolated the military and considered replacing the armed forces with the classical consultation in Islamic -Shura- (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 234). Politics, to them, was simply a mission of mobilizing groups in terms of a perspective of display of power (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 234). Indeed, Sidaoui explains how extremists had contradictory propagandas; they believed in democracy as important in the Algerian politics, yet they did not have a clear programme towards a concrete achievement of it (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 235).

Given the fact that the FIS won a majority of seats in both provincial and municipal, they started applying their agenda by imposing radical extremist ideology on the population. Following the sequence of events, the armed forces declared a 'state of emergency' and had to ban them by cancelling the result of the elections, 'arresting most of their leaders including Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj' and, afterwards, forcing Chadli to resign in January 1992 (Crowley, 2017, p. 6; Stone, 1997, p. 75). The reaction of the Algerian government was criticised by radical extremist Islamists as a neo-colonial policy (Vince, 2015). Events went very quickly from clashes with extremists to massacres, bombing of public spaces and assassinations of intellectuals. Consequently, Algeria fell into a tragic civil war and political instability that resulted in approximately 200,000 victims (Benrabah, 2013).

Sidaoui explains how the Algerian army adopted several strategies to defeat extremists, isolate them and to stop the spread of their effect on the Algerians. During the first years, it was hard to ban the extremist movement because 'the Algerian army was operating in a very traditional manner using tanks and heavy equipment as trained by the Soviets advisers' (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 237). After 1995, in addition to the traditional strategy, the army adopted new strategies by employing 'sudden and small-sized operations' against Islamic groups (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 238). In 1997, the Algerian state created a self-defence group that belongs to the Ministry of Interior composed of 100,000 men (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 238).

Following the sequence of events during the Algerian civil war in 1990s and the state's reaction to it can still be seen as complex and very contradictory with the design of Algerianness. If Islam has always been a key component of the Algerian community of values, why would the state power reject the Islamist groups and categorise them as illegal groups? Why did the

establishment of an Islamic state fail in Algeria? In order to answer these questions, I will briefly demonstrate the main differences between an Islamic state regime and a regime of a modern state as detailed by Hallaq's book (Hallaq, 2014). Theoretically, the Islamic state is both impossible and contradictory in the age of modern states and globalisation whose legal, political, and moral patterns are incompatible with those of the Islamic state. This does not mean that the Islamic state is corrupt, or it would fail in whatever context, but it means that the paradigm of the modern state and the structure of the globalised world that are secular are designed not to fit Islamic governance and its principles. One of the differences is that modern state principles are based on western / European values derived from Europe's history; the other, the Islamic state, is based on moral codes described in Shari'a law. In this regard, the modern state system is dominated by capitalism and corporations and Islamic governance is genuinely based on religious, moral and normative principles rather than political ones. Within a nation state context, law and morality are separated, power is monopolized and is separated as executive, legislative and judiciary authorities, whereas 'in the Islamic state the function and authority of the executive and legislature are subordinate and ancillary to the judiciary' (Roberts, 2003, p. 05). Hallaq (2014, p. 23) adds further that ' the modern state possesses five form-properties: (1) its constitution as a historical experience that is fairly specific and local; (2) its sovereignty and the metaphysics to which it has given rise; (3) its legislative monopoly and the related feature of monopoly over so-called legitimate violence; (4) its bureaucratic machinery; and (5) its cultural-hegemonic engagement in the social order, including its production of the national subject'. Additionally, sovereignty within the nation state is the power that a particular state has over its own territorial boundaries while within the Islamic state paradigm, sovereignty is derived from the divine power of God that is the only source of ultimate moral authority (Hallaq, 2014).

Within the Algerian context, the failure of the FIS can be traced back to both internal and external factors (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009). Internally, Sidaoui argues that the strategies adopted by the Algerian regime, especially during Zéroual's presidency (1995-1999), were effective in weakening the FIS. Politically, the Algerian regime carried out modernisation at the level of the security and military forces which made the relation between the military and the regime more congruent and homogeneous. The Algerian regime isolated the FIS and started supporting parties of Islamic moderates and not extremists. This resulted in pulling the rug from under the FIS's feet which made them lose the societal support they had during 1990 and 1991 elections (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 239). Economically, the rise of oil and gas prices helped economic growth and the rate of inflation and corruption significantly decreased in the late 1990s (Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 240). Externally, Sidaoui (in Redissi & Lane, 2009) adds that the stance of the US, EU countries and UK against extremism by the late 1990s enhanced Algerian policy towards eradicating extremism and proved that the crisis is international and not only Algerian. After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the US, all possible international relations established by the FIS militants outside Algeria have been eradicated.

With a multi-party-political system, the GIA and FIS exploited Islam as 'a political vehicle' to justify the acts of Islamist extremists (Stone, 1997, p. 13). Indeed, Entelis argues that Islam has always been incorporated within the socialist ideology of Algeria as a modern state, however, after the 1970s, 'Islam's politicisation has become a central fact of the Algerian society' (1986, p. 77). This politicisation tended to force Algeria as a modern state to adopt extremism as a denomination of Islam by applying Islamic laws (Shari'a law) in all aspects of a nation-state rather than applying it in certain codes such as the Family Code (marriage, divorce, heritage…etc). Claiming to be an authentic Islamic party, the FIS, for instance, started making

modifications to the existing community of values, although against Islamic principles and values, by rejecting anything that may have been brought by the western culture by banning cinemas, 'forbidding co-education schooling', 'forbidding girls to continue formal education after the age of twelve' (Entelis, 1986, p. 86), human rights abuse, unlawful killings, the violation of women's rights and disappearances.

It is very important to mention that Islam in Algeria is moderate and belongs to the Sunni denomination which is the official religion of the state that has always been associated with reformists namely Ibn Badiss and his organization Ulema (Entelis, 1986). Entelis (1986, p. 81) argues that the role of Islam in Algeria has always been an instrument of unity and identity formation, 'not as a legal code by which to order state and society'. He (1986, p. 81) further claims that Algeria is 'a secular state with an Islamic cultural component'. However, I should confirm that Islam is not only a cultural component in the Algerian state, but it is a religion and a source of legitimacy. Indeed, some laws are based on Islamic laws. For instance, *adoption* in Islam, which is supporting an orphan and giving them the name of the adoptive parents, is illegal. But *sponsoring an orphan*, which is supporting an orphan without giving them the name of the adoptive parents, is legal in Islam. Another example is heritage law in the Algerian Family code; this is the same as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah (family code: book 3, chapter 1 to 10, 2003 & 2007). It should be mentioned that while some of Algerian laws are derived from the Quran and Sunnah, others are not necessarily influenced by the Islamic laws (Shari'a) such as finance code, trade code. They are adapted to the realities of international laws within the age of globalisation. Additionally, this has created an antagonistic conflict between religion and secular forces, as we saw with the military and state regimes in Algeria during the 1990s.

Volpi (2003, p. vii) argues that the Algerian crisis is the first clash of Islamic and Western ideologies of democracy in 'the Middle East and North Africa'. Benrabah (2013) argued that the state's policy of Arabisation provoked xenophobia and chauvinism to grow in the Algerian society. Most my research participants from the Syrian cohort believed the opposite and research data revealed that one of the strong factors that paved the way towards social inclusion in Algeria is the ethnic heritage: Arabness, that both nations share. In this regard, Fatima, from the Algerian cohort, added: 'being Arabs, this has helped in avoiding major problems or huge differences between Algerians and Syrians' [b hokm anana Arab makanch machakil kbira wala ikhtilafat kbira]. Unlike what Benrabah (2013) argued, my research data revealed that it was rather the black decade in the 90s that caused "a fear of otherness" to grow among Algerians towards others. Fatima, confirmed that

'…at the beginning some Syrians were not used to the Algerian mentality and the way Algerians think about the other … they felt that Algerians may be aggressive … Algerians are, by nature, somehow nervous and hot tempered and this is not because they are aggressive but because Algerians have gone through hard times from the French colonisation to the black decade in the 90s. All have impacted the way Algerians treat people they do not know / foreigners… in every Algerian family, everyone has at least witnessed one of these historical events … these events have impacted the way Algerians deal with the 'other', however, once Algerians are sure that 'the unknown other' is kind and trustworthy, they can give whatever they ask for … I know some Syrians that complaints about the mentality of Algerians but after few months they deduced that Algerians are one of the kindest and most caring people… these are what Syrians themselves admitted to me' […W kayen haja okhra and chaeb el jazaeiri li hiya narfaza w lazem lwahed yefahmo bach yekder y' ich ma'ah. W had narfaza w sor'aat el infi'aal hiya b hokm dorouf tani li achha el chaeb el jazaeiri; kima ta'arfi ano mafatch bezaf ala el ihtilal el faranci w el ochriya sawdae/ el irhab. Fa telkay fi kol bit jazaeiri aala el akal wahed ayach hado el ahdat fa akid rah t'atar fih w fi 'akliyto … fa el jaliyat el okhra momkin yafahmo ano el chaeb el jazaei'iri saeb mn na7iyat 'aklito lakin ba'ed modat achhor mn ta'ayouch ma'ahom bdaw yefahmo ano cha'eb el jazaeiri w hadik narfaza maykssad biha walou w blakss el fahmo ano cha'eb el jazaeiri ykder yaetik malo w khobzo w daro w howa mayedi walou …

souriyin fi el bidaya hkaw ala narfaza li fi tab'e el jazaeiri lakin fi el akhir fahmo ano makanch atyab w ahan mn kalb el jazaeiri w hadi b chahadathom w I'etirafathom…].

4.1.4. Who Counts as a Citizen? Citizenship Law, Rights, and the Boundaries of Post-colonial National Identity

In addition to the processes of Islamisation and Arabisation of people, the Algerian state enacted citizenship and nationality laws after independence to mark the birth of a new independent nation-state. Roberts (2003) argues that Algerian nationalism was not an extension of Arab nationalism; it has its own cultural context and roots and political history that are traced back to the colonial period. The colonial status of Algeria had influenced the post-1962 decisions in developing the nationality code (Mahiou, 2005 in Parolin, 2013). After independence, the Algerian government enacted the first Nationality Code on March 27th, 1963 which granted Algerian nationality and citizenship only to those whose father and grandfather had Muslim personal status (Loi n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 18, 2-4-63, p. 806-808). Decisions determining who is Algerian were not arbitrary. Post-colonial Algerian citizenship could be seen as a reaction to Code de l'indigénat of 1881 and Senatus-consulte (1865) that excluded all people of Muslim personal status, instead appointed them as subjects in French Algeria. Additionally, the law of Algerian citizenship is also a reaction to Crémieux decree (1870) which granted full French citizenship and rights to Jews in Algeria, in contrast to those whose fathers and grandfathers held Muslim personal status, who did not receive legal, social or civil status unless they abandoned their Muslim personal status. 1963 nationality law came with some provisions. Firstly, through the options provided by Evian accord, another category of people could possibly receive Algerian

citizenship ‘within three years of the date of self-determination’ provided they were not involved in any crimes against the Algerian nation. This category included European population in Algeria that could demonstrate 10 years of residency in Algeria (if born in Algeria) or 20 years of residency in case they were not born in Algeria but of Algerian-born parents (Loi n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité Algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 18, 2-4-63, p. 806-808: Vince, 2015, p. 150). Secondly and most importantly, the acquisition of Algerian citizenship was still possible to a category of people regardless of their ethno-religious status or residency criteria. In this respect, between 1962 and 1965, about 300 anti-colonialists of European origins were declared Algerians for their «participation in the Algerian war of liberation» (Mohand-Amer & Benzenine, 2012, p. 191, my translation from French to English). Finally, at that time, new-borns of unknown parents and stateless people were still eligible to Algerian citizenship. However, this law was gendered because Algerian females could not confer citizenship to their children unless the father was stateless or was unknown. An Algerian female could also lose her nationality in case she marries to a non-Algerian (Loi n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité Algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 18, 2-4-63, p. 806-808: Vince, 2015, p. 150).

Looking at how law of Algerian citizenship has been structured and how the process of determining who is Algerian has been carried out proves that religion has always been a key element of Algerianness and has remained aligned with the concept of nationalism even after independence as demonstrated in the post-independence nationality code. Ethno-cultural and religious factors defined Algerianness and as such, only people of Muslim personal status would unconditionally become citizens in the new independent state. Algerians whose ancestors were not Muslim, yet Christians and Jews, known as pieds-noirs (black feet) within the Francophone world, (Crowley, 2017) had to leave the country and emigrate to France.

In 1970, the law of Algerian citizenship was substituted with an order excluding religious status but keeping the parental condition for citizenship. Although the Algerian constitution (article 2) states that the state's official religion is Islam, it remains more liberal compared to other Muslim countries and religious minorities in Algeria can be Algerian citizens (Marzouki, 2012, p. 75). Nowadays, a Christian evangelised minority (between '20.000 and 30.000') still lives in Algeria (Marzouki, 2012, p. 75). Article 36 of the Algerian constitution 'establishes freedom of consciousness and opinion as inviolable liberties'. This includes freedom of religion because 'conversion and apostacy are not considered as criminal offences' (Marzouki, 2012, p. 75).

According to Law of citizenship in 1970, only Algerian fathers could confer citizenship to their offspring; mothers, on the other hand, could only pass nationality to their children in cases where the father is stateless or unknown (Law 1970-86, 15 December 1970, Algerian Nationality Law). Algerian law of citizenship in 1970 was discriminatory and did not give women the right to confer nationality neither to her children nor to her foreign spouse. Gender had been a determining factor when it comes to the status of Algerian citizenship during the 1970s and the 1980s. In the UK, for example, the concept of social rights of Marshallian citizenship were founded to put an end to discrimination and differentiation between social classes. In T.H Marshall's conceptualisation of citizenship, enjoying equal civil, political and social rights shape citizenship in the sense of protection and social justice, i.e. all citizens have equal status in law and equal rights (Dwyer, 2010). Legal citizens should enjoy the same social, civil and political rights such as the right to education, healthcare, voting/electing rights and the like (Basok & Ilcan, 2013). In other words, it can be argued that in order to achieve social equality among citizens of different social classes, they should fully enjoy their legal and social forms of citizenship. However, in independent Algeria, all Algerians received equal and free access to social rights of citizenship including healthcare, education, housing and employment.

Unlike in the UK, it was the right to confer citizenship to children that made Algerian females equal to males. After joining the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1996, Algeria enacted the new Nationality Code on February 25th, 2005 which gives women the right to confer nationality to their children following the CEDAW Art.9 (2) (UNHCR, n.d ; L'ordonnance n 5-01 du février 2005. Réactif journal officiel n 63/ 1972). Consequently, nationality by descent is now granted to children whose father or mother is Algerian. The right of conferring citizenship became equal between Algerian males and females and Algerian females have been able to confer citizenship to their foreign spouses (Home Office UK Border Agency, 2013). There is an exception in Algeria's citizenship law that is, in case of a child born to unknown parents in Algeria, the child could receive Algerian citizenship. Citizenship and nationality laws also give an idea about how Algerianness has been shaped throughout time.

In French Algeria, in 1949, the French biopolitical governmentality had established a social security system which excluded 90% of the Algerian population and covered only those who served the French army and the French administration (World Health Organization, 2002). The French welfare system was primarily dedicated to French nationals and naturalised citizens in colonial Algeria. After Algeria's independence, Boumedienne's era fostered national pride and boosted the process of Algerianisation by establishing a strong social policy to achieve social justice. Algeria's biopolitics aimed at enhancing the welfare and the well-being of the new independent population through free education, free healthcare, employment and housing. From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, 'this mode of governing to increase the 'utility and docility' of populations is enacted through concern with welfare - bodies, health, subsistence and habitation (Foucault in Judge, 2010, p. 06).

Before diving into the Algerian context, the concept of social protection system should be clarified. Karshenas and Moghadam (2006, p. 93) state that a solid social protection system is a mechanism of redistribution of wealth by using the income from GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in order to support 'vulnerable, elderly, disabled and underprivileged people'. Additionally, the social security system should cover all citizens and should be adequate to ensure the well-being of all members of society. For instance, among Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, the Tunisian model of social welfare has been the most successful mainly because it adopted a fusion of capitalism and western social programmes and strongly guaranteed the right of women to fully participate in all aspects of life through the enhancement of their socio-economic status by developing tourism and being open to 'export-led industrialization' (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 20, 21). However, in the Algerian context, the model of social welfare is completely different. After independence and because of a weak and a dislocated national identity and unity, openness was not the best option for Algeria to adopt. In order to develop the new independent nation, it was the state's decision to adopt a 'socialist model of development-industrialization and generous social policies' that have been fully dependent on oil industry income with no emphasis on tourism or agriculture like its neighbouring countries, namely Tunisia and Morocco. Over the period of more than twenty years, between the 1980s and 2004, Algeria struggled to move from a socialist system of economy to a more liberal regime in terms of political and economic policies (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, pp. 20, 21, 78, 79). This ultimately contributed to the violent civil war due to the government failure to manage the political and economic situation in the country (Ringen, 2006).

Over the past 20 years, the economic issues Algeria has witnessed can be referred back to the original design of the national mechanism of social policy and the heavily loaded bureaucratic

procedures imposed by the state (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). The socialist design of social policy did not offer a radical change, it only masked the real issue by offering a temporary assistance to Algerians after independence which made them more state dependent (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). State schemes such as: 'ANEM (National Employment Agency)', 'ANSEJ (National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment)' and 'CNAC (National Unemployment Insurance Fund)' (ETF, 2017, p. 08) are designed for Algerian citizenship holders and established to financially assist both Algerian youths to start their own projects and unemployed youth.

While the state's strong social policies should be based on maintaining strong economic growth that follows a 'solid programme of economic development, the Algerian social policy neglected this aspect and put its primary focus on social protection: assistance for employment, social security and social assistance dependent' (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). Though being one of the richest countries in Africa in 'natural resources, material wealth, and its human capital' (Aghrout and Bougherira, 2004, p. 62), the start of civil protests on February 22nd, 2019 was a reaction to the failure of a social policy, that remained fixed, unchanged and has not been updated since independence, within the age of globalisation and technological changes and development. Consequently, the insufficiency of social policy has widened the gap between lower and upper social classes of people and the middle class has almost disappeared in the Algerian socio-economic scene and social justice has failed to maintain equality in distributing wealth. Additionally, Karshenas and Moghadam (2006) confirm that despite all the social, economic, political changes that took place in independent Algeria, its social policy that was designed during Boumedienne's era has not yet been adjusted or updated to meet the needs of the population in the context of globalised capital. There is no doubt that this has resulted in social inequalities, a high rate of unemployment, especially among youth and degree-holders,

a significant expansion of the informal labour market that is not regulated and checked to meet the official and legal rules of employment law (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 92). The World Bank annual report released in April 2018 indicated that inflation in Algeria climbed from 4.8% in 2015 to 8.1% in 2019 and is expected to increase to 9.0% in 2020 (World Bank, 2018). In an attempt to revive Algeria's national economy, the new elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboun announced a new plan which aims at integrating more youth into national economy, decreasing bureaucratic procedures, encouraging youth with start-up ideas and turn them into successful businesses, exporting Algerian products to the African market.

4.2. Discourses of Algerianness in the Age of Mass Migration

In his work on Reflections of Migration and Governmentality, William Walters inserts that if Foucault's concept of governmentality is applied within the context of border control, and critical migration or people's displacement, in general, it should be investigated from a perspective of a struggle of power / knowledge (2015). In its relation to the analytical framework of migration, governmentality also focusses on rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities of power (Walters, 2015, p. 15 & 16). In this respect, governmentality should be seen as an 'encounter' and not only as 'a ready-made framework' (Walters, 2015, p. 04). He explains

'… the relationship between governmentality and migration is better modelled as one of encounter rather than application, since the idea of an encounter presumes that what we understand by migration, but also governmentality will change when these two phenomena are brought together … governmentality affords a

valuable perspective precisely because its understanding of power is not wedded to a static concept like the state, nor to any telos of transformation like global governance. With its characteristic analytical focus on rationalities, technologies, subjectivities, and bolstered and extended with other midrange concepts, it is well suited to map the new territories of power that are being brought into being by the encounter between politics and migration' (Walters, 2015, p. 15-16).

Foucault's concept of governmentality offers a demonstration of the state's construction, technologies, and art of governance throughout history from an angle of subjectivity and governance of the self (Bröckling et al, 2011, p. 02 in Walters, 2015, p. 02). The reason why I use biopolitical governmentality within the context of displacement, is because it frames 'discursive constructions and debates around asylum as part of constituting national identity' (Doty 1996, Pirouet 2001, Steiner 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). Another reason is because the struggle of power within the Algerian context that is manifested in the state's biopolitical practices of managing the flow of displaced people demonstrates a complex image of Algerian citizenship and openness of Algerianness towards displaced Syrians. In this regard, national identity or the national body is considered as a social construction which is monitored by the production of knowledge around the "ideal citizen" that can be included and who does not belong (Doty, 1996 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). This means that today's state decisions on whether to include or exclude Syrians from Algerian citizenship are still governed by the past. Postcolonial states often see the refugee body as a threat to the national body and often the production of knowledge around refugees is governed by the colonial discourses of 'the other' (Phil Hubbard, 2004 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). Due to the nature of Algerian citizenship, the process of naturalisation in Algeria is often mysterious and its success is not guaranteed. Perrin (2016, p. 16) claims that immigrants in the Maghreb states including: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Libya, became an 'object of rejection and negation' whose rights are often denied. Besides, the immigrant population is not well organised to defend them. The

current thesis relates to this gap. It argues that, in Algeria, for instance, because of the nature of citizenship which still retains its normative and nationalistic force, Algerian citizenship is still seen as a privilege rather than a right to an immigrant that fulfils the conditions of naturalisation. Although Arabs and Muslims, Syrian war refugees are no exception. Most of my Syrian participants reported inability to apply for Algerian citizenship because of legal procedures that limit their rights to legalise their status. Mohamed (32), a shop owner, was one of my Syrian participants that I asked about the possibility of naturalisation. With a despairing attitude, he expressed his view: 'I cannot apply for the Algerian citizenship because I do not have legal status in Algeria such as: long-residence permit and that is the problem [… la jinssiya mafi … la … w hada lmochkil el wahid li 'andna nahna souriyin houn w ntmana anhom ysa'adouna fiha. L mochkila ano ma'adna ikama (ikama da'ima) …]'.

In his work about 'governing population through the humanitarian government of refugees: Biopolitical care and racism in the European refugee crisis', Mavelli (2017) explains the difference between biopolitical governmentality and the humanitarian government and demonstrates how they can be used as state rationalities to govern both the host community and non-citizens. The humanitarian government of refugees can be understood as a biopolitical government of the host community. This can be possible through targeting both their 'emotional and material well-being' (Mavelli, 2017, p. 818). The humanitarian government describes the conflict between values of 'humanitarianism' and 'securitisation' in governing asylum seekers and refugees. Additionally, it is at the same time an indirect way of governing the host community because it still governs them through biopolitical government by taking into account their biological and emotional care and needs when trying to set up immigration and asylum policies and deciding who is 'valuable' and deserves inclusion and who is 'not

valuable' to the host community and deserves denial (Mavelli, 2017, p. 809). Mavelli further adds:

'With the term 'biopolitical governmentality', I understand a rationality of government that aims to biopolitically enhance the lives of the population under power's control both in biological and emotional terms … governmentality as the promotion of positive forms of self-understanding and self-appreciation – through biological and emotional biopolitical – rationalities of care which are the condition of possibility for forms of self-government. Humanitarian government makes the decision of which refugees need to be welcomed and which ones need to be rejected a function of the biopolitical care of the populations of the countries that accept them. This biopolitical governmentality, I will show, rests on a 'differentialist' understanding of racism that draws on, but partially transcends, traditional accounts of racism based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, colour, gender, and alleged intractable cultural differences. This biopolitical racism redraws the boundary between 'valuable' (to be included) and 'not valuable' lives (to be excluded) according to the refugees' capacity to enhance the biological and emotional well-being of host populations' (Mavelli, 2017, p.812).

Within the context of the present thesis, Stone (1997) argues that after Algeria achieved independence, the Algerian regime adopted three main challenging missions which are Algerianisation, Islamisation and Arabisation to unify the enormous regional and ethnic mix in Algeria under one national identity of similar values. I believe, post-1962 Algerianisation policies, to some extent, have created a homogeneous society and achieved social harmony in independent Algeria. However, any utopian thinking of creating and protecting the homogeneity of Algerianness would struggle in the age of globalisation and mass migration. Besides, the level of openness towards foreigners, especially 'precarious lives' of vulnerable displaced populations such as asylum seekers and refugees (Mavelli, 2017, p. 809), will be questioned.

From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, Algerianness can be seen as a struggle of powers that defines the host community, Algerians, and sets up dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of non-Algerians such as Syrian displaced people. This can be noticed in the struggle of different types of power namely: Arabness / pan-Arabism, Islam, nationalistic power and globalisation, when managing the flow of Syrians and the state's response to their flow. The humanitarian government of refugees is a form biopolitical governmentality whose rationalities aim at biological and emotional care for the host population (Mavelli, 2017). Mavelli (2017) sees the latter point as missing from the Foucauldian biopolitical governmentality. Algerianness and Algerian citizenship as political forces can, thus, be seen as forms and rationalities of the humanitarian government of Algeria through which the Algerian state governs both Algerians and Syrians. It includes "worthy" and excludes "unworthy" lives. Having said that, both the Algerian community and the Syrian community represent political objects of Algerianness / Algerian citizenship.

Power games in the Algerian context at different levels: cultural, political, and religious, led by movements of nationalism (Arabism and Moderate Islam), state secularism, and Islamic extremism, have created a chronic identity crisis that continues in twenty-first century Algeria. The historical struggle during colonial and post-colonial periods reveals how the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of others have been governed by biopolitical state rationalities to minimise the level of diversity in Algerianness by protecting the homogeneity of its legal and normative forces. This demonstrates the nature of Algerianness which is exclusive and conditional to others that do not share the same values. The latter involve values of loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for the Algerian nation. However, even being Arabic native speakers, the challenges for Syrians are far beyond than just being Muslims or being able to speak Arabic. In the age of mass migration and international terrorism, the integration of refugees in host

societies is often dependent on the protection of national security and state sovereignty. This questions the norms and requirements of inclusion and exclusion of foreigners set by the Algerianness and Algerian citizenship both legally, normatively and socially. These norms of inclusion and exclusion are not clear in the Algerian constitution but can still be observed through the state practices of hospitality that are governed by principles of the ethics of Arabic and Islamic traditions and through the state's exercise of power that manages the integration of foreigners in Algerianness and granting rights of citizenship. The Algerian state's decision on 2015 to close borders due to the world's refugee crisis and adopting a non-deportation approach of Syrians even with the absence of a refugee national mechanism in the Algerian law reflects a conflict within the humanitarian government of refugees between norms of *hospitality* that are governed by brotherhood between Algerians and Syrians, *humanitarianism* and *state's security*.

Having said that the humanitarian government creates dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of refugees, the western reaction, especially that of Germany and the UK, to the world's refugee crisis is a conflict of rationalities of biopolitical governmentality and humanitarian government. The decision taken by the British government in 2014 to stop rescuing illegal migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean and reach Europe is an indirect of biologically governing and preserving the well-being of British population, culture, wealth, health (Mavelli, 2017, p. 824 & 825). Additionally, after the Brexit referendum in 2018, police recorded statistical data of rising hate crimes, especially against EU migrants. A Polish-born student was stabbed in 2016 in the neck for speaking Polish (Dearden, 2016 & 2018).

Discussions around timely issues of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants often play a central role in political events and populist campaigns by European extremist parties and this narrative is fast gaining general traction. Mafu (2019, p. 03) confirms that mass migration has provoked social tensions in the host community in many of the EU countries such as in Germany, France…etc. During Trump's campaign, for instance, one of his major announcements was to ban Muslims, refugees and migrants from reaching the US. Similarly, the Turkish government started implementing integration schemes, and Turkish politicians and leaders during local election events still announce that long-term integration of Syrian refugees into the Turkish society is not an option. Consequently, the Turkish government insists that Syrians return to their home country (Makovsky, 2019).

4.3. Conclusion and Discussions

The Algerian national identity, Algerianness, is designed, shaped and created by the state power because in post-1962 Algeria, Algerians were not given the chance to choose the normative values that best represent and cover the ethnic diversity in Algeria. It was a state decision that has relied on the historical events that colonial Algeria witnessed and which has been welcomed by the majority of Algerians. Arabic and Islam have been declared national / official languages and the only religion, respectively. This decision was driven by strong anti-western imperialism attitudes and values of nationalism. Additionally, the decision can be seen as a reaction to what the French civilising mission tended to eradicate. Before the French colonization to Algeria, Islam bound together different ethnic backgrounds (Berbers and Arabs) in the name of one common religion. The French used Islam to divide the Algerian community and at the same time Islam had played a significant role in the cultural aspect of

Algerian nationalism and Algerian identity along with Arabic language. Without a national poll, the Berber language and Berberism have gained their place in the constitution of Algeria in the 2000's in response to the Berber spring in the region of Kabylia in Algeria, though kabyles have always enjoyed equal rights of citizenship as Arabs.

In post-1962 Algeria, moderate Islam with its Sunni denomination represented the main factor that defined who had the right to belong and who was deemed outsider. However, Islamic extremism is a form of religious extremism that had been brought to Algeria by different extremist groups such as GIA and FIS. Leaders of extremist groups were banned from creating political groups; thus, denied their political rights. This decision was not because Islam is no longer an important element of Algerianness or Algerian citizenship but because Islamic extremism does not belong to Algerianness that has been designed and shaped by the state. In 1994, US president Clinton declares that enemy of the Algerian regime was Islamic extremism and not Islam (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 242). During the civil war in Algeria, the FIS conceptualised Algeria as a radical Islamic state by penetrating extremist thinking into the Algerian society through politicisation and mobilisation of university students and others in mosques during Friday prayers (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 233). The FIS discourse is 'characterized by oppositions such as good-bad and positive-negative' (Redissi & Lane, 2013, p. 234). Madani's discourse, 'the people is us and we are the people, because it only recognises itself within Islam', was analysed by Sidaoui who indicates that Madani strongly believed that the legitimate representative of the Algerian people is only FIS (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 233). According to Sidaoui, discourses delivered by Ali Belhadj, on the other hand, 'were more poetic rather than rational'. 'His messages were simply jihad: the holy war' (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 228). He believes in democracy as long as it leads to an Islamic state. He states:

'… multipartism is unacceptable because it is the result of an occidental vision … There is no real democracy, as the sole source of power is Allah and the Koran, not the people. If the electorate votes against the law of God, then that is nothing else but blasphemy. If this happens, one must kill the false believers' (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 234).

Given the literature I have reviewed, Algerianness can be observed as a struggle of internal powers such as *Arabness* and *Islam* as key cultural components of Algerian nationalism and the Algerian identity, *Berberism*, *state secularism* and principles of *globalisation* in the 21st century. Reviewing the historical struggle in Algeria, Algerianness has originally been designed as conditional if not exclusive to others. The question that should be raised can be about the perception of the other within from a perspective of Algerianness in the 21st century. In other words, within a world of globalisation and a refugee crisis, how far is Algerianness inclusive of "other" in the 21st century?

The internal struggle of powers within Algerianness did not confront a high flow of refugees until the Syrian civil war started in 2011. Algeria has hosted more than 50,000 Syrians. The 21st century's challenges that Algerianness has been facing are values of globalisation that are far beyond Islam, Pan-Arabism and Arabité that shape the values of hospitality. Additionally, Algerianness is now facing new evolving challenges of humanitarianism and security. Humanitarianism and securitisation are two principles of the humanitarian government which is designed to govern both the refugee population and host population biopolitically (Mavelli, 2017). Consequently, the humanitarian government of refugees controls the state's immigration and asylum policies by deciding who deserves inclusion and whose inclusion is denied (Mavelli, 2017). However, the fact of '*blaming refugees for their own suffering'* is a

manifestation of biopolitical racism within the framework of a humanitarian government (Mavelli, 2017, p. 824, italics in original text).

Duffield's (2014, p. 75, 78) insight onto the new emerging humanitarianism in the world is a response towards 'new wars' in different parts of Africa, for example, and the new system of 'global governance' that has emerged as a result of a change in development and security discourses in nation states. This is when political concerns and sovereignty stand above the humanitarian need for saving lives and providing humanitarian assistance. Within the Algerian context, due to the civil war in the 90s and due to the current challenges, that have constantly menaced Algeria's territorial security because of the instability in the Sahel region and the rest of the Arab world, humanitarianism has been securitised. A new humanitarianism (Duffield, 2014) has emerged and has governed the state's discourse towards Syrian displaced people since 2015. At the Foreigners' Office (Maktab el Adjanib), Asma, confirms that Algeria has tightened the access of displaced people due to instability in neighbouring countries: Libya and Mali. Consequently, this has affected the state's social policy of egalitarianism and offered conditional social rights and restricted access to legal rights of citizenship. Not only did security concerns lead to securitisation of humanitarian assistance but the state's rationality to define a national destiny for the majority in-group has also played a role in offering conditional assistance to war refugees in Algeria. In this respect, Asma, a state official, added: '… Most Syrians do not have a sense of belonging towards Algeria, they came to Algeria just because they had to leave their country due to a civil war, besides, most of them had chosen Algeria because it is near to Europe and they consider it as a transit point to the EU countries…'. Asma's quote illustrates that citizenship is securitised in Algeria and it requires commitment to Algeria rather than just sharing the same faith or language. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss in detail how humanitarianism has been securitised through the state strategies of hospitality and

security that have offered conditional assistance to war refugees in terms of social and legal rights of citizenship.

Chapter Five: Methodological Considerations

This thesis is a qualitative account that demonstrates the conceptualisation of Algerianness by sociologically investigating the historical, social and political aspects of citizenship in Algeria. Using Foucault's insights into territorial security, political sovereignty and human subjectivity, I will explore the relation between the practice of biopolitical governmentality and citizenship discussed in the previous chapters by documenting how these norms or *dispositifs* are lived out by Syrian minorities escaping war. In addition to using Foucauldian biopolitical governmentality, I also used thematic analysis in order to produce general themes and sub-themes in order to understand which rights are given to whom and why. A Foucauldian analysis is vital to answer the "why" questions and identify power-knowledge relations. Conducting a Foucauldian analysis is not only an analysis of power but more importantly a creation of a history of modes by which a kind of power has created humans as subjects (Foucault, 1982, p. 208 in Al Amoudi, n.d, p. 03). A Foucauldian insight into biopolitical governmentality is necessary to explain how state strategies will bridge the gap between the state practices of integrating Syrian displaced people into certain rights of citizenship. Additionally, Foucault's insight helps analyse the nature of Algerian citizenship in terms of its biogovernmental norms and investigates how they treat non-citizens in drawing boundaries between "valuable" citizens who deserve partial inclusion and "unworthy" citizens that need to be excluded. This chapter also discusses the aims and objectives of the fieldwork and will defend the philosophical choice of research design, including use of data collection methods, analytical strategies, and ethical considerations.

5.1. Research Design

5.1.1. Qualitative research Approach and Analytical Strategy

A very basic distinction between qualitative and quantitative research methods, is that qualitative research treats *context* and *meaning* as important while quantitative research is primarily interested in *numbers* and *statistics* (Braun & Clarke, 2013, emphasis added). A qualitative research paradigm refers to a set of beliefs, assumptions, values and practices involved into a framework of a qualitative research which are different from that of the quantitative research paradigm (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Discourse analysis was deemed appropriate to the present thesis in order to draw back on cultural and historical events that make sense to today's reality (Gill, 2000 in Jones, 2014, p. 06). A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, which is a form of discourse analysis, has been used as a strategy of data analysis because it offers insights on relation between power and discourse. More specifically, conducting an analysis in terms of governmentality allows me to examine the implication of power in society through state practices at a societal level and the production of knowledge and its circulation in a specific context and real societal situations. In the power- knowledge relation, a Foucauldian perspective suggests that 'power and knowledge directly imply one another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute ... power relations' (Foucault, 1980, p. 27 in Hall, 1992, p. 203). Undoubtedly, power has a manipulative and a controlling nature but when power operates in favour of 'truth', it produces rituals of truth and enable a certain behaviour to happen. Discourse produces 'a regime of truth' (Hall, 1992, p. 205). If discourse

produces knowledge, knowledge will have real consequences and will constitute a kind of power over those who are "known"; the latter can be subjected and referred to as a "subject" when that kind of knowledge is exercised in practice (Hall, 1992, p. 205). This will define the subject position which is tied to power in order to regulate and control people's conduct. This epistemological position will provide a definition and a description of the nature of the main concern (Salmons, 2019) of the present thesis which is how different power discourses of Algerianness / Algerian citizenship compete and conflict in the Algerian context when trying to manage the flow of Syrian displaced people. Certainly, these power discourses have their historical context, and they are bound up by institutional practices in order to organise and regulate and administer social life. For example, Algerian citizenship and the process of naturalisation cannot be separated from its history and the history of the Algerian state especially during the colonial era when Algerian Muslims were excluded from citizenship rights and were considered as French subjects. In post-colonial Algeria, Algerian citizenship was offered to Muslims and the majority of non-Muslims, including Jews and Christians, left the country and immigrated to France. In the age of mass migration and human movement, Algerian citizenship, although offering limited or full access to social rights, naturalisation still remains a privilege for those who can express deep nationalistic feeling of belonging to Algeria and relate to its past. As mentioned earlier, Syrians of Algerian ancestors that belong to the family of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri were lucky enough to receive Algerian citizenship by naturalisation. What remains questionable is how to gauge the loyalty of potential citizens or even citizens themselves?

This thesis is interested in analysing how the Syrian displaced community in Algeria is governed and how the diversity of the local population (Algerians) is still managed and controlled by excluding Syrians from Algerian citizenship. The art of governing a population

is referred to as ‘governmentality’ in Foucault’s thinking (Foucault, 2007). Foucault’s concept of governmentality refers to the ‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 102 in Lippert, 1999, p. 295). When governing a population, knowledge about health, housing, economy is very important in practicing control and surveillance. Governmentality studies employ the ‘programme of government’ that refers to the state’s ‘imagined projects of administering social life’ and within which state technologies are brought together with state rationalities (Lippert, 1999, p. 296). In International Relations and in its relevance to the notion of refugeeness, governmentality defines state technologies, strategies and rationalities: ‘governmental power and refugee studies invoke Foucault's "power-knowledge" knot: There is no cause and effect that can be unravelled here’ (Lippert, 1999, p. 319). Using Foucault’s governmentality in relation to refugee studies, I will investigate two main state strategies namely: hospitality and security. Hospitality is a state strategy that has been adopted from 2011 to late 2014 to care for Syrian displaced people. Hospitality has been ordered by historical ties and relations between both Algeria and Syria. In addition to historical ties that started since the exile of one of the most influential figures of Algerian popular resistance against the French colonialism, El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, hospitality in Algeria, is an Islamic virtue that is dictated by values of faith (Islam) and ethnicity (Arabness). The ethos of hospitality in Islam should not only be from a Muslim towards a Muslim, but a Muslim should also show it to their guest regardless their faith or origins because the hospitality relationship in Islam is triangular; it includes ‘the host’, ‘the guest’ and ‘Allah (God)’ (El-Aswad, 2015, p. 462). In this regard, Prophet Mohamed said: ‘He whoever believes in God and the last day should honor his guest’ (Rababah & Rababah, 2016, p. 44).

Having said that, from 2011 to December 2014, subjectivation and knowledge production around Syrian refugees shaped them as 'guests' that are worthy of inclusion and unconditional welcome and they should be honoured. The state welfare rationalities offered them unconditional access to social rights of citizenship including healthcare, education, and accommodation. However, the state discourse and strategy of managing Syrian displaced people have changed since January 2015. Given its complex history of decolonisation, the struggle against terrorism in 1990s and constant threat of international terrorism coming from unstable countries such as Libya and Mali, security became a dominant discourse. This shift in state strategies and power discourses produced a new knowledge around displaced people. As such, Syrians and displaced people in general started to be classified as a 'potential threat' to national security. For this reason, new state technologies have been applied to achieve more control and surveillance around Syrians' life. In January 2015, Algeria closed its borders with Syria and Syrians were obliged to submit visa files prior to their arrival to Algeria; if granted access they must stamp their passports every 45 days because they have short-residence permits. Short-residence permit is not a travel document and does not grant its holder a freedom of travel outside Algeria; only inside. Additionally, rationalities of welfare restricted access to employment. By policing the imagination and knowledge around the group of short-residence permit holders, one can tell who counts as a potential citizen according to practices of Algerian citizenship. Those who hold short-residence permits are unfortunately not eligible to apply for Algerian citizenship even if they spend more than 7 years of continuous residence in Algeria. This shift in state strategies, technologies and knowledge production in dealing with the flow of Syrian displaced people is not arbitrary, but it has multiple reasons that are linked to struggles of prominent power discourses in the Algerian context such as: nationalism, Arabness / pan-Arabism, Islam, globalisation, humanitarian obligations and biopolitical practices. These discourses remain embedded in the national body politic and remain shaped by the imagination

of Algerianness and Algerian citizenship. Therefore, a historical and critical reading of how these discourses conflict in the past is crucial in the present thesis in order to investigate the state actual practices within the framework of migration in the 21st century. This shift from a welcoming approach to a very restrictive and exclusionary approach also reflects how the state categorises and differentiates Syrians.

5.1.2. Levels of Analysis

In order to locate biopolitical governmentalities of refugees and displaced people in the Algerian context, this research identified the state's produced knowledge and changes in knowledge practices through which the state strategies, technologies, rationalities and mentalities practice power over the governed subject. In his essay '*The subject and power'*, Foucault argues that "power" and "subject" are two main elements in his analysis to power relations (Foucault, 2000e, 326–327 in Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 05 italics in original text). In the archaeological phase of Foucault's, Foucault sees the elements of subject and power connected to discourse (Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 06). Moving from archaeology to genealogy, through discourse we can identify power relations and answer questions such as: who governs what? according to what logics? with what techniques? toward what ends? who or what is to be governed? why should they be governed? how should they be governed? to what ends should they be governed? (Rose & O'Malley & Valverde, 2009, p. 03). As such, what would lead us to the phase of genealogy is that we can identify explicit and implicit / hidden rationalities of power games and knowledge practices that have taken place throughout history of a certain power game (Välikangas and Seeck, 2011).

The present thesis addresses how conscious and unconscious rationalities of nationalism, national security, Islam and Arabness and pan-Arabism in colonial and post-colonial Algeria have played an integral role in producing a constantly changing knowledge around Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Välikangas and Seeck (2011, p. 08) argue that in Foucault's genealogy, power can be seen as 'not only negative, but as positive, productive and enabling'. In this research, the constantly changing knowledge illustrates how power games can produce Syrians as either guests, brothers in faith at different times or a threat to national security.

The first level of analysis identifies and analyses the state strategies / technologies of dealing with the flow of Syrian displaced people since 2011. This analysis discusses two main state strategies: hospitality and security and they represent Algeria's paradoxical response to the waves of Syrians. The second level of analysis discusses the production of knowledge and subjectivity of Syrians. Power-knowledge relations suggest an ontological study of what is reality or what is the nature of the relation between inseparable elements namely: discourse, power, knowledge, reality and 'episteme' or 'whom discourse serves' (Schneck, 1987, p. 24). This analysis will discuss the following questions: what is the status of Syrians in Algeria? What could "guest" and "potential threat" representations tell us about the dominant discourse in Algeria and how they reflect a struggle of powers in the Algerian context and why? For how long can Syrians be "guests"? Can Algeria's guests, Syrians, receive long-term / permanent inclusion into the Algerian setting? Will "guests" be qualified for the status of "citizens" by granting them citizenship and political participation in the Algerian context? Why do Algerian state officials often use the word "guest" as opposed to "refugee" or "immigrants"? Does the "guest" status grant Syrians any rights within the Algerian context and what might be the limitations associated with this status? What might be the state's policy and ideology behind labelling Syrians as "guests"? What can this knowledge-power relation tell about the nature of

Algerian citizenship? The third level of analysis will discuss how the state welfare rationalities that shape the state technologies treat Syrians differently according to their ability and capacity to enhance the biopolitical condition of the host population. 'A discursive formation will manifest a *set of relations* between institutional sites, functions, activities, subjects …etc' (Young, 2001, p. 405 italics as in original text). By analysing discourse at a macro-level rather than then analysing it at a sentence level or analysing its grammar, the discursive formation will provide an image about how knowledge functions in practice, technologies and their rationalities, and how refugees and refugee related issues are conceptualised within Algeria and how they are shaped by discourses of nationalism, state sovereignty and security, and hospitality.

5.2. Profiles of Research Participants and Research Setting

Participants that took part in this research belong to two main cohorts: Syrians and Algerians. Both cohorts reside in Algeria, in the capital of the country, Algiers. The city of Algiers was not chosen arbitrarily but it is the first Algerian city that hosts a large population of displaced Syrians. Given the fact that there is a large population of Syrians in Algiers, I believe they would be noticeable in the Algerian society if they are facing either inclusion or exclusion at both legal and normative levels. Additionally, the choice of the capital is because Algiers is where the main Algerian authorities that have been involved in the management and resettlement of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; it is where the Foreigners' office and the Algerian Red Crescent Society are based. The choice of location is also based on connections I built with Syrian and Algerian volunteers that have agreed to take part in this

research and have facilitated the flow of research and the continuation of semi-structured interviews.

This research was undertaken in urban places where both Syrians' working places, the Algerian ministries and participants are based. The main research locations in Algiers included different districts such as: Dali Ibrahim, Bir Khadem, Kouba, Baba Hassan, Bab El Zouar, Staouali, Sidi Yahia, Alger centre, Salambier, le Golf, El Madania, 15 bis Boulevard Mohammed V, and Place du 1er Mai 1945 (Mustapha Pacha).

Regarding the inclusion and exclusion criteria, both the Algerian and Syrian cohorts were chosen regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, religion, or their ethnic background. Unlike participants from the Syrian cohort, my Algerian participants were chosen based on their profession. Because one of my research is to look at how the state's welfare system and social rights of citizenship (healthcare, education, housing, and employment) are delivered to the Syrian community, I included Algerians who come into contact with this population such as doctors, teachers, landlords, employers. The Algerian cohort also included representatives from Algerian Red Crescent and state officials at the level of the Foreigners' Office (Maktab el Adjanib). The latter is responsible of delivering legal rights such as the renewal of Syrians' residence permits.

a- Inclusion criteria

The sample of this research is mostly restricted to the Syrian displaced community living in Algiers, Algeria. This research limits itself to state officials at the level of Algerian ministries such as Algerian Red Crescent and Foreigners' office in Algiers; Algerian

social care providers including healthcare providers, teachers, landlords and employers; Algerian charity organisations that have been involved in dealing with issues related to managing and resettlement of displaced people in the Algerian host community.

b- Exclusion criteria

The choice of the Algerian local community was not random. Participants from the Algerian cohort were chosen based on their relationship with Syrians and based on their activities of providing emotional and humanitarian aid and supporting Syrians during the processes of resettlement and integration into the Algerian setting. Therefore, random Algerians that did not have direct contact with Syrians were completely excluded. This does not mean that their opinions do not matter but it is because they may not be aware of Syrians' personal experiences when it comes to either inclusion or exclusion from Algerian citizenship and Algerianness.

As far as the process of recruiting research participants, a snowballing method was helpful to get in touch with more participants from both the Algerian and Syrian cohorts and gain their trust and consent. Relying on snowballing methods to recruit research participants, it was essential to involve primary contacts that acted as gatekeepers. Initial gatekeeping individuals involved Syrians living in Algeria such as Samer, who acted as cultural insiders and Algerian volunteers, and landlords such as Fatima Zohra. In order to get in touch with the Algerian authorities and state officials at the Foreigners' Office the Algerian Red Crescent in Algiers, I used a different technique. I had to follow bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical connections between state authorities. In order to do that, I had to request an authorisation letter (check

appendix 5) from the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research which stated that I am a sponsored PhD student at Portsmouth University and I needed information from state officials regarding my research around Syrians in Algeria. The letter had to clearly state the academic purposes for the fieldwork. In addition to following the state bureaucratic procedures, I had to follow the state's security procedures at the level of the Foreigners' Office in Algiers as research data that would be provided during the conversation may be sensitive and may disclose the anonymity of refugees' lives and experiences or may violate the state's security procedures related to issues of migration that are not available to the public. For these reasons a security check was done.

This thesis relied on semi-structured interviews with both cohorts: Algerians and Syrians, in Algeria, Algiers. Due to UK's Tier 4 student Visa restrictions, interviews were conducted during three research trips between 05/03/2018 to 08/05/2018; 12/08/2018 to 08/09/2018; and 18/11/2018 to 21/12/2018 (check appendix 6) in different public spaces such as cafés, interviewees' working places, homes, restaurants, shops and offices. In total, 32 semi-structured interviews were collected from participants. The socio- economic profiles of research participants can be summarised as follow:

a. Gender

Females = 9 (5 Syrians and 4 Algerians). Males = 23 (18 Syrians and 5 Algerians).

b. Age and civil / marital status

The target population did not involve children or teenagers. All participants are adults aged between 21 and 53 years.

c. Religion and Ethnicity

All Syrian and Algerian participants described themselves as Muslims and Arabs and of Muslim and Arab origins. Exception was made for one Algerian participant that described herself as an Algerian Muslim of Berber origins of Boumerdass region in Algeria.

d. Legal Status in Algeria

Apart from participants who belong to the Algerian cohort that are Algerian nationals, 16 Syrians held short-resident permits and 3 of them held long-resident permits. Only 4 Syrians were registered with the UNHCR and they held legal documents which proved that they are protected from the state's illegal deportation and they were eligible for UNHCR's humanitarian aid. None of the Syrian asylum seekers held refugee status because there has been no refugee national law in Algeria that would adjudicate their asylum applications and issue them legal status. The names of participants were deliberately changed in order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity and commit to research ethics of protecting participants' identity. The following table shows the profile of research participants;

Name	**Age**	**Gender**	**Civil / marital status**	**Religion / Ethnicity**	**Status in Algeria**	**Job**	**Date of arrival**
Rabie	53	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner (family shop with his brother)	Nearly 6 years in Algeria

Wael	37	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Van-driver	2014
Leyth	23	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop keeper (running a family business)	2012
Mohamed	32	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	2014
Bachir	25	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Family business (bakery)	2014
Lara	45	Female	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Registered with UNHCR	Dressmaker at her brother's small factory)	Before 2015
Moataz	23	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop keeper	01/01/2013
Ayman	40	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	Mid-2011
Hatem	42	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	long-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	Used to come to Algeria since 2000 for business but decided to reside in Algeria after 2011

Fateh	39	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	2014
Wissal	40	Female	Married to an Algerian	Muslim and Arab	Long-term resident permit holder	Housewife	2012
Amin	28	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	2014
Yasser	45	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop owner (restaurant)	2013
Amar	35	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	long-term resident permit holder	Shop owner	6 years in Algeria (2012)
Samer	43	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder + registered with the UNHCR	Consultant in an Algerian pharmaceutical company	2013
Anas	39	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Shop keeper	06/2017 He applied for an entry visa from UAE, where he had a long-resident permit, not from Syria.
Kamal	35	Male	Not married	Muslim and Arab	Registered with the UNHCR	Shop owner	2013

Wafae	27	Female	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Housewife	She came on 2016 from Sudan. She applied for a Visa at the Algerian consulate in Sudan and her application was accepted to enter Algeria.
Nirmin	49	Female	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Registered with the UNHCR	Housewife	2012
Iyad	40	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim	Short-term resident permit holder	Welder	Arrived at Algeria before January 2015
Riaydh	37	Male	Married to a Syrian	Muslim and Arab	Short-term resident permit holder	Builder	Arrived at Algeria 4 days January 2015
Syrian couple (Husband and wife; Malik and Nora)	21 and 19	Couple (male and female)	Syrians male married to a Syrian female	Arab and Muslim	Short-resident permit holders	Housewife and a painter	2012
Asma	50	Female	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	A staff member at the level of the foreigner's office with more than 10 years of experience in the office. Previously a lawyer.	N/A
Fatima (representative of charity organisations)	39	Female	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Businesswoman. Landlord for Syrian tenants, Active member in national charitable organisations	N/A

Nabeel	54	Male	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Landlord to Syrian tenants	N/A
Tarik	40	Male	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Doctor at Mustapha Pacha Hospital in Algiers	N/A
Hassiba	60	Female	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Midwife at Mustapha Pacha Hospital in Algiers	N/A
Fares	34	Male	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Middle school teacher of Civil education, History and Geography at Ibn Rochd Middle school in Bab Zouar Province	N/A
Marwan	55	Male	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Employer (an owner of a pharmaceutical company in Bab Zouar, Algiers, that was based in Syria before the civil war in 2011. They moved back to Algeria after the Syrian civil war)	N/A
Anis	49	Male	N/A	Arab and Muslim	Algerian	Staff member at the Algerian Red Crescent	N/A
Salima	37	Female	N/A	Kabyle (Berber) and Muslim	Algerian	Psychologist	N/A

The table above provides information about age, gender, civil / marital status, religion, legal status in Algeria, job and date of arrival to Algeria of my Syrian participants. These details are important in reviewing every participant's profile and in grouping them according to the three modes of biopolitical governmentality namely: hospitality, security and humanitarian support. Generally, Syrian participants that entered Algeria before 2015 can be grouped under the mode of hospitality as a strategy that had been embodied through unconditional access to welfare services and legal restrictions. Exceptions were made for businessmen and Syrians of Algerian ancestors that received either long-residence permits or were naturalised. As such, they received certain privileges such as: freedom of mobility outside Algeria, right to family re-unification. On the other hand, those that arrived with an entry visa to Algeria after 2015, would provide more information about how the state security measures have impacted their integration into the Algerian context in terms of social welfare and legal recognition. In comparing and contrasting Syrians who arrived before and after 2015, data gives more details about the state's practices of inclusion and exclusion. In terms of similarities, both groups can register with the UNHCR in Algiers. Additionally, from a lens of biopolitical governmentality, information about the economic status of every participant will provide a deep understanding about how the state strategies have included "worthy" Syrians and excluded "unworthy" Syrians according to their ability to enhance the well-being of the Algerian local population. Both the date of arrival to Algeria and the economic status are related to the status of every Syrian respondent because they define whether a Syrian is eligible to short-residence permit or a long-residence permit. The gender and religion of my Syrian participants are important in comparing / contrasting how different genders face different challenges and have different experiences. For instance, research data revealed how Syrian females are very dependent on their male siblings even in participating in this research, looking for jobs, commuting to different parts of Algeria and the like.

Research data were gathered through face-to-face semi-structured interview conversations with research participants from both the Algerian and the Syrian cohort. A checklist interview format was followed in order to make sure the conversation covered all research areas and attained the interview objectives. As most research participants had busy schedules, I had to be flexible according to their circumstances. Interviews took place during the participants' lunch time, at their workplace, at night at their homes and at the weekend or outside their working hours. While interviewing research participants, or on our way to the interview venues or places such as cafés or when we walked along the street and even during our lunch or dinner, I kept fieldnotes to analyse the body language of respondents and to check their personal documents when they openly decided to share them (a copy of UNHCR document issued by the UNHCR's office in Algiers, a copy of long-resident permit issued by the Algerian state, passport' stamps for short-residence permit holders and the like). Accompanying recorded interviews with fieldnotes was helpful in case the respondent wanted to share extra information linked to the study that they forgot during the time of recorded conversations. The length of interviews was from 45 minutes to one hour. The primary language of interviews was Arabic in both its standard form and in its dialectal version including Algerian and Syrian dialectal Arabic. This has ensured mutual intelligibility and understanding. The Algerian cohort alternated between the use of Algerian Arabic and French. During the interviews, no problems were raised in terms of language as a means of communication. Both my participants and I spoke Arabic fluently.

5.3. Ethical Consideration

Given the fact that this research had involved vulnerable people, some ethical concerns were raised. One of the major issues during the present research was the uncertainty, ambiguity and

polemic regarding Syrians' legal status in Algeria. Due to the absence of a national refugee law in Algeria, some Syrians preferred to call themselves as immigrants, others preferred to be addressed as refugees or asylum seekers because they sought refuge in Algeria after the civil war in Syria in 2011. I will not use stateless people as this has not been used by my research participants neither from the Syrian cohort nor from the Algerian state officials. Additionally, as there are different discourses that conflict at a state level and at a societal level when addressing Syrians in Algeria, I will use the term "displaced people" throughout my thesis in order to cover all my Syrian participants.

The political and legal marginality of refugees shows that they enjoy limited rights; this reflects that they are vulnerable to arbitrary actions on the part of the state authorities and sometimes even to the international relief community (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 187). For these reasons, refugees are discreet when it comes to their opinion regarding the host state and local community. It is the researcher's duty to gain trust and familiarise themselves with the cohort and guarantee anonymity and safety. After receiving the approval of my ethical application from the ethical committee at Portsmouth University, I contacted my primary contacts and visited them in Algiers, Algeria, to start my research. I adopted a snowballing technique known as 'chain referral method' of sampling and recruiting participants (Neuman, 2011). I had connections with cultural insiders (Syrian males, an Algerian female, and Algerian volunteers) who have always shown willingness to collaborate and take part in the present research.

Prior to the interviews and with the help of my research gatekeepers, I started by visiting potential participants, disseminating information sheets, invitation letters that included my contact details and distributing consent forms. I had to explain the ethical obligations of my research, rights of participants and my obligations towards the anonymity of research

participants. The next step would be either receiving a phone call from participants or re-visiting them at their workplaces to take their decisions. The majority of participants I visited accepted to take part in this research immediately and provided both verbal and written consent. I have to mention that about 10 Syrian males declined to take part in my research. Although their participation was voluntary, they apologised for not being able to take part in the present research because of their time limitations, work commitments, or because they preferred not to share their personal experiences.

Unlike Algerian female participants and due to cultural differences, Syrian female interviewees had to obtain the consent of their fathers, brothers or husbands prior to agreeing to take part in the study. Only 5 female Syrians gained the consent of their male siblings and agreed to take part in the current research and accepted our conversation to be voice recorded. For instance, Lara (45) gained consent of her brother; while Wissal (40), Wafae (27), Nirmin (49) and Nora (21) gained consent of their husbands as they were married. After the interview day and before starting the analysis of interviews, participants were given two weeks in case they wished to withdraw their recorded conversations and decline their participation in the study for any reason. During this period of time, nobody decided to withdraw from the research.

Although the purpose of the present sociological research is not to influence Algerian immigration policy or to suggest a national refugee mechanism or even suggest solutions to Syrians facing legal problems, conducting research that is related to social sciences in Algeria is still monitored by the state, as Faradji (2015) argues. As hinted earlier, before conducting interviews with the Algerian state officials, I requested an authorisation letter from the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research which had reassured that the present

research would take place within an officially permitted framework according to state's regulations and laws. Initially, the authorisation letter paved and eased the way to conduct interviews and talk to representatives at the level of the Foreigners' Office (Maktab el Adjanib) in Algiers and the Algerian Red Crescent society. An information sheet about the study and areas of interest, aims, objectives of my study, and confidentiality of data were provided in order to gain access to these state's organisations.

As far as the legal and public interests are concerned, it is my legal duty and responsibility as an Algerian citizen and resident to report any suspicious acts and crimes such as prostitution, human trafficking, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, spying or any activities that threaten national security. In order to mitigate potential risks associated with vulnerable groups such as Syrian asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants, I informed my participants that I am legally obliged to report any criminal activities so that they can avoid incriminating themselves. Additionally, many, if not all, have experienced tough journeys in fleeing war and reach safety. Discussing their traumatic experiences during the Syrian war could have brought back violent events to their minds and may have made some participants reluctant to share their experiences in Algeria, despite the overt public interest in their situation. Therefore, I avoided sensitive subjects and situations and paid attention to the kind of questions I planned to ask and how they were asked. Additionally, the aim of this research does not discuss the path that displaced people took to reach Algeria, it only discussed their life experiences after they started residing in Algeria. In order to protect the anonymity and ensure confidentiality, the real full names of respondents were not asked during the interviews. If they have been provided by mistake, I had to change them during the process of transcription and data analysis. Respondents were given pseudonyms instead. Besides, exact personal data which may lead to the identification of the research respondent were not used in this research.

Generally, conducting semi-structured interviews and voice recordings did not raise major sensitiveness among both Algerian and Syrian research participants. However, surprisingly, voice recording raised issues with Algerian participants. Syrians expressed enthusiasm to talk to me and were open to be recorded because they perceived the experience as an opportunity that could create a platform through which they become more visible within the Algerian context. My Syrian participants also considered this research as a means through which their voices could reach policymakers and suggest solutions to solve legal, not societal, restrictions that Syrians displaced people have been facing and which have affected their daily lives. The Algerian cohort, on the other hand, did not accept voice recordings easily. Only one Algerian female out of 9 Algerian respondents accepted her voice to be recorded. The experience with the Algerian cohort was not easy as I anticipated and my experience at the Foreigners' Office was not an exception. Before the state official at the Foreigners' Office, Asma, accepted my invitation to participate in the present research, she needed to make sure I am an Algerian national and I am conducting a research within a legal and ethical framework that the funding body approves. The secretary at the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) had to question my identity and asked if I am Algerian. I confirmed my Algérianité by nationality and confidently said: 'yes, I am an Algerian citizen'. He replied: 'saying you are Algerian or speaking Algerian Arabic does not mean you are Algerian'. At that moment, I realised that I sounded "*a source of suspicion"* although I had an authorisation letter from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. I had been informed that they would conduct a detailed investigation regarding my background, legal status and my records before accepting my invitation as my research deals with a sensitive topic. This reflected the level of censorship applied by the state on researchers dealing with vulnerable groups and may be collecting sensitive information regarding their life which could be exploited by foreigners serving different political agendas. After an investigation that lasted for more than 10 days, my

invitation was approved, and I was accepted to see Asma. At the door and due to security measures, I had to leave my belongings with the security guard. As filming and voice recording is banned in state organisations, Asma declined the use of voice recorders or video filming devices as this was against internal rules and regulations of anonymity and confidentiality stated by the Algerian state at sensitive workplaces such as ministries or their branches which was the case of the Foreigners' Office (Maktab el Adjanib) that is branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I have to state that my Algerian respondents, including state officials, were very cooperative and dedicated ample time for note taking and interview-writing. However, they had limitations concerning what kind of information they would be able to provide. Asma, for instance, set up rules before the start of our conversation and ensured that she cannot answer any questions related to the state's strategies to counter terrorism in the light of the Arab spring as this was out of her responsibilities and tasks. She ensured that the Foreigners' Office can only renew residence permits for all Syrians including Syrians in the country. Anis, at the level of the Algerian Red Crescent was not able to offer further details about financial budgets the state has provided for Syrians in Sidi Feradj guest centre. Details about the state's counterterrorism strategies or the state's financial budget to support Syrians were not among the primary objectives of my thesis. My research focusses on how the state has been managing the flow of Syrian displaced people since 2011 and what are the strategies that the state adopted to integrate Syrians at both a societal and a legal level? (check appendix 2 and 3).

I believe the issues I faced with the Algerian cohort are not primarily because of a lack of trust but rather a fear from "the unknown other" that resulted in a lack of trust at the first encounter. The latter raised an issue among the Algerian population that refused to be recorded. The reaction of the Algerian cohort and the state of fear from the other has been developed since the black decade (civil war) in 1990s. Additionally, the unpopularity of social researchers that

deal with sociological aspects of the Algerian local society also contributed in raising these issues among the Algerian cohort. In this regard, Faradji (2015) confirms that the Algerian state does not give much attention to sociological research compared to scientific research that is more developed.

The present study had different types of semi-structured interviews designed for the purpose of obtaining different information from different cohorts. For instance, a semi-structured interview that was designed for the Syrian displaced community has covered four main sections: social networks and social cohesion; legal procedure (civil and legal rights); the feeling of belonging and national identity; social rights of citizenship (labour market, accommodation, healthcare and education). Each section contains related in depth-questions. Although the interview has been divided into different sections, some probing questions related to the main themes of this research still emerged and were covered during the conversation. Semi-structured interviews with the Algerian state officials discussed the legal status of Syrian displaced people and how the state manages their flow and provided emotional and humanitarian support. While conducting interviews with state officials, I kept in mind the reason of my research which was to decipher the state discourses associated with Syrian displaced people and how they have been changing due to certain circumstances and historical events. For instance, Asma's use of words like: 'guests' [doyouf], 'brothers in faith' [ikhwatna fi din], 'potentials threats' [Masdar khatar], 'dangerous' [khatirin], 'hospitality' [diyafa w tarhib], 'national security' [amn el kawmi], 'state challenges' [tahadiyat li twajha l bilad] and the like, all gave hints about the state discourses that govern the Syrian community.

Semi-structured interviews with Algerian social care providers namely: healthcare providers, teachers, employers and landlords, discussed legal procedures that Syrian displaced people need to comply with in order to receive their social rights. Generally, they covered the social integration of the Syrian displaced community into the welfare system in Algeria in order to deduce how the welfare state treats Syrians. This has also given information for why social rights have changed throughout time and the reason for limiting their access.

5.4. Positionality, Voice and Valuation

Within a qualitative research paradigm, qualitative sensibility represents a research orientation in terms of research questions and data analysis and interpretation. Braun & Clarke (2013, p. 09) argue that reflexivity is a crucial skill in making up a qualitative sensibility. It refers to the positionality of qualitative researchers and their ability to act as 'insiders' or 'outsider' vis-à-vis their research (Gallais, 2008 in Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10). A qualitative researcher can be referred to as an 'insider' when they share the same identity of their research participants. An 'outsider' status, on the other hand, is when the qualitative researcher does not share the same identity with their research participants (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10). In the present research, I could refer to myself as both an insider and an outsider. Sharing the same status of being an Algerian myself, I can be referred to as an insider when I conducted interviews with Algerians. However, I could be perceived as an outsider when I dealt with respondents from the Syrian cohort as I do not share the same identity with them. The roles of being both an insider and an outsider in relation to both cohorts and their perceptions to researchers could at the same time alternate and I saw myself swapping positions at different points in time. Although I share the same identity of being Algerian with the Algerian cohort, I was perceived

as an outsider and a source of suspicion by some Algerian respondents because of the unpopularity of sociological research that deals with people in Algeria. During my interview with the state official, Asma, she gave hints that Algerianness is a matter of being a nationalist if not a patriot. Additionally, because I have been registered as a PhD student at a Western country, the UK, I sounded suspicious. This can be due to the representation of the Western world in the eyes of Algerians due to the complex violent history between France and Algeria or the opposite: the representation of Algeria by Western media. For instance, on September 20th, 2020, the Algerian state banned the French television channel from continuing its work in Algeria over a reportage on Hirak, the popular uprising that led to the downfall of the former president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in 2019. After the reportage that lasted for 75 minutes, the Algerian authorities denied the fact the that these French journalists, of both Algerian and French origins, have received an authorisation from the Algerian Ministry of Communication to conduct or film a reportage in Algeria. In fact, in the region of Ouragla in the south of Algeria, the journalist, Bernard de la Villardière, confessed that his team had to use a hidden camera to film because people of the region refused to be filmed. The Algerian authorities described the reportage as being subjective and biased because it was not honest and did not reflect the real image of the Algerian youth and the value of the Algerian Muslim woman in Algeria. The reportage entitled 'L'Algérie, le pays de toutes les révoltes [Algeria, the country of all uprisings]' (North Africa Post, 2020) was unethical and was led by hidden socio-political agendas which aim at attacking and destroying the reputation of the Algerian nation at an international level. Sidaoui, an expert in socio-politics and at Geneva university in Switzerland, has claimed that Algeria has always been targeted by terrorist groups and foreign intelligence agencies since the start of the so called "the Arab Spring" and the French reportage realised by M6 channel was, in reality, manipulated by the French intelligence agency and was a part of their plans to ignite social anger and destabilise the country (CARAPS Riyadh Sidaoui, 2020).

The M6 reportage was not the only one produced by a French TV channel. Prior to it and in May 2020, France 5 and the channel of the Parliament (LCP) released a documentary about the popular uprising, Hirak, that created a polemic among the Algerian society (Ouest-France, 2020). The Algerian authorities claimed that the documentary did not reflect the real aim of the Algerian popular uprising which was the change of the old political, social and economic system, it rather portrayed the Algerian Hirak, also known as the revolution of the Smile [*tawrat el ibtissama*], as a terrain where feminists, Islamists and secular parties claimed rights. Following the incident, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately summoned the Algerian ambassador in Paris, France for negotiations (Ouest-France, 2020). These reportages and documentaries caused an implicit crisis to the French-Algerian socio-political scene. I believe, for reasons similar to these, I sounded suspicious to my Algerian cohort and this could prove their refusal for being recorded and their willingness to know more about me before accepting to take part in my research.

In order to mitigate the risks associated with me sounding suspicious, I submitted my authorisation letter issued by the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research to state officials at the level of the Foreigners' Office and the Algerian Red Crescent in Algiers. When approaching the Syrian cohort, I relied on Syrian gatekeepers who had direct relations with Algerian landlords and employers. Surprisingly, I have been perceived as an insider by the Syrian community in Algeria, as an Algerian who shares the same values of religious and ethnic brotherhood in the name of Pan-Arabism and Islam. When I revisited my fieldnotes, I remember when I finished my interview with Moataz (23), we left his workplace for lunch. He offered help and referred me to his friends that took part in my research. I thanked him for his efforts and for his invitation for lunch, he replied: 'You are my sister … we are all Muslims; Syrians and Algerians are brothers… [inti okhti … kilayatna ikhwa ... nahna

moslimin]'. The Syrian community that I interviewed were very open and welcoming. Lara (45) is another example. After we finished the interview, she invited me to her house where I met her mother and her brother's children. They prepared a Syrian dish for dinner called 'Mahchi Koussa wa Batinjan'. I appreciated their invitation and openness, but Lara and her family expressed their feelings towards Algerians and argued that 'Algerians and Syrians are Arabs and Muslims; they are the same' [el jazae'iriyin w souriyin kilayathon ikhwa… nahna moslimin].

The awareness of Syrians about the historical relation between Algerians and Syrians, since the exile of Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei'ri in Damascus in the 19th century during the French colonisation has played a crucial role in building a good rapport and trust between the Syrian community and the Algerian host population. This also contributed in minimising obstacles between me, as a researcher, and my Syrian participants and made us very comfortable discussing further details even after our recorded interviews finished. Additionally, some Syrians whose families were in Algiers even invited me to their houses for dinner or coffee and expressed willingness to build a relationship of friendship and brotherhood. Just like Lara and Nora, Wafae, for instance, was another female participant that opened her door and welcomed me to her house in Algiers and prepared some traditional Syrian sweets for coffee. I remember another day when my gatekeeper, Fatima, Wafae, her baby and I went for a picnic at Dounia Park in Algiers where we met her Syrian friends and many other Syrian families with their children. These events made me feel at ease within the Syrian community in Algiers and revealed more details about life experiences of Syrians in Algiers. In these cases, for instance, I relied on accompanying my semi-structured interviews with a fieldwork diary which documents this additional contextual information either provided by the research respondents or observed by the researcher. All in all, Syrians' emphasis on the historical ties that have

united Algerians and Syrians explained how they were referring to their identity from a perspective of belonging to a general community of Arabs and Muslims.

As an insight into handling bias associated with the funding body, although this research is fully funded by the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, as a part of my contract, the funding body has not had any influence on the present research topic including data interpretation or the choice of research stakeholders. Obtaining an authorisation letter from the funding body was part of a bureaucratic procedure that will ensure that I am conducting a research within an ethical framework. The letter also eased the flow of bureaucratic procedures with the Algerian state officials. Knowing that the present research is funded by an Algerian body, most research participants did not feel monitored or under surveillance, they rather considered it as a confirmation of my identity. Syrians, for instance, felt secured because I shared my personal details, phone number and my email with them. The fact of sharing my details with my participants made them feel legally protected especially after knowing that 'some Syrians at Sidi Feradj guest centre were interviewed by foreigners that claimed to be Algerians or Syrians but in reality, they were not', the security guard at Sidi Feradj guest centre informed me. This was also confirmed through Moataz's hesitation before knowing me. He thought I was 'a journalist that would cause more pain to vulnerable people from the Syrian community and steal their stories'. Surely, Moataz was referring to the group of people that claimed to be Algerians or Syrians who paid a visit to Sidi Feradj guest centre and inhumanely took advantage of Syrians' vulnerability without paying attention to their emotional and wellbeing.

Generally, interview questions did not raise any sensitiveness, Ayman and Samer, for instance, appreciated that they have more freedom of speech in Algeria compared to Syria. In this regard, previously a journalist and an activist in Syria that opposed Assad's regime, Ayman argued:

'… in fact Algeria and Syria are similar in terms of the weather, sunny days …, but what is different between Algeria and Syria is that people in Algeria can criticise the regime and even the president of the state which is not the case in Syria at all… and that is why we revolted but our revolution was stolen from us by foreign parties… [amatan el jazaei'ir w souriya mitlhon mitl ba'ad min nahiyat el jaw w lmonakh w taks lmochmis bas ana b'olak lfark yali binatna hya antom fi jazaei'r andkom chway horiya zayda alina ya'eni tekdro tantakdo nidam w hata ra'iss dawla bas nahna bi souriya ma fina w hada li khalana nantafed did dolm bas tawratna nsarakat mena min kibal jihat ajnabiya …]'.

I have to admit that the Syrian cohort was very open compared to the Algerian cohort although they knew that my research would not, by all means, find solutions to their problems in Algeria. Other techniques can be adopted at the level of research setting, participants and data collection methods in order to handle bias (Rajendran, n.d). In terms of research setting / context, all provinces and counties in Algiers were included into my research. In terms of research population, this research did not exclude anyone because of their ethnicity, religion, race, age, gender, socio-economic level, or legal level. As such, this research included documented and undocumented people from the Syrian community. The exclusion criterion that I adopted initially was based on nationality; only Syrians and Algerians were included because the present research aims at looking at how the Algerian state manages the flow of Syrian displaced people. In terms of data collection methods, I offered several options such as voice recordings, note taking, fieldwork diaries, and interview writings. In case my participants did not accept voice recordings, for example, or wanted to disclose any information that they felt was important to my research but may identify them, I had to write it down rather than recording their voices.

It is worth mentioning that my gatekeepers played a crucial role in my positionality with Syrians especially males. Khan referred to this as 'gendered positionality' (2015, p. 84). During

my research fieldworks, some Syrian male respondents were not comfortable to talk to me alone as I was perceived as a female foreigner from a religious perspective. Kamal, a Syrian participant, for instance, was very timid to talk to a female alone lest he should fall in an illicit relationship or the public's negative perceptions. He argued: 'If we were in Syria, for example, I could not sit for a chat alone with a female foreigner without a third party [… law kouna fi Souriya makouna nk'od lawahadna w nahki …]'. He backed up his attitude with the Prophet Mohamed's saying: 'no man is alone with a woman but the Shaytaan (Satan) will be the third one present [… la yakhlou rajoul bi imra'a ila kana chaytan thalithouhoma …]' (translation into English at: "And Shaytaan…", 2013). Being a Muslim myself, I understood that this was not due to a lack of trust or an attitude of sexism, but the participant was still timid and expressed a very religious mindset although the interview was planned to take place at his workplace which was not separate from the public. His Syrian and Algerian friends, that acted as gatekeepers, had to invite us for lunch so that he could overcome his timidity and be ready to take part in my research. Being very conservative, Kamal also expressed his attitude and viewpoint regarding mixed education and the absence of single-gender education in Algeria which is not the case in Syria. He believed that separating genders at the age of adolescence may be beneficial for students' academic achievement and emotional balance as they will be in a more relaxing environment where either boys or girls can express themselves more openly without having to worry about gender stereotyping from the opposite gender [… fi Souriya mn el ibtidaei ila el jamie'i ma fi ikhtilat bin el jinssayn bas houn fi ikhtilat mn el ibtidaei. Fi Souriya … la ano hada el wakt li yatakawan fih el maraa aw rajol ama houn fi el jazaeir mn el ibtidaei hata el jamie'i fi ikhtilat. Ana b choufa ano amr mohim jidan mn ajl istikrar el nafssi wa tawazoun el moyoul el jinssi…]. Female employment also seemed a taboo among the Syrian community. That is why my research covered only 5 females from the Syrian cohort. In this regard, Kamal argued that in his culture (Syrian culture), women will be more respected if they

assume their responsibilities at home and play their roles as housewives and do not go out for work where males are females are mixed. Instead, it is the responsibility of men to work and earn money and women are only supposed to look after their children. Kamal described 'the Algerian lifestyle to be similar to the European lifestyle and saw that the people in Algeria are westernised [… Fi el jazaei'ir, chway mota'atirin bi Europa min nahiyat el hayat wa tarikat el aych …]'. Amar, like Kamal, was worried because his sister has been "*algerianised*" especially after she started her university studies in Algeria. He stated that, 'she started thinking like Algerian women and wanted to finish her studies and work … the majority of women in Algeria are employed and they work in all sectors …, however, in Syria not many women work and even if they work, they have certain sectors where they can work … not in all sectors like Algerian women… [Kayen ikhtilaf okhar ano horiyat el mar 'a f jazaeiir aktar mn horiyat el mar'aa souriya. Matalan mn nahiyat choghl al mar'aa, houn b jazaeiir fi ktir nissae ychtaghlo bas fi souriya la, klal li ykhdmo w houn tssibihom ykhdmo kolchi ama fi souriya, kayen mihan mo'ayana li ykhdmohom. Ana okhti jat sghira mn souriya, kan kolchi sahel fi lmadrassa, krat houn b jazaeiir w el an takra ma'ahom fi ljami'aa w sar 'andha nafs tafkir el jazaeiiri … tani hiya haba tkhdom kifhom …]. Kamal and Amar's viewpoints explained why my female participants from the Syrian cohort namely Lara, Wissal, Wafae, Nirmin and Nora did not agree to take part into the present research unless their male siblings approved their participation.

5.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter discussed key areas of research design that are crucial in generating and analysing data. It also provided a detailed overview about the fieldwork and how it was conducted, research setting (place and time), gaining access to the cohorts and gaining their consent, and

ethical issues that I faced when approaching participants from both the Syrian and Algerian cohort. Additionally, I have provided a detailed profile of research participants but still respected their private and personal identities by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. In addition, I have highlighted important research aspects which are the perceptions of my research participants towards me as a female researcher and how I was positioned as both an "insider" and an "outsider" in different situations.

Chapter Six: At the Edges of Algerianness, Islam and Arabness: Understanding Hospitality as a Discourse and a Biopolitical Practice of Care and Exclusion

Anis (49), a staff member at the level of the Algerian Red Crescent, expressed Algeria's obligation to unconditionally support Syrians. He stated:

'we have to help our Syrian guests and brothers that chose to come to Algeria due to war and instability in their country… for instance, every year during Ramadhan the Algerian Red Crescent organises collective Iftar (a ceremony to break fast) … the reason we do this is to make our Syrian brothers feel like home […nahna lazem 'alina ana nsa'ed el ikhwa wa doyouf souriyin souriyin li ijaw 'adna b hokm dorouf li ymoro biha haliyan fi baladhom … matalan fi Ramadhan dayman l hilal el ahmar el jazaei'ri ynadam iftar jamaei'I li el ikhwa souriyin li khalk jaw maykhalihom yhasso anhom fi ghorba]'.

During our interview, I wondered why Anis addressed Syrians as either 'guests' or 'brothers' rather than using words like refugee, asylum seeker, or immigrant. He explained

'… in our religion, Islam, we do not have the word 'refugee'… Whether a Muslim or a non-Muslim, as Muslims we must help everyone that is in need … Besides, Syrians are privileged: they are our brothers in Arabité and Islam and we have a strong kinship since El Amir Abdu El-Kader went to Syria during the French colonisation in Algeria …' [nahna fi dina el islami lhanif, makanch kalmet laji'e … sawa'e kan moslim awla machi moslim nahna

wajbna n'awen ki ykouno b haja lina. W zid b zyada hadou souriyin khawtna … rana kaml arab w moslimin w manensawch ano el Amir Abdelkader lama ach fi souriya khalkat rawabit amika bayn cha'ebayn].

Anis's narrative reflects the state's discourse of hospitality that is mostly based on maintaining ethnic, religious and historical relations between Algeria and Syria. One of the limitations of Algerian hospitality, is that it does not offer a legal status and does not guarantee any legal, social or civil rights by law to Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Instead, it offers privileges at a societal level. Some of my Syrian participants such as Wael did not see the fact of showing acts of hospitality as important to him. According to him, in the name of Islam, historical ties and Arabité, Syrians should not be considered as foreigners and should not be excluded from enjoying legal status in Algeria.

This chapter explores what Algerianness, as a socio-cultural, religious and a political entity, has offered to Syrian displaced people, particularly during the first phase of migration from 2011 to 2014. The next chapter (chapter 7) will focus on the second phase between 2015 until the present which has been dominated by a discourse of security and state sovereignty. In the present chapter, I will discuss the norms of hospitality and humanitarian support in Algeria and the state's strategy to manage the flow of Syrians since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Even though Algeria is a signatory to the refugee convention of 1951 and agreed on its 1963 and 1967 protocols in 1963, Algeria, to date, has not legislated for an official national mechanism of refugees and asylum seekers yet (UNHCR Global Appeal, 2010-2011, p. 08). Instead, Algeria's approaches and strategies of managing the flow of refugees have been constantly changing depending on social circumstances, security threats, and mass migration. Data collected during fieldwork revealed that the state's discourses, practices and approaches

in dealing with the flow of Syrian displaced people can be divided into two main phases. The first phase lasted between 2011 until December 2014; the second phase started in January 2015 and lasted until the present. Ayman from the Syrian cohort explains the change in state's approaches and legal procedures in managing the flow of displaced people to Algeria. He argued:

'… Before the Syrian civil war in 2011, for Syrians, coming to Algeria was a matter of just purchasing a flight ticket and having a valid Syrian passport. Once we, Syrians, arrive to Algeria, we used to receive a resident permit of 3 months. If, however, we want to stay more, we should contact the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs and apply for a long-residence permit that is valid for 2 years and is renewable … I myself used to come before the Syrian war to Algeria for business purposes … After the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrians needed to have a sponsor or a guarantor before entering Algeria. This sponsor / guarantor can be a Syrian resident in Algeria or an Algerian citizen … On 01/01/2015, it was a surprise, (said in a sarcastic way), Algeria denied entry to non-visa holders coming from Syria… [kabl el harb fi souriya, kan lkodoum ila jazaei'ir mayhtaj ay chi, bas nakhod ta'chira ticket tayara w njib passport salih lfa'aliya w w ndkhol houn la jazaei'ir bi doun mochkila … fi halat ma kan min lmohtamal ani abrok aktar mn 3 chohour, brouh la solotat lma'niya mitl wizarat dakhiliya w atlob ikama da'ima saliha modat 'amayn… ana matalan kabl el harb bi souriya kount aji la jazai'ir bi gharad tijara fakat … ba'ed el harb asbah lazem alina nkadem bitakat iwae aw takafol min jazaei'ri aw souri mokim houn b jazaei'ir … fi 01/01/2015, kanet el mofaja'a, el jazaei'ir faradat el visa ala souriyin w ay wahed bi doun visa maykder ydkhol la jazaei'ir]'.

The first phase was characterised by Algeria's unconditional approach of hospitality and granting rights; the second phase, on the other hand, has been managed by the state with a discourse of security due to the constant threat of international terrorism to the country. The present chapter discusses the first phase, its characteristics, dominant state discourses, techniques and their rationalities. Hospitality was a dominant discourse from 2011 to December

2014 and remains a strategic narrative used by State officialdom to show how benevolent the response has been towards Syrian displaced people. This is an overtly moral narrative and it is used to also impose a duty on its subjects. Although hospitality seems 'a gift relationship' (Komter & Van Leer, 2012, p. 07) offered by the Algerian state to Syrians, this chapter explains how it is a strategy of subjectivation.

The present chapter will elaborate the state's strategy of granting unconditional rights in the name of hospitality. The latter is primarily linked to a moral duty of Algeria towards Syrian brothers and sisters. What Algeria considers as a moral duty and a generous offer is traced back to historical relations that started since 1855 between Algeria and Syria and between Algerians and Syrians since the exile of one of the iconic leaders of resistance during colonial Algeria to Damascus, Syria, El Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei'ri. Asma, the state official at the level of the Foreigners' Office, confirms that:

' …Syrians and Algerians share the same history … when our leader, El Amir Abdu El-Kader went to Damascus, he lived there with his family and his grandchildren were born there and they are both Syrians by birth and Algerians by naturalisation… [nahna adna tarikh mochtarak ma'a souriya lama el ka'id El Amir Abdu El-Kader rah la dimachk kanet fih mossahara ma'a souriyin w ahfado nwaldo tama w homa souriyin w mojanassin bi el jinssiya el jazaei'riya]'.

In a country where culture and social values are highly dependent on religion, Algeria's approach to hospitality has been driven by Islamic values and principles of unconditionally honouring the guest for God's sake. 'Islamic hospitality represents the culture and ethics of giving and relates to many different domains ranging from private or family relations to public spheres and from social-mundane interactions to sacred or religious beliefs and rituals', El-

Aswad confirms (2015, p. 462). 'A guest—Muslim or non-Muslim, stranger or relative, rich or poor—must be received and treated with kindness, dignity, and respect' (El-Aswad, 2015, p. 462). In Algeria, the approach of hospitality involves commitment to Islamic principles through promising a high level of dignity at a societal level and a positive public opinion to the Syrian displaced community, and showing tolerance when it comes to legal procedures, responsibilities and commitments that Syrians are expected to follow such as the renewal of their legal documents and respecting the national law in Algeria such as road traffic codes, employment laws …etc. For instance, most short-residence permit holders from the Syrian cohort were able to use their Syrian driving licence in Algeria with no restrictions. The state does not offer the possibility for Syrians to apply for an Algerian driving licence because they do not have legal status.

This discourse has produced Syrians as "worthy guests" that deserve care but still face restrictions and exclusion in terms of naturalisation and legal rights. The state production of Syrians as guests allows them to be equally treated as Algerians at the level of healthcare, education and housing. They are not recognised as refugees or asylum seekers at a societal or a legal level. As a strategy of governing the flow of migrants, the Algerian state does not prevent the interference of the UNHCR in registering and managing the Syrian displaced community. The "guest" status allows Syrians to register with the UNHCR in Algeria which will make them eligible for humanitarian assistance, financial support and allows them to apply for asylum *in another country* via the UNHCR if they wish. Although the "guest" status does not allow Syrians to travel outside Syrian, it protects them from illegal deportation and grants them freedom of movement inside the Algerian national territory where they can reside and work. Although the "guest" status is a right-based approach and does not draw a negative public opinion towards the Syrian displaced community in Algeria, it is still a biopolitical

decision to protect the homogeneous Algerian national identity as a political order by preventing full integration and restricting the possibility of naturalisation and mixed marriage between Algerians and Syrians. Hospitality is, indeed, a biopolitical strategy to both maximise and preserve the Algerian community as a political entity and control its diversity by governing the Syrian displaced community and granting them limited and conditional rights. Full unconditional integration within the scheme of Algerian citizenship and its rights seems to be the limit of Algerian hospitality towards Syrian displaced people.

6.1. Hospitality: A Gift Relationship or A Moral Duty? and the Production of "Guests" and "the Suffering Body"

By the mid of April 2017, Algerian national newspapers (Abd el Razak. B, 2017) and the world's newspapers (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Amnesty Press, 2017) announced that a group of Syrians were trapped in the desert between the Algerian and Moroccan land-borders. National and international news providers disputed the number of trapped Syrians from 41 to 55 people (Abd el Razak. B, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; AFP, 2017; Middle East Monitor, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). The group of vulnerable Syrians included men, women (pregnant and breast-feeding women), children and babies. Deeply concerned about the deteriorating conditions at the borders and the potential risks associated with them, the United Nation urged both countries, namely, Algeria and Morocco, to assume responsibility towards these vulnerable refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Puzzled by the Syrians' story and their journey to reach the Algerian-Moroccan borders, the incident resulted in a diplomatic crisis between both countries. Both Algeria and Morocco rejected these vulnerable people in the name of security. Given the unstable diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Morocco, the Algerian state

denounced Morocco's reaction towards Syrian refugees as leverage during this unfortunate situation (AFP, 2017; Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 2017; Bouteldji, 2017).

After Morocco refused to share responsibility and to comply with the international legislation of refugees, the tragic experience of trapped displaced Syrians that had lasted for two months (from April to June 2017) ended up with the Algerian state granting them access into its territory in the name of hospitality of brothers and sisters in faith, although the Algerian political and immigration scenes have been governed by the state discourses of security and borders' control since 2015. Following the state's decision, Sai'ida Ben Hbilass, the chairwoman of the Algerian Red Crescent, declared that the group of displaced Syrians were taken to the closest border province, Béchar, where they would be hosted in the state guest centres. Ben Hbilass further added that the Algerian Red Crescent was in charge of providing immediate healthcare and necessary health checks to Algeria's guests, Syrians, especially to a pregnant woman that needed intensive care after spending two months in the desert (Bouteldji, 2017).

The group of Syrian displaced people, like all Syrians that sought refuge in Algeria have received free and unconditional access to social rights, including access to healthcare, education, and housing / accommodation. However, the Algerian act of hospitality towards this group of Syrians had limitations; it did not grant them legal status such as refugee status, resident permits or potential access to Algerian citizenship; constraints and conditions in terms of employment still remain. The declaration of the state official, Sai'ida Ben Hbilass, at the level of the Algerian Red Crescent labelled Syrians as "guests" and not as refugees or illegal migrants. As such, the relationship between Algeria / Algerians and Syria / Syrians is a host-guest relationship. Although Algeria's approach of accepting, managing and governing Syrians

has been strongly led by security and borders' control since January 2015 in response to the country's constant security threats (see chapter 07), the state considers saving lives of trapped Syrians as a moral duty and a generous offer towards brothers and sisters in faith following a discourse of hospitality discourse that dominated the Algerian political scene from 2011 until December 2014.

If I am to briefly analyse this scene and discourses that were delivered within this situation from a perspective of governmentality, I could say that the dominant discourse is a discourse of hospitality that is explicitly driven by an emotional charge of brotherhood that seeks to unify Algerians and Syrians in Islam and Arabness. Since power works at the level of 'micro-relation [s], capillaries and everyday practices' (Clegg et al. 2006, 254; see also Foucault 1989 in Seeck, 2011, p. 05), the state technologies through which the state's discourse of hospitality and its political programmes function can be observed in the provision of accommodation in guest centres in the city of Béchar, in the provision of unconditional healthcare and education …etc. This discourse categorises the group of Syrians as Algeria's guests and not as asylum seekers or refugees. The fact that the Algerian state took so long (from April to June 2017) to respond to this humanitarian crisis can tell a lot about how its governmentality functioned at the time. This incident coincided with a new strategy, approach and state discourse of security and border control that has been adopted since January 2015. These Syrians were associated with a "potential threat" to national security as they could have been exploited by terrorist groups or traffickers at the borders of Algeria with its unstable neighbouring countries until they proved the opposite. Since the state did not identify any potential threat to its national security after accepting the group, and after already gaining access to the Algerian territory, the exceptional Syrians were labelled as "guests and brothers". From a biopolitical governmentality viewpoint, these Syrians were accepted based on their vulnerability and biological needs especially

because among the group there were children and a pregnant woman who had been trapped at the borders for 2 months and desperately in need of medical intervention. Having said this, this is a case of refugees gaining "bio-legitimacy" (Schindel, 2016, p.22), which means that their sick bodies became the most effective resource of gauging vulnerability according to Algerian biopolitical logic. The production of these Syrians as *vulnerable subjects* or typifying the *suffering body* is clear. These refugee bodies were deemed legitimate for biopolitical reasons and their health conditions have turned their bodies into 'social resources' / *'suffering body'* (Schindel, 2016, p. 22) that the Algerian state and its rationalities (security, biopolitics) recognise and legitimise. In their case, the matter is not about being useful for work because they are not often granted social rights to legal employment unless working with an Algerian citizen. Producing a 'passive and a suffering figure' belongs to a 'humanitarian logic', Schindel claims (2016, p. 22). The humanitarian logic produces refugees in terms of 'bare life'; this means that these lives are exposed to danger and therefore need protection 'for the sake of their biological survival' (Schindel, 2016, p.22). The humanitarian practice can be perceived as form of modern biopolitics that separates between what is inside and outside the qualified life (Schindel, 2016, p.22). About the humanitarian government of refugees, Mavelli (2017) argues that the humanitarian government of refugees is a form of the state biopolitical governmentality which is designed to govern both the displaced community and the local population by including 'valuable lives' and excluding 'unworthy lives' according to their capacity to boost the emotional and biological well-being of the host population.

In Algeria, the socio-political scene is where paradoxical state discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarianism meet. My research data shows that these practices have not been helpful for Syrians to create and stabilise their identities of being either asylum seekers, refugees, guests, brothers in faith and Arabness, illegal migrants, or economic migrants. As

such, there is a confusion between state policies and state practices when managing the flow of Syrian displaced people.

6.1.1. The Production of "Guests": Historical ties Vs Citizenship Rights

In his essay *The Subject and Power*, Foucault argued that subjects and power cannot be separated because it is power that makes subjects or 'the way by which human beings are made' (Foucault, 2000e, 326-327 in Seeck, 2011, p. 05). 'Both subject and subjectivity are historically produced through certain discourses and certain desires' (Dreyfus 1999; Cooper & Burrell 1988, Foucault 2000b in Seeck, 2011, p. 05). Given the arbitrary nature of host-guest relationship, a guest can remain for a limited period of time but cannot be included into the host community. Darling (2009, pp. 656, 657) argues that 'for Derrida (1999), the ethical 'law of hospitality' must always be subsumed within conditional `laws of hospitality', which translate ethical demand into practical concerns and conditions: for to be hospitable is to never question the guest and to be surprised by his or her arrival'. In this regard, Rozakou (2012, p. 565) also adds that 'hospitality, seen in the form of a gift, includes the stranger in the social world of the host, though it is temporary and a conditional inclusion in which the host holds the monopoly on agency'. As previously mentioned, if hospitality is meant to be conditional and temporary, this chapter raises several questions from a perspective of power-knowledge relation including: For how long can Syrians be "guests"? Can Algeria's guests, Syrians, receive long-term / permanent inclusion into the Algerian setting? Will "guests" be qualified for the status of "citizens" by granting them citizenship and political participation in the Algerian context? Why do Algerian state officials often use the word "guest" as opposed to "refugee" or "immigrants"? Does the "guest" status grant Syrians any rights within the

Algerian context and what might be the limitations associated with this status? What might be the state's policy and ideology behind labelling Syrians as "guests"? In order to answer these questions, I will rely on data collected from both Algerian and Syrian respondents. Given the absence of an asylum / refugee mechanism in Algerian law and the ambiguity of the state policies regarding refugeehood, documenting life-experiences of my research informants in Algeria would reflect the strategies adopted by the state for managing the flow of Syrians since 2011. I will do this by analysing how the discourse of hospitality is built through its technologies and state rationalities of citizenship and how Syrians are produced as "guests" based on power-knowledge relations.

It is worth mentioning that the phenomena of migration (legal / illegal) and refugeehood (including asylum) are not common and Algeria's experience in managing flows of refugees and immigrants (excluding economic migrants) is still in its infancy compared to the experience of the western world (Europe, UK, USA, Canada …). After the Syrian civil uprising that started in 2011 against Assad's regime, Algeria received approximately fifty thousand displaced Syrians (asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants). The UN has urged the Algerian state to enact a national law, but Algeria has not set up a mechanism of asylum and refugeehood. As previously stated, the first wave of immigration of Syrians (2011 to December 2014) was governed by principles and ethics of hospitality that took into consideration historical ties between Algerians and Syrians since the French colonisation in Algeria and the aspects of common origins in terms of faith (Islam) and Arabité (Arabness / Pan-Arabism). However, state technologies of hospitality discourse embody a state rationality based on nationalism, colonial and post-colonial Algerian citizenship, biopolitics of the local community (Algerians).

As with most of my Syrian respondents, who seemed very knowledgeable about the shared history between Algeria and Syria, Kamal mentioned a strong feeling of kinship originating since El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri lived in Syria in the 19th century. He emphasised how mixed marriages between Syrians and grandchildren of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri have bonded both peoples and granted them citizenship. Unfortunately for Kamal, since he failed to prove that the first ancestor of his father's family is El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri, he could not be naturalised in Algeria. However, he alluded to some of his friends' successful stories of naturalisation because they were able to provide the necessary documents to receive Algerian citizenship by descent.

Although, 53-years old Rabie stopped schooling at an early stage, his memory did not fail him to remember his old days at his primary school in Syria. He remembered when pupils were encouraged to recite both the Algerian and the Syrian anthem before class every morning. Still about his education and schooling in Syria, Rabie remembered that they were taught about El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri and Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss. Both figures were introduced in Syrian schools as loyal men that fought for the independence of their country and promoted moderate Islamic values by rejecting religious extremism, Rabie stated. Additionally, on my first meeting with another Syrian informant, Riyadh; he recounted very interesting stories about the life of El Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei'ri in his exile in Syria that his grandfather used to tell him about. One of the stories discussed the fact when El Amir Abdu el-Kader hosted and protected a Christian minority in his palace in Damascus when their lives were threatened. On the day of our interview, and as an answer to my question about what might have motivated Riyadh and his family to residency in Algeria, he replied: "Algerians gained a good reputation in terms of hospitality that they learned from their ancestors compared to other Arab nations in Syria's neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia" [… tarikat

mo'aamalat el jazaei'ri la souri ahssan wa diyafa ahssan… ana sma'et tajarob asdikai' li fi amakin mota'adida ; matlan asdika'i fi lobnan hakouli ano fi wad'e ma'ichi mou mnih w kaman fi el ordon b sabab katrat souriyin hounik w hata fi so'odiya…]. He referred to the three countries as unsuccessful when it comes to providing good living conditions for the Syrian displaced community.

Amin, a shopkeeper, shared Riyadh's sentiment of Algerian hospitality but he turned to the hadith traditions in contrast to the aristocratic ideal of familial descent from Abdu El-Kader which Rabie had learnt about in his Syrian school. For Amin, a more democratic spirit of fraternal kinship has to prevail: 'None of you [truly] believes until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself' ("An-Nawawi…", 2012). True to his everyday experience working among Algerians, Amin cited an anecdote of ordinary generosity. Visibly moved, he recounted his story with a woman who offered her seat to him in a crowded bus. She welcomed him to Algeria as his 'second country' […marhba bik fi ljazaei'ir … inta fi baladak tani…]. This is interesting for a number of reasons. The structure of feeling, of patriotic sentiment for one's country extends beyond territorial space; it is as if the concerns of state politicians -the discourse of territorial integrity- in the face of terrorist threats had never touched the lives of ordinary people. The pre-nationalist mode of moral governmentality, 'the government of souls', as Foucault puts it (Foucault, 1997, p.81), has no need for the state. This gift of hospitality is not only afforded to men by men, as the female passenger's welcoming remark to Amin shows.

Others from the Syrian cohort considered mutual and reciprocal hospitality as a moral duty that Algerians owe to Syrians. Wael, a deliveryman, believed that the historical moment in 1855

that marked the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri in Damascus, Syria, was a favour done by Syrians to an Algerian fighter who was forced to leave his country by a colonial power but welcomed by Syrian society. In his comment about the aspects of hospitality within Algerian society towards non-Algerians, Wael criticised the new approach adopted by state authorities to manage the flow of Syrian refugees. He was disappointed because he did not expect that 'as a Syrian, that was supposed to be treated as a brother to Algerians in Arabité and Islam, would need to go to the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) every 45 days to renew his short-residence permit, where non- Arab foreigners like Americans, French and Chinese have to go to renew their residence-permits' [… min nahiyat iltizamat el mafrouda alina min nahiyat dawla el jazai'iriya, lazem nmaded el khatem taba'e el ikama el mo'akata kol 45 youm fi maktab el ajanib. Nahna souriyin, nahna Arab w yeba'atouna 'ala maktab el ajanib! nrouh ma'a kol el ajanib: el amriki, l fransi, sini … yekhtmo jawazat safarhom, nrouho nahna kaman nekhtom honik …]. Wael's critique targets the state's policy and its bureaucratic procedures in dealing with Syrians in terms of their legal status and administrative issues. For him, hospitality means a well-defined legal status and travel documentations (long-residence permit instead of a short-residence permit) which will give him unconditional access to employment, and the right to family reunification. Although the Algerian state guaranteed the freedom of movement within its territory, freedom of mobility outside Algeria is still restricted.

Data from the Syrian cohort revealed that hospitality, to them, means inclusion into two main aspects. The first involves achieving social inclusion and unconditional welcoming; the second and most important aspect was legal integration via offering long-residence permit or Algerian citizenship, granting unconditional / unlimited access to social rights (healthcare, education, housing and employment) and the exercise of the freedom of movement outside Algeria. In order to gather more data and details regarding the state technologies that embody the political

and social programme of hospitality, I asked the state official at the level of the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) in central Algiers, Asma. Asma, previously a lawyer with nearly twenty years' experience in the Foreigners' office, also referred to the shared history between both Algerians and Syrians. To her, Algeria's approach to hospitality covers the following aspects: insuring social inclusion and integration of Syrians within the local society [… el indimaj fi el mojtama'e el jazaei'ri …], freedom of mobility within the Algerian territory [… horiyat tanakol fi el Jazaei'ir…] and granting rights (healthcare, education, housing, employment) in order to facilitate the life of Syrians in Algeria, tolerance and generosity [… takabol, tassmoh wa el karam wa hosn diyafa], non-discrimination and justice [… adam el tamyiz wa el adl …], no detention or deportation [… la ihtijaz wela ikaf, la tarhil …], and guaranteeing safety and security within Algeria [… salama wa el amn ta'ahom fi el jazae'ir…]. Indeed, achieving social justice reflects the equalities in the use and implementation of power. Regarding the duties of Syrians, Asma argued that Syrians, in turn, are expected to show respect to the state's internal law. However, these rights and main aspects stated by the state official, Asma, seem vital and legitimate rights for a refugee and should be highly respected by all signatory state members of the UN Refugee Convention when hosting and receiving refugees (UNHCR, 1967).

The answer provided by the state official gave important clues about the state technologies of hospitality. These technologies including duties and rights, levels of justice, dignity, tolerance, and inclusion / integration (legal and social) had to be discussed with my Syrian participants. Due to a lack in state's reports and official documents that may have helped in deciphering Algeria's strategies to manage the flow of the Syrian population and guarantee the rights of these displaced people, these discussions aimed at bridging the gap between the state's intentions and their implementations in daily lives of Syrians. Additionally, I had to talk to

Algerian social welfare providers, namely, healthcare providers, teachers, and employers to identify social rights that Syrian displaced people enjoy.

6.2. State Technologies of Hospitality and Integration: Rights and Bureaucratic Challenges

For displaced people – asylum seekers, refugees and forced migrants – the best destination is where successful and accessible integration policies along with effective and permanent protection systems are offered and guaranteed by the host government. Hopkins and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe- (2013) state that there is no common definition of a complex term like integration / inclusion. They further confirm that the term is often taken subjectively because the state may perceive it from an angle that is totally different from that of the displaced community and even from that of the host community. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, for instance, suggests that integration is a long-term process which aims at including everyone into society on condition that they learn German, abide with the law and its constitution, and accept the normative values of the German national community (Hopkins and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013). In the UK, Ager and Strang sum up ‘integration in the following indicators and the level of their accessibility; employment, housing, education, health equivalent to the receiving society, through social connections and connections with services of the state, and through acquiring linguistic and cultural competence and a sense of security and stability’ (Hopkins and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013, p. 14). The Canadian migration policy, on the other hand, defines integration as a ‘two-way process which encourages a mutual accommodation and

adjustment by both newcomers and the larger society' (Hopkins and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013, p. 14). At a legal level, for instance, refugees should be entitled to freedom of movement, access to education and healthcare, to the labour market, to valid travel documentation and the ability to reunify with their families. At the final stage of legal inclusion, refugees should receive their permanent-residence permits. At an economic level, refugees should be given the opportunity to participate in the economic aspect of life. Cultural and society-related aspects are ideally reciprocal acts of interaction, accommodation and contribution between refugees and the host community that should be governed by principles of diversity, openness, equality and non-discrimination or exploitation despite differences (Hopkins & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe, 2013, p. 15).

The UNHCR confirms that there is a fine line between integration and assimilation; the first is an interactive process where 'adaptation' and 'welcome' are guaranteed from both refugees and the host society at the legal, economic and socio-cultural levels, the latter, on the other hand, refers to a conditional inclusion that requires from the refugee to abandon their own beliefs and adopt the host community's ideas and values (Hopkins & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe , 2013, pp. 14, 15). The strategies of integration adopted by Germany, the UK and Canada are different, and they depend on migration policies and principles of each country based on their political and social hierarchies. According to their conceptual definitions of integration, I believe that the policies designed by the German and the British governments are assimilationist rather than about integrating refugees. An assimilationist view would consider the newcomer as an outsider who needs to prove their acquisition of the normative values, linguistic and cultural competences in order to be included and maybe naturalized. In contrast, the Canadian perspective puts both the benefits

of the newcomer and those of local society at the same equal level in order to achieve harmony between both groups. The conceptualisation offered by the Canadian government is based on mutual accommodation between both groups, host society and refugees regardless their religious, cultural or linguistic backgrounds.

As previously mentioned, the state official at the level of the Foreigners' Office in Algiers, Asma, argued that the state technologies of hospitality involve integration into social rights of citizenship. However, my research data from the Syrian cohort revealed that the Algerian approach in granting rights has been unconditional / unlimited and equal to Syrians as Algerians in terms of healthcare, education and housing. Access to employment, however, has been selective, conditional and dependent to legal status of Syrians and the legal documentations they have. In fact, 'certain technologies come to serve different functions depending on the specific rationalities they articulate with' (Valverde, 1996, p. 358 in Lippert, 1999, p. 296). Granting conditional access to employment serves a state rationality of protecting Algerian citizenship. I believe from a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, since unconditional access would pave the way to a long-residence permit and therefore to possibly the acquisition of Algerian citizenship, the state is restricting its access to better control the Syrian community and care for the host community (Algerians). Due to the nature of Algerian citizenship which is highly governed by maintaining loyalty and belonging to Algeria as a state and its people, Syrians have been granted conditional access to employment in order to better manage the diversity of Algerianness. This idea will be elaborated in chapter 6. This section and sub-sections will discuss the fact of granting rights to healthcare, education and housing as a technology of state's approach of hospitality.

6.2.1 Healthcare and the Understanding of a "Suffering Body"

From independence (1962) onward, the Algerian national security system adopted an egalitarian plan for healthcare provision where 'hospitalization, and outpatient care is equal and free to all Algerians' (Metz, 1994, p.118). Within a biopolitical logic that aims to enhance the well-being of Algerians, these top-down policies were based on the principles of 'the welfare state as a form of government in which the state plays a critical role in the protection and promotion of the social and economic wellbeing of its citizens (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 67)'. The World Health Organization (2002, p. 04) documented that after the economic crisis in 1980s, the Algerian health insurance system moved from an economic to a social welfare model in order to ensure 'collective security, social protection, social solidarity, and social citizenship' (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 68). Karshenas and Moghadam add that the Algerian social protection policy covers the following: 'social security', 'social assistance', 'social net allowance and home living social assistance', 'family allowance', 'student allowance and low-income housing assistance', 'social assistance to the elderly, the mentally ill, and to children' (2006, p. 93). The Algerian health insurance system has extended to both employed and unwaged Algerians through two main schemes, 'CNAS and CASNOS' respectively (WHO, 2002, p. 04). In terms of medical insurance, most Algerians receive different reimbursements from the supplementary Health Insurance Company within the scheme of CHIFA and through their CHIFA cards. Beneficiaries receive from 80% to 100% coverage of costs according to the type of illnesses they have, their status. Employed people still receive their allowance during sick leaves (WHO, 2002, pp. 05, 06). Generally, foreign workers and foreign students in Algeria are entitled to free healthcare treatment at public hospitals and are eligible for health insurance as well. Their eligibility to health insurance varies depending on the insurance provided by their employers or companies they belong to. By contrast, undocumented

immigrants and refugees, although entitled to free healthcare service, may face challenges in terms of health insurance and reimbursements of their medications, as they do not hold CHIFA cards. Even though there is no refugee national mechanism, all Syrians are entitled to equal and free healthcare treatment at public hospitals regardless their status (documented migrant, undocumented migrant, short-residence permit holders, long-residence holders, people registered with UNHCR).

From a top-down perspective, Asma, the state representative from the Foreigners' Office in Algiers on April 25th 2018, confirmed that 'the Algerian social welfare policy offers an egalitarian support to all Syrians, without any exception, just as all Algerians in terms of welfare rights, including healthcare services' […bi nisba ila ria'aya sihiya, kamel souriyin bi doun istitnae andhom el hak fiha w yrouho l mostachfayat el dawla mitlhom mitl el Jazaei'iriyin a kamel bla massarif … mitlhom mitl el Jazaei'ri nafs el hala …]. At practical level and in real life situations, Algerian healthcare providers in public hospitals confirmed that the application of the state instructions of providing healthcare to Syrians free and equal to Algerians, is a must. When I went to the main hospital in Algiers - Mustapha Pacha - I walked into the emergency department where I noticed a busy scene with patients and doctors. I was not able to distinguish Syrians and Algerians through the way they have been treated in the hospital. On November 25th, 2018 in Mustapha Pacha hospital, I met a general healthcare practitioner with nearly ten years of experience, Tarik (40), who confirmed that

'all Syrians have been enjoying free healthcare in the state public hospitals since their first arrival in 2011. However, not all of them have CHIFA cards that grant them health insurance. This means that they cannot receive reimbursements to their medications compared to those whose Algerian employers have offered them health insurance' […Lakin machi kamel souriyin 'andhom el daman el ijtimaei'i bi istithnae li ykhdmo fi charikat

jazaei'iriya li hya amnthom ijtimaeiyan w andhom hata bitakat CHIFA li tkhali dawla tsa'adhom min nahiyat el dawae wa tkadamlhom tae'widat bi had el khoussous…].

Interestingly, Tarik mentioned an exception for 'most vulnerable people with chronic diseases such as diabetes, blood pressure and even pregnant women and claimed that they are entitled to free medications even if they do not have CHIFA cards' […lakin kayen kadalik li 'andhom el amrad el mozmina mitl sokari, daght dam, nissae el hawamil … hadou 'and ma yjiw l mostachfa na'atouhom dawae ta'ahom bi el majan…]. After our meeting, Tarik invited me to visit the delivery suite in Mustapha Pacha hospital to hear more about the experience of pregnant women and the challenges they may have faced. I met Hassiba (60), a midwife with more than 30 years of experience in the maternity department in Mustapha Pacha. Just like Tarik, Hassiba did not hesitate to take part in my research, however, she was not comfortable with voice recording. For her, the well-being of the patients and staff members in the department is very important and should be respected by everyone. She said this while pointing at a bilingual notice on the wall which says "no smoking, respect our patients, keep silent, please" in both Arabic and French [el rajae la li tadkhin, ihtarimo mardana, iltazimo samt; ne pas fumer, garder le silence, respecter nos patients SVP]. Hassiba confirmed that 'the maternity department has been continuously receiving Syrian women since 2011'. She assured that 'they are treated equally as Algerian women'. Bearing in mind what Dr Tarik informed me about the reimbursement of medication, Hassiba also affirmed that 'all pregnant women are entitled to free medication along with their newborns because they are the most vulnerable' [… souriyat andhom nafs el hokouk fi ria'aya sihiya fi had el masslaha kima el jazaei'iriyat w awladhom aussi … ki yjiwna hata el dawa'e nmadoulhom batel la anahom des femmes enceintes li yahtajo da'em…].

The Algerian healthcare system did not appear to treat Syrians equally and research data revealed nuances in care and in gauging vulnerability. I remembered on March 10th, 2018 in Bab Zouar, Algiers, when I met Rabie, whose story was very moving. Rabie was a very welcoming man of 53 years old and a father of three children. Rabie was an example of a father who has been working hard for his family and the future of his children. I asked him about the Algerian healthcare system, and I could tell that he was not very satisfied with the services he received although they are free. Having an autistic son, Rabie expressed his frustrations about his son's spectrum disorder and about not being able to provide medications for his son and being unable to cover the fees of his son's private cognitive behavioural therapist. In fact, it is not only the case of Syrians, but autistic children of Algerian nationality also still receive limited support and the state's strategy of looking after this category of patients is widely critiqued by doctors, civil society, and Algerian associations. However, being self-employed with an expired Syrian passport that was not renewed by the Syrian consulate in Algiers, Rabie seemed very concerned because he was not eligible to receive a CHIFA card that may allow him to receive support and reimbursements for his son's medications as most Algerians possibly do. Within the state's conceptualisation of a *suffering body*, Rabie's autistic son, unlike pregnant women and people with chronic illnesses, did not fit into the state's understanding of vulnerability and therefore did not receive a CHIFA card to help him with his medications and consultations with his cognitive behavioural therapist.

In addition to the challenges of health insurance and CHIFA cards that Rabie has mentioned, the most challenging aspect for Syrian women is when they had to face the state's bureaucratic procedures, administrative errors, and paperwork. Hassiba shared a very frequent scenario that has been occurring with pregnant couples which is the case of Syrian couples that are unable to provide proofs of their identity or their marriage contracts in order to register their babies

and issue them registration certificates from the hospital. These certificates of registration are necessary in registering the new-born at the Syrian consulate in Algiers and in applying for a Syrian passport. Hassiba added that

'the application of bureaucratic procedures, in such cases, are sometimes unfair because it is obvious that displaced people, that fled their countries due to wars, are more likely to lose everything including their identification documents. For their consulates in Algeria, the issue of new documents usually takes a long time than expected. So, both the Algerian state and the Syrian consulate are concerned and should collaborate to find solutions to these issues'.

The scenario narrated by Hassiba is equally applied against Algerian couples. Algerian couples that fail to prove their legitimate marriage are more likely to face bureaucratic obstacles that would prevent them from registering their new-borns. What Hassiba narrated about the experience of Syrians can be perceived as a representation of the state's governmentality where Syrian war refugees, who are most likely to have lost their personal documents during war, had to prove their marital status in order for their new-borns to be registered at the hospital. Prior to Hassiba, this issue was also raised by Fatima Zohra, a thirty-nine-year-old Algerian businesswoman that has committed to voluntarily providing financial, emotional and mental support for Syrians that fled to Algeria since 2011. Fatima Zohra also argued that the issue of lost papers had put Syrian couples and their babies into troubles with both the Algerian government and the Syrian consulate in Algiers.

Fatima Zohra, whom I met on April 28th, 2018 in central Algiers, looked very independent and expressed her will to help Syrians in all aspects of life and whenever possible. She appreciated

how ‘both the Algerian state and local society have been extremely open and helpful when it comes to brothers and sisters coming from Syria’ [… el dawla el jazaei’iriya wa el cha’eb el jazaei’iri kano fi el mostawa wa istakblo w kamo b lwajib w aktar mn jihat ikhwatna mn Souriya …]. When talking about challenges that Syrians have faced, she mentioned the issue of missed documents and lost IDs and explained how this has created constraints for both Syrian couples and their new-borns in their daily lives. Fatima Zohra explained how hard she worked along with her team members in order to find solutions in such cases, especially for pregnant couples to prove the legitimacy of their marriage in order to register their babies. As a representative and an active member and a representative of three charity organisations: Jame’eyat Hiraae (organisation of Hiraae), Jame’eyat Akhawat el khayr (Organisation of Sisters’ Good Deeds) and Jame’eyat el Irchad wa el Islah (Organisation of Guidance and Reform), Fatima Zohra relied on lawyers in these three organisations to help Syrians solve their bureaucratic issues by at least requesting their marriage certificates from the Syrian consulate in Algiers and urge their consulate to issue them their papers.

The reason why the state governmentality has offered conditional access to social welfare to unmarried couples is to save the moral values of the Algerian society. This is again a state rationality of biopolitically caring for the well-being of the local population through governing the Syrian community. In this regards, Fatima Zohra argued that:

‘Within a conservative society like the Algerian society where peoples’ values, traditions and ethics are highly dependent on their faith: Islam, unmarried couples cannot have sexual relationships and babies outside marriage. Babies of unmarried couples or single mothers raise a cultural issue’, […sadfna mochkil wahid w kbir, ano lama tkoun el maraa souriya hamil, fa hnaya bi hokm a’arafna wa ‘adatna w takalidna w mojtama’ana el mohafid, fa

netolbo mnha daftar el a'eili bch twlad w li ybayan ano had el tifl ja an tarik alakat zawaj chare'iya aw ghayr chare'iya aw tkoun hya om 'aziba].

This state's biopolitical governmentality, however, may result in statelessness among new generation of refugees whose parents were unsuccessful in providing papers to legitimate their marriages.

Another facet of Algeria's biopolitical governmentality covers its power to restrict interracial marriages between Algerians and Syrians. In Algeria, there are two major steps that are necessarily important in marriage namely: Islamic marriage and legal marriage. The first one can be achieved by the presence of an imam; legal marriage comes after the Islamic marriage is achieved and requires the presence of the couple, the girl's father (wali el Amr) and two witnesses. Marriages between Syrians are allowed, and the married couple will receive a marriage certificate issued from the Algerian state which will help them register at the Syrian consulate in Algiers and request a family register (Daftar el 'Ae'ili / Livret de Famille). However, mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians are not always allowed. It is worth mentioning that by law, mixed marriages are not banned in Algeria. However, as a state's technology to limit access to citizenship by marriage, the state has enacted exceptional informal restrictions against mixed couples (Algerian-Syrian couples). Leyth, a twenty-three-year-old Syrian man is no exception. His marriage to an Algerian female was declined because of her family. According to Leyth, his request was declined by the girl's father who doubted that the Algerian state will legalise the marriage even if the Islamic marriage is approved. Leyth claimed that the state has informally stopped legalising mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians especially because some Algerian women were divorced right after their Syrian spouse received their long-residence permits. The reason why the Algerian state restricts mixed marriages is again a state's technology to discipline and administrate the life of Syrians as

governed subjects. These state technologies are also designed to care and preserve moral values and care for all aspects of life of the host population (Algerians). If the phenomenon of single mothers or unmarried couples having babies outside marriage is tolerated or encouraged, Islamic norms and values of Algerianness will be disturbed. Through these bureaucratic procedures, the state's biopower has identified governing technologies and measures to regulate the conduct of both Algerian and non-Algerians including Syrians.

These technologies and measures embody the state rationality of promoting Islamic ethics and laws that ban sexual relationships outside marriage, being pregnant outside marriage and even ban abortion inside or outside marriage. Although the Algerian government has not adopted Shari'a law as a source of its politics, the family code in Algeria is highly dependent on Islamic rules (see chapter 4). If mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians were not restricted, the chances of Syrians claiming their rights to long-residence permits and naturalisation will be high. The state would face unexpected diversity in Algerian society. The act of exceptionally and informally banning or imposing restrictions over mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians is itself a biopolitical act which aims at preserving the genetic stock and quality of Algerians by excluding Syrians. Leyth's story of being unable to marry an Algerian girl because he is a Syrian and cannot legalise his marriage due to the state's restrictions on mixed marriages is an example of this. The historical development of the Algerian national identity reveals that Algerianness as both a political and normative entity is exclusionary and does not fit into multiculturalism because it adopts one religion which is Islam as its official state religion. In addition to preserving values of nationalism and the nature of Algerian citizenship and Algerianness, the rationality behind banning mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians can still be shaped thoroughly by the state discourse of security which categorises Syrians as "potential threats to national security". The latter will be discussed in chapter 7. Within the context of how a biopolitical decision of the state can still control the diversity of

the governed population by granting access to those who deserve and denying access to those who do not (Mavelli, 2017), the state bureaucratic procedures in Algeria can still be viewed as biopolitical state decisions that have been adopted in order to foster and care for the Algerian society and preserve its Muslim identity, values of nationalism and security by controlling the Syrian displaced community.

6.2.2 Education as a Technology of Care and Social Integration within the Classroom

As stated in previous chapters, in French Algeria, Arabic was considered inferior as a medium of education and was completely disregarded from the schools' curriculum. After independence, the Algerian state adopted the policy of Arabisation as a part of Boumedienne's ideology of linguistic decolonisation that would end the dominance of the French language. Education has played an important role in rebuilding the Algerian nation and fostering national pride after colonial predation and the French assimilationist attempt to eradicate all indigenous norms of Algerianness. The policy of Arabisation was only with the assistance of three main Arab countries namely, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. These countries sent teachers of standard Arabic language to Algeria to boost Arabisation during Boumedienne's presidency and re-connect Algerian society again to the Arab nation. Although all efforts to make the project of Arabisation succeeded, French still has an important status in the Algerian administrative and social contexts, and it is still used as a lingua franca in Algeria (European Union, 2018).

The Algerian constitution guarantees free education to all Algerians and is compulsory from the ages of 6 to 16 (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2015). In his reply to my email, Hocine, a staff member at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research confirms that like home students, international students in Algeria receive free service from the state's educational institutions. This covers their tuition fees, students' allowance, healthcare and health insurance, accommodation and catering (Executive decrees No 10-137 related to the conditions of accepting foreign students / learners in Algeria and the coverage of their costs, 2010, pp. 7-9; Hocine, February 03, 2019 personal e-mail communication). For this research, I did not interview school pupils or teenagers. This research included only parents whose children are of school age and are registered at Algerian schools, and Algerian teachers that are involved in teaching responsibilities towards Syrian pupils.

While more than 3 million displaced Syrian children of school age do not have the opportunity to go to school (UNHCR, 2019), in Algeria and after talking to Asma, at the Foreigners' Office in central Algiers, she confirmed that 'all Syrians, without exception, have the right to receive free education in Algeria as Algerian nationals' […bi ghad el nadar 'ala ay chi, jami'e el atfal el souriyin 'andhom el hak fi ta'elim wa da'em fi hada el majal majanan mitl el jazaei'ri …]. 'Although most Syrians do not have legal status in Algeria, their children still receive compulsory education between the ages of 6 and 16 as Algerians and receive free textbooks', Asma added. Data from the Syrian cohort have shown that Syrians do not usually face problems or delays in accessing or resuming education in Algeria. Narratives from my Syrian respondents also confirmed that the Ministry of National Education facilitated the pathway of resuming primary and secondary education for their children in terms of registration, free learning materials and textbooks and free educational support such as health and wellbeing support mental and emotional health support services, and the like. I remember when I was at

Rabie's bakery shop in Bab Zouar, his daughter, Hiba, walked in during lunch time. Hearing Hiba talking to her Algerian best friend, her accent did not reveal her identity as a Syrian until her father, Rabie, introduced her as his little daughter. Hiba and I shook hands and she was very fluent in Algerian Arabic that was previously very difficult for her and her family to understand when they first came to Algeria. Rabie's daughter was one example of many Syrian pupils who have been registered at Bab Zouar middle school and were able to resume their studies in Algeria after they left Syria. Just like Hiba, 'those arriving in Algeria with no proper identification documents and qualifications were not prevented from resuming their schooling. Syrian school children only needed their birth certificates from the Syrian consulate in Algiers in order to prove their identity and a declaration from their parents that should state their real level of education in Syria', Rabie argued.

One of the most critical aspects that may hinder the integration of Syrian children at schools in Algeria are mental health problems that they may have developed due to traumatic events they witnessed, persecution, displacement, and abuse. After we had lunch together, Hiba and her Algerian classmate left for school and her father shared her story with me. He seemed very thankful to the emotional and psychological support his thirteen-year-old daughter, Hiba, received. I was curious to know more about Hiba's story and Rabie was very open and decided to share it. With tears in his eyes, he remembered when his daughter first joined school in Algiers, she recalled the scenario that happened to her while in Syria. Hiba witnessed the death of her classmates after missiles hit her school in Syria, consequently, she was suffering from a post-traumatic stress disorder and refused to resume her studies in Algeria. Rabie stated that his daughter received emotional and mental support from her school's sociologists and psychologists that helped her overcome her fears and return to school in Algeria. When I saw

Hiba for the first time and without knowing what she went through, she was an example of somebody that loves life, school and enjoys every aspect of it including her classmates.

While it was easier for school children to resume their studies in Algeria, 'most Baccalaureate holders and university students faced challenges in pursuing their studies at Algerian universities because the Algerian university curriculum is based on French as a foreign language and the Syrian curriculum is based on English as a foreign language' […lakin fi halat ma kano darssin fi el jami'aa fi Souriya, lazemlhom baccalaureat jazaei'iriya li tkhalihom ysajlo fi el jami'aa el jazaei'riya. Hada kamel la ano le système fi souriya wa jazaei'ir meshi kif kif; Matalan fi jazaei'ir le système ybaser ala el faranciya ama fi souriya ybaser ala el ingliziya ka lougha ajnabiya …] Asma, the state representative at the Foreigners' office, argued. Very few were encouraged to apply for Baccalaureate exams and access universities in Algeria, and Fateh was one of them. Fateh (39), a shop owner, recounted his experience

'… as a Syrian citizen that passed the Algerian Baccalaureate exam after registering at Algiers University without paying tuition fees and received his student card with all the accompanying student rights and benefits, equal to those granted to Algerian university students. These included free catering, free university transportation, free healthcare and health insurance …' […kan andi tajroba ani darast fi el jamiaa el jazae'iriya … kadamt ala imtihan el baccalauréat w najat w sajalt fi el jamiaa el jazaeiriya houn b doun ay rossoum aw massarif … el iteam fi el jamiaa kanet majaniya, nakl, akl fi mat'am el jamia'a …].

6.2.2.1. The Integration of Syrian Pupils in the Classroom: The Case of Middle School Pupils

Syrian informants in my fieldwork did not mention that they have faced major problems such as unwanted attention, harassment, discrimination, or any act of exclusion during the process of registering their children in public schools in Algeria. However, they reported linguistic difficulties that their children faced. Despite the official language in both Algeria and Syria is standard Arabic, Syrians showed linguistic difficulties in understanding Algerian dialectal Arabic. Coming from a different linguistic background, Syrian families shared a common linguistic problem when it comes to understanding vernacular Arabic in Algeria and French language. Kamal, for instance, shared the difficulty of his nephew (his brother's son) in understanding Algerian dialect at school which was a linguistic barrier for social inclusion and integration. Kamal added: 'the Algerian dialect was not easy for my nephew at school but later he mastered it' […mn nahiyat ta'alim, 'andna wild akhi yrouh l madrassa majanan w fi tashilat mn had nahiya hamdoullah, f awal fatra kanet logha s'iiba chway alih bas ma'a lwakt walaf …]. While some Syrian pupils, like Rabie's daughter Hiba preferred to be exempt from French classes and attended only Arabic and English, other Syrian parents expressed their interest in multilingualism that the Algerian educational system offers. As such, they registered their children in private schools that offer French classes to help their children outside the classroom.

Given the data provided by my Syrian informants and during my third research trip to Algeria on November 26th, 2018, I decided to pay a visit to a middle school or a secondary school where most Syrians in Bab Zouar sent their children. I visited a middle school in Algiers which was highly recommended by most Syrians living in Bab Zouar province. Once I arrived at the

school, I had to submit my authorisation letter that was issued by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research which proves my identity and what I was doing in terms of my research and studies. After my request had been approved by the school's headmaster, I met Algerian teachers and invited them to take part in my research. Unfortunately, very few offered their assistance and the reason why most of them refused to participate into my research was because they had to finish the curriculum of the trimester before the mid of December and before the start of the exams and the new year break and holidays. Fares (34) was among those who offered their assistance and invited me to join him for a session on citizenship and nationality. Fares was a 3rd and 4th year-grade teacher of Civil Education, Geography and History.

Fares introduced me as a teacher-to-be to his pupils. In the last row, I took a seat and observed how the session would go. In the beginning, I was not able to detect who was Algerian and who was Syrian because I did not notice any major differences in terms of teacher-pupil rapport, pupil-pupil rapport or even in terms of their linguistic performance. 'The organisation of seats within the classroom was deliberately arranged by their principal teacher that made a Syrian pupil and an Algerian pupil sit together on the same table', said Fares. I believe this was a good idea to ensure feeling of integrating and inclusion among Syrian pupils and rather than encouraging exclusion within the classroom. This will also provide an opportunity for Algerian pupils to know more about their Syrians classmates, their culture, and their linguistic backgrounds. My session with 3rd - year grade pupils was not fruitful and rich because of the subject of that session compared to that with 4th- grade pupils. After my session with his 3rd – year grade pupils, Fares, invited me to join him in his next session with final- year middle school pupils (4th grade) because the subject of this session was relevant to my research; it discussed subjects around the Algerian state and Algerian society and the ideal Algerian

citizen. Theoretically, the session covered the normative values of the Algerian society, legal values, the Algerian constitution and relations between state, administration and citizens. Before diving into the subject of the session, Fares asked his pupils to introduce themselves by full name and nationality so that I could recognise Syrians from Algerians. Interestingly, some Syrian pupils identified themselves as both Syrians and Algerians though they were not naturalised citizens or of naturalised parents. Just like me, I could see that Fares, their teacher, was astonished by their answers as well. He asked what made them identify themselves as both Syrians and Algerians. One of the girls expressed her love for both Syria and Algeria. Another girl said that she was born in Syria and she has been living in Algeria with her parents and that is why she feels she belongs to both countries. Interestingly, the classroom observation and through Syrian pupils' answers, I concluded that Syrian pupils reflected an image of displaced children that were successful in integrating into the Algerian society without renouncing their Syrian identity and culture. This can be seen as a part of the state's strategy of hospitality that aims at achieving integration rather than assimilation. The classroom atmosphere did not manifest any cultural or linguistic barriers, acts of social exclusion, racism or discrimination among peers. As a teacher of two different levels, Fares did not report any major problems or challenges that his Syrian pupils faced during their schooling apart from difficulties in understanding the Algerian dialect of Arabic at the beginning of their schooling.

6.2.3 Housing and "Guest" Centres

Immediately after independence, the housing sector was not defined as one of the state's main priorities compared to the sectors of education and healthcare in Algeria. The reason was because the independent population was very limited, 'around 12 million in 1966' and most of

them moved to vacant properties that were abandoned by their French / European owners (Metz, 1994 & Nait Saada, 2003, p. 01). Due to a significant baby boom and internal migration from rural to urban areas, Algeria started adopting a series of housing policies, strategies and reforms. Buildings in public sector reached '360.000 units per year between 1990 and August 1993' (Metz, 1994, pp. 122-123).

From independence to 1990s, the housing policy changed significantly from a 'social product to an economic product that became available for rental or sale purposes' (Nait Saada, 2003, p. 03). The state started subsidising people with housing services according to their housing condition and their income. Nait Saada (2003, p. 07) confirms that the 21st century's Algerian housing policy is in a dilemma that can be traced back to the 1990s during which Algeria witnessed an economic and political instability due to shortage in financial support. Another reason is because politicians and decision makers did not address the crisis and could not develop efficient policies to meet the expected objectives and higher demand due to a population growth of 1.9 per annum with 70% of the whole population living in cities (Africa Housing Finance yearbook, 2018, p. 62). 'Although Algerians have the right to benefit from low-cost state rental properties, housing affordability in the private market remains an issue for 60% of the population due to the increased rate of unemployment, slower GDP growth, and higher inflation' (Africa Housing Finance yearbook, 2018, p. 62).

Generally, foreigners are not eligible to the state's social housing. Murphy and Vieten (2017, p. 25) believe that a good quality of housing is the most prominent aspect for a host country in order to achieve integration to displaced people and through which it enhances the access of forced migrants to education and employment. In the case of displaced people such as Syrians,

and due to the absence of a formal national refugee mechanism in Algeria that should define programmes of re-settlement and provide housing schemes to successfully integrate newcomers into the host community, the Algerian state hosted Syrians in "guest" centres. In Algiers, Sidi Feradj, previously a tourist complex, is now a place for hundreds of Syrian families that have not been able to afford private accommodation.

6.2.3.1. 'Guest Centres, Not refugee Camps': Between Care and Control

'Guest centres, not refugee camps' […hado morakab diyafa mach mokhyamat laji'in …], this was strongly articulated by Asma, the state representative at the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) when I asked her about the existence of refugee camps in Algeria like Sidi Feradj centre in the municipality of Staouali in Algiers. The rejection of calling "guest centres" refugee camps shows the dominant discourse adopted by the Algerian state in governing and managing Syrians which is that of hospitality. The latter is manifested in a host-guest relationship. Algerian society and the Algerian state represent the host and the Syrian community represents the guest. Syrians that reside in Sidi Feradj enjoy the same rights as Syrians who were able to rent private properties outside the state's guest centres. They have full free access to healthcare, education, housing, and conditional access to employment unless they have long-residence permits.

Although the present research does not intend to provide a contrastive analysis between two groups of Syrians: those that have chosen to rent private properties and others that chose to stay in guest centres like Sidi Feradj, hearing more about the conditions of Syrians in Sidi

Feradj guest centres was still relevant to my research in order to analyse how norms of hospitality may or may not have changed with both groups. Unfortunately, gaining access to the guest centre was not possible due to security measures. The security guards at Sidi Feradj guest centre were ordered by responsible staff managers not to grant anyone outside the centre access including researchers, journalists, and NGOs. 'The reason behind this refusal was because Syrians inside the guest centre have previously been interviewed by journalists who claimed to be Algerians and conducted research with Syrians without taking into consideration their previous traumatic experiences in Syria, instead they added fuel on the fire', argued the security guard. He also confirmed that some Syrians' life experiences were politically and inhumanely exploited by a group of foreign researchers that claimed to be Syrians that wanted to visit their friends in Sidi Feradj centre. For these reasons and because the guest centre represented a very securitised space, only Syrians that reside in Sidi Feradj could either invite or reject the invitation of people outside the guest centre. The invitee will have to provide their ID and a proof of kinship so that they can access the centre. Because both the physical space and the lives of Syrian residents in Sidi Feradj guest centre are monitored by the Algerian state, as a second plan I have chosen to talk to Syrians that may have visited or previously resided in the guest centre of Sidi Feradj. Fateh was one of my Syrian participants that had a general idea about Sidi Feradj and previously paid visits to it. Fateh visited his friend in Sidi Feradj guest centre after his friend had a surgery in the hospital and was discharged after his condition was stable and safe to leave the hospital in Algiers. In our conversation, Fateh confirmed that 'Syrians who live in the guest centre and those that have chosen to rent private houses outside enjoy the same rights'. He also argued that 'Sidi Feradj guest centre is only for those who could not afford accommodation in the private sector and not people that are excluded from the community' […el ijraat el kanouniya mn nahiyat tanakol w kamel lhokouk mitl ri'aya sihiya wa ta'elim hiya nafsha. Ya'ani mitlna mitlhom. El morakab ta'ae Sidi Feradj howa makan lal

mabit fakat darato dawla el jazai'eriya la nas li ma'andha kodra anha takri bara...]. Fateh further added that 'Syrian residents at Sidi Feradj guest centre are not deprived of their freedom; they can work for themselves, they have access to healthcare and education, and they can quit the centre at any time if they can afford private housing'.

Having already visited his friend at Sidi Feradj guest centre, Fateh mentioned that the Algerian Red Crescent has been in charge of managing the guest centre and of satisfying residents' daily needs such as catering, medical treatment [… el hilal el ahmar el jazaei'ri motkafilin b tawfir el akl w hata el mossa'adat sihiya ka modawat w atibae…]. He added:

'…because Middle Eastern cuisine is different from the Algerian cuisine, the Algerian Red Crescent provides groceries such as vegetables, fruits and pantry essentials for every family … Syrians have a shared kitchen where they can prepare their own food…[… homa yakhdo hissass ghidaeiya ghayr mohadara w fi matbakh w kol ae'ila takder thadar wajbatha el ghidaeiya b tarika li tnassbha…]'.

When I met Anis, the representative at the Algerian Red Crescent, on November 26th, 2018, I asked about the responsibilities of the Algerian Red Crescent in terms of managing the guest centre of Sidi Feradj, providing food supplies and assistance to Syrian residents. He explained that the Algerian state has been providing accommodation to Syrians in guest centres such as Sidi Feradj in Algiers. Initially, three guest centres were equipped and ready to host Syrians since 2011, but most Syrians preferred to rent private houses with their own money. As such, two centres were closed, and only Sidi Feradj remains open and continues to host Syrians. He had the same attitude as Asma, the state official at the Foreigners' Office in Algiers and argued that 'Sidi Feradj is not a camp, it is a guest centre'. Anis confirmed what Fateh mentioned;

'…The centre is an emergency accommodation that is equipped with multiple mobile caravans for more than 100 refugee families compared to approximately fifty thousand Syrians that have chosen to reside outside the guest centre. Sidi Feradj centre also benefits from a massive kitchen where all families could prepare their own meals of the day. In terms of food provision, the Algerian Red Crescent is responsible of this and it also provides doctors; general health practitioners, psychologists and sociologists that are in charge of providing assistance in terms of mental and physical health of Syrians. The responsibilities of the Algerian Red Crescent involve providing social support including healthcare, accommodation. It is beyond our responsibilities to find jobs for Syrians or solve such issues for them [… hada machi mokhayam lajiein lakin markaz iwae w diyafa wafrato dawla el jazaei'iriya l aktar mn 100 a'eila souriya mohtaja … nahna ka hilal ahmar nwafroulhom el akl w homa ytaybou wahadhom fi el matbakh li kayen fi el markaz … andhom hata atibae wa mokhtassin nafssaniyin wa ijtimaeiyin bch ysaadouhom … nahna lhilal el ahmar el djazaei'ri yahtam bi takafol el ijtimaei'iya mitl sakan aw siha ama choghl nahna mch man salahiyatna…]'.

6.3. Concluding Remarks and Discussion

Having had less experience in dealing with wide flows of displaced people compared to European countries, data gathered during three research trips to Algeria revealed that the Algerian state adopted hospitality as its main approach to welcome and manage the flow of Syrians between 2011 until December 2014. After January 2015, the state approach has changed and started to be driven mainly by discourses of security and border control (see chapter 7). The approach of hospitality adopted by the Algerian state, Algerian society and Algerian charity organisations was not a part of a state official scheme, project or network. It has not been structured or organised by religious communities in Algeria, either. Instead, research data revealed the strategy of hospitality towards Syrians is an act of kindness towards brothers and sisters in faith (Islam) and Arabité. Additionally, it is an act of maintaining and

strengthening relations between Syria and Algeria that are not new but started since the exile of Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei'ri in Damascus in 1885 during the French occupation in Algeria.

Within a non-official framework of hospitality, the Algerian state offers full and unconditional access to certain social rights that are not directly dependent on refugees' legal status in Algeria such as the right to healthcare, education and housing. Full unconditional access to employment, however, is a privilege that needs a long-residence permit or a citizenship by naturalisation (see chapter 7). At a state and societal levels in Algeria, Syrians are labelled as "guests" rather than being labelled as "refugees" or "asylum seekers". Although the "guest" status offers facilities and less obligations to Syrians, it can still be seen as a restrictive strategy to control and discipline the Syrian community.

Literature review chapters in the present thesis mentioned how the nature of the post 1962 Algerian citizenship was exclusive because after Algeria's independence people were excluded based on their political and religious beliefs. Years later, Algerian citizenship law changed, and all discriminatory conditions were lifted but the law of naturalisation itself remained unclear and ambiguous. Having said this, it can be said that the biopolitical production of Syrians as "guest" comes as a camouflage to the gap that exists in the Algerian law of citizenship and immigration. The "guest" status is an indirect way of excluding Syrians that are unworthy from Algerian citizenship by naturalisation. It is not an exclusion from Algerian identity, it is rather an exclusion from the political order.

‘Within Algeria, charity organisations are not specifically founded to help displaced people such as foreign refugees and asylum seekers only, their main aim is to provide help to everybody in need; be it Algerian or foreigner, for the sake of God’, Fatima Zohra confirmed. This implies with the tradition of Islamic values and principles of hospitality that involves three main components: ‘the host, the guest and Allah’ (El-Aswad, 2015, p. 462). The strategy adopted by Algerian national charity organisations can be divided into two main tasks: the first was supporting Syrians that were willing to come to Algeria but were stuck either in Syria or in different places in the world in terms of securing accommodation prior to their arrival in Algeria. The second task was supporting Syrians after they arrive in Algeria. Fatima Zohra confirmed that she provided proofs of address while Syrians were in Syria, Sudan and Egypt and secured accommodation for them even after they came to Algeria. As an active member of local and national charity organisations, Fatima Zohra also explained

‘ I helped more than 50 or 60 people even before they came to Algeria by providing proofs of accommodation and invitation letters with my personal details so that Syrians would be granted entry at police check points in the Airport of Algeria [… fa wafarna chahadat el iwae li el katir mn souriyin w b asmaena el khassa w anawin boyoutna el khassa majanan ‘ala assass ano nahna ntkaflo bihom ki yjiw la jazaei’ir…. fa matalan ana ‘amalt had chahadat l aktar mn 50 aw 60 chakhs souri b asmi ana w onwan manzili el khas…]’.

Not only charity organisations were in charge of helping Syrians before they came to Algeria, Fatima Zohra mentioned an Algerian businessman who financially supported Syrians though he does not belong to any charity organisation. Fatima Zohra mentioned

‘I called an Algerian businessman on the phone and asked for financial assistance as there was a Syrian family that was stuck in Egypt and could not afford the flight tickets to come to Algeria. Without any self-interest and without hesitation, the businessman paid for the family’s travel expenses, welcomed them once they arrived at Houari Boumedienne’s Airport in Algiers, secured accommodation in Douira in Algiers and paid its rent for one year in advance, and provided furniture for them [… tkhayli ana mara ‘ayat l wahed fa’el khir f telephone kotlo ano fi ‘aeila souriya fi masr malkatch kifch tji lahna la jazaei’ir, kifch tchri les billets ta’e tiyara tkhayli bi mojrad makotlo a’eila souriya kali a’atiini asmaehom w ana ntkafal b takalif naklhom abr taira mn masr la jazaei’ir. lama jaw stakbalhom howa w staejarlhom bit fi Douira w khalasslhom ijar ‘aam kamil w jablhom el atat … tkheyli hada insan wahed ‘amal had chi wahdo w b doun mokabil…]’.

Fatima Zohra and ‘many Algerians outside the charity organisations believed that to help Syrians is a moral duty towards their brothers and sisters because they are Muslims and Arabs just like Algerians’: […ka moslimin… hnaya majbourin ano nsa’adhom …], Fatima added. In Bab Zouar, Nabeel (54) an Algerian landlord, did not share the same view as Fatima Zohra. He stated that in order to rent out his properties to a Syrian or an Algerian tenant, they should agree to sign a 12-month tenancy agreement like an Algerian citizen and must pay one-year rent in advance. He believed that this could make both the landlord and the tenant safe. Unlike Fatima that cared about maintaining high levels of hospitality as a moral duty, Nabeel cared about the financial situation of Syrians and their ability to pay the rent during their tenancy agreement.

Generally, Syrian participants: single people and families, did not express major problems such as insecurity, homelessness, exclusion, racism and discrimination, inequalities in service provision and anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood, which may have discouraged them from renting with private sector providers. However, some of my Syrian respondents, such as Samer, stated the fact that they should not be noisy and disruptive after 23h at night because

Algerians tend to dine and go to bed early, before midnight, especially in winter, which is not the case among Syrians. This aspect was not described as a major problem that may have been a turning point in Syrians' lives; it is rather a cultural difference which did not affect their social life.

Refugees that fled wars and reached out to other countries for safety and security do not only need support in terms of their physical health, their mental and psychological health also requires intensive support and care. About the provision of emotional support to Syrians in Algeria, Fatima Zohra gave an example of a twenty-four-year-old Syrian female was a victim of sexual abuse while she was internally displaced in a refugee camp in Syria before she came to Algeria. It was during an event, that one of the charity organisations Fatima Zohra belongs to planned to gather both Algerians and Syrians in order to encourage social integration and inclusion, when Fatima Zohra noticed a Syrian female that was afraid of others and looked extremely introverted during the event. Fatima Zohra approached the girl's mother who told her that her daughter was raped in a refugee camp in Syria. Fatima Zohra felt heart-broken after knowing her story and decided to shoulder responsibility towards her: she arranged free psychological therapy sessions with one of the psychologists in her organisation called Salima. Fatima Zohra felts very proud because the girl recovered, and she is now resuming her studies in Algeria.

On the 30th of October 2020, Fatima Zohra, my gatekeeper, arranged a skype call with Salima to hear more about her experience with Syrians. Salima (37), a psychologist and a mental health counsellor in Algiers and a member of Sisters' Good deeds organisation, mentioned that the most vulnerable people that were extremely in need for support did not choose Algeria as their

destination, but they went to neighbouring countries of Syria. Just like Fateh, from the Syrian cohort, Salima argued that, in a state of war, not all Syrians could afford flight tickets that are expensive. That is probably why Syrian war refugees did not live difficult life experiences in Algeria as their fellow countrymen did in Lebanon or Turkey. Salima and I talked about the Syrian girl that was violated in a refugee camp in Syria and she stated: '… Narjas, the girl that was violated in Syria was not the first or the last one we helped…'. She added:

'…my responsibility is to provide mental health support with no medical interference / therapies. If, for instance, a Syrian needs further therapies that we cannot provide, we can either book them with private practice or refer them to the hospital where they can see social / medical assistants. Social / medical assistants will book them with doctors specialised with mental health disorders: psychiatrists … the latter will assist help them with overcoming their disorders with the help of medication … these services are provided by the state for free to all Algerians and Syrians as well … I remember we, my team and I, referred Syrian females to the state hospitals for further therapies…[… fi ljamei'iya nahna mohimtna anana nsa'ed kamel nas lmohtaja … Narjas, makantch awal wela akhir wahda sa'ednaha lama kanet andha mochikila … Matalan ana mohimti ani nwafar da'em nafssi fakat bla dwa… fa Matalan jatna hala w htajet tadakhol tibi … najmo hna ka jame'iya nkhalsoulha and tbib pive wela nb'atha l mostachfayat dawla kayen assistan sociale yakder y'awnha mn nahiyat ichtirae dwa w motaba'at l ilaj … hado des services li dawla twafarhom mach fakat la souriyin; la, l kamel l jazaeiriyin w souriyin ki jaw kadro ydemjouhom fi had les services bch y'awnouhom…]'.

Being aware of Rabie's autistic son, I asked Salima if autistic patients might be eligible to receive these services. Salima added:

'unfortunately, these services are still limited, but autistic patients especially children less than 18 years can still receive support in terms of medication either from our organisation or from social assistants at the state hospitals…'.

I wondered about the services provided for autistic children and teenagers (less than 18 years old), Salima mentioned a centre in Ben Aknoun called 'Club Espoir [El Amal]' that provides a wide range of therapies for autistic children such as Equine-assisted therapy [l'équithérapie], which involves activities with horses to help children during their treatments. 'Ben Aknoun's centre receives children from all provinces of Algeria', Salima stated. Not being sure if Syrian autistic patients might be eligible to register at the centre or not, Salima advised that:

'… in the case of Syrian autistic children, they may want to get in touch with the Ministry of National Solidarity, Family Affairs and the Status of Women. This ministry and its branches all over the country receive more than 1000 children with disabilities every year and integrate them within a scheme of Psychopedagogists. They help them with special needs education and assist their families as well on how to manage their children's skills… if these services are free to Algerian children, I assume they are free to Syrian children as well…'

Salima mentioned an interesting story of an Algerian ophthalmologist that has been providing free consultations to Syrian war refugees at his private eye clinic in Algiers. The story is that the Algerian doctor studied ophthalmology in Damascus, Syria, after Algeria's independence and when Syrians moved to Algeria due to civil and political instability in their country, he committed to provide free consultations to all Syrians as an act to show gratitude for to his Syrian brothers among whom he lived and studied. In addition to some private doctors that have provided healthcare and medical assistance to Syrians, my interview with Salima revealed that both the Ministry of Health, Population and Hospital Reform and the Ministry of National Solidarity, Family Affairs and the Status of Women are responsible of providing healthcare and medical assistance for the *suffering body* of war refugees and of providing psychopedagogical assistance to school pupils with disabilities, respectively. Unfortunately, as Rabie's autistic son does not fit into the state's conceptualisation and its construction of the

suffering body of a war refugee that includes newborns, pregnant women and patients with chronic conditions, he might not be eligible for further assistance from healthcare providers. Although the Algerian strategies of hospitality and the provision of welfare help enhance the refugee population's well-being, the construction of a *suffering body* falls into biopolitical racism when a group of patients with physical chronic conditions receive further medical assistance and health insurance by the state, while others with chronic cognitive disabilities may be deprived of this welfare right.

To conclude, Algerian unconditional hospitality towards Syrians at a social level was driven by Islamic values and historical ties that implicated genuine acts of kindness and the will to always help those in need. Algerian hospitality also offered a full integration into the Algerian society as the majority of Syrian respondents expressed their satisfaction with the level of social inclusion felt among the Algerian local population. Although the Algerianness as a normative order believes that hospitality and offering help to Syrians is a moral duty between Muslims and between two countries that shared history in the past, its political order did not fully and unconditionally integrate Syrians into the legal order of Algerian citizenship. If hospitality is both a strategy of care, control and exclusion, it is still a form of a biopolitical governmentality that indirectly aims at enhancing the well-being of the local population (Algerian society) by preserving its social and political national identity through including worthy refugees into citizenship such as businessmen and excluding unworthy refugees and label them as "guests". Next chapter (chapter 7) will investigate how the state's strategies of hospitality and humanitarianism have been securitised in 2015 and how this has resulted in my Syrian participants themselves feeling as if their autonomy is being sacrificed to bureaucratic rationality.

Chapter Seven: The *Dispositif de Sécurité*: Citizenship and Biopolitical Practices of Controlling Circulation and their Impact on the Syrian Displaced Community in Algeria after 2015

Research data revealed that the three elements of citizenship: legal recognition / legal status, employment and security are intimately related, and each element in this relationship affects the other. Practically in Algeria, when security measures have been tightened in 2015, this has led to governmental interventions into legal rights of citizenship and restriction were applied to exclude Syrian displaced people from enjoying legal recognition such as: long-residence permits or naturalisation. The latter is not only a matter of legalising status; it is also a practice of subjectivity (Olson, 2008). These legal restrictions constructed Syrian war refugees as "potential danger". Because, Syrian subjects have been deemed potentially "dangerous", this has resulted in their exclusion from legal labour market and rights of unconditional employment because they are explicitly legally excluded. This is another facet of new humanitarianism that offers conditional assistance to war refugees (Duffield, 2014) and will, in turn, affect the state decisions of inclusion and exclusion of refugees. This is a vicious cycle where my Syrian participants, such as Wael, feel lost in. He added:

‘we obviously need to work … we do not have the right to work at the state’s organisations because we do not have legal status. If I want to start my own businesses and register everything in my name, I need a long-residence permit , because we do not have a legal status, I cannot apply for a trade register … the state is no longer issuing long-residence permits for Syrians… […ida bidna nchtghol and dawla y’oloulak ma fik la anou ma adna ikamat … niji nftah machrou’e b ismna y’oloulak lazem sijil tijari, tkadmi ala sijil tijari ykolak wina el ikama … mafina na’emal ay chi ala ismna la anou mafi ikamat … tiji tkadmi ala ikama mafik la anou dawla wa’afet la souriyin…]’.

The previous chapter demonstrated how the historical ties, that linked Syrians and Algerians since the day El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri was exiled in Damascus in 1855 by the French, and how the aspects of faith and Pan-Arabism have governed the state discourse of hospitality. By questioning how Algeria’s social policy has promoted the well-being of the Syrian displaced community based on their rights and public responsibilities dictated by their legal situation in Algeria, chapter (6) demonstrated an understanding of Algeria’s hospitality as a biopolitical practice that produces certain Syrians as “worthy guests” that deserve unconditional inclusion within the sectors of Education, healthcare and housing and others as “unworthy” that do not necessarily deserve to belong.

Having mentioned in the previous chapter that Syrians do not necessarily share similar life-experiences in terms of their integration into the social rights of citizenship and in terms of their legal status, the present chapter will explain the paradoxical discourses that contradict the discourse of hospitality, especially when it comes to employment and training. My research data revealed that the state’s underlying rationalities of security, Algerian citizenship, and biopolitics problematise the integration of Syrians within sectors of employment and training by including valuable, loyal, and worthy Syrians and excluding invaluable, suspicious / dangerous and unworthy lives of refugees. The state’s dynamics of inclusion and exclusion

reflect the normative nature of Algerian citizenship / Algerianness. This is another biopolitical practice of preserving biological existence, emotional well-being and even preserving the nationalist feature and the homogeneity of the Algerian national identity through the practices of security and control of borders. To sum up, 'biopolitics is a *dispositif de sécurité* which secures - that is to say regulates, strategises and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species life - by instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes of re-productive circulation which impinge upon species existence as such' (Dillon in Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01, italics in original text).

7.1. Threats at Algeria's Borders: Encounters with International Terrorists and "Illegal Migrants"

January of every year marks the anniversary of the Teguentourine attack that took place in the gas field of Teguentourine in Ain Amenas gas plant in south-eastern part of Algeria in 2013, the largest gas processing plant. The region of Ain Amenas is in the south-eastern part of Algeria close to the country's borders with Libya and Mali, countries which have witnessed political upheaval and interventions of foreign military troops to combat terrorism. The gas development plant in Ain Amenas is a 'joint venture' between the Algerian state company, Sonatrach, and foreign companies including UK-based multinational British Petroleum (BP) and Norway's Statoil ("In Amenas…", n.d). The gas field covers a large area in the Algerian Sahara of more than 2750 km2 ("In Amenas….", n.d), where approximately 685 Algerian workers and 107 foreign national workers reside (Post Staff report, 2013).

Gas and oil productions are considered the backbone of the Algerian national economy. The fields of Hassi Rmal and Hassi Messoud in Laghouat and Ouargla provinces, respectively, are known worldwide and have been operating since the nationalisation of hydrocarbon industry in Sahara during Boumedienne's presidency in 1971 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019; Layachi, 1998, p. 12). Although still in its infancy in 2013, Ain Aminas started to operate as one of the main gas processing plants in the country and it has covered four main gas fields in the country including Teguentourine, Hassi Farida, Hassi Ouan Taredert and Hassi Ouan Abecheu, where natural gas reserve is estimated to be 85 billion m3 ('In Amenas Gas Project', n.d). Foreign producers follow the Algerian law of investment that entitles the Algerian producer to 51% of the profits and 49% for the foreign company (Hamouchene, 2016, p.22). The contract of Ain Amenas gas plant project entitles Algeria's national gas and oil company, Sonatrach, to 51% of interest and BP and Norway's Statoil multinational energy company receives 49% of profits.

The terrorist attack on the gas processing field in Algeria started on the early morning of January 16th, 2013 when a group of terrorists, claiming to be affiliated by El-Qaeda division in the Islamic Great Maghreb region led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, stole into the country and began their attack (Stewart, 2013). The attackers are believed to have conducted attacks in both Syria and Banghazi in Libya (Gråtrud and Skretting, 2017, p. 43). The terrorist attack started when a group of 32 heavily armed terrorists of different nationalities (Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Canada and Netherlands) (Al Arabiya, Hodna, Zarou, 2013) invaded the base and kidnapped Algerian and foreign national workers as hostages. The Algerian army forces refused negotiations with the attackers and after a battle in the middle of the desert, the lives of 685 Algerian nationals and 107 foreign nationals, including hostages from different nationalities (USA, Japan, Philippine, Norway, UK and France), were saved (Euronews Arab,

2013; Post Staff Report, 2013). The number of people died is disputable: Algerian sources argued that 23 people died, foreign sources, on the other hand, claim that 37 lives were lost including Algerian national guard and foreign nationals. By the end of the incident, 29 attackers were killed and 3 of them were arrested by the Algerian national security forces ("Moktar Belmoktar…", 2013).

If terrorists took control over the gas fields in Ain Amenas gas plant, Algeria would lose its reputation as a safe country after struggling with a civil war for 10 years in the 1990's and it would lose its foreign investors and tourists. Having said this, Algeria's economy is heavily dependent on the processing and production of oil and gas, the attack on Ain Amenas's plant would drastically impact the Algerian economy especially with the fluctuation of oil and gas prices since 2010. At the level of security, both the lives of national and foreign workers at the plant would be lost and the general safety of the local population would have been menaced. After significantly reducing the scale of the internal terrorist threat and violent religious extremism since the civil war, the threat started to grow at the borders and in the neighbouring countries due to the waves caused by the Arab Spring and as a result of the civil wars especially in Libya and Mali that resulted in a complete chaos and political unrest. Regional destabilisation, civil unrest and terrorism in Libya and Mali have led to the spread of criminal networks, drugs and weapons trafficking and terrorist groups that have permanently threatened Algerian national security at its borders (Harmon, 2014). Additionally, foreign interventions of military troops in Mali and Libya have destabilised the Sahel region which, in turn, has threatened Algeria's national security. Refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants face a high risk of being either assassinated or kidnapped by terrorist groups, if not recruited in different terrorist affiliations such as ISIS and El-Qaeda. International terrorism is both a major cause of mass migration in the twenty-first century and a source of menace to the lives of displaced

people. In an attempt to solve the issue of illegal migration and refugeehood, the Algerian state suggested that these fragile nations, regimes and states should be supported in order to solve their internal socio-economic issues without foreign interventions of military forces from their former European colonisers (eg, the case of French troops in Mali). For instance, Algeria mediated between the conflicting parties in Mali. As a result of that, Mali has adopted the Algerian experience and Agreement of Peace and National Reconciliation which was advocated by the previous president Bouteflika in order to stop the bloodshed during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. However, the restoration of peace in Mali through adopting the Algerian model of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism may or may not work depending on the context and on the conflicting parties. Boukhars (2012, p. 04) points out that 'a sustained, cooperative, and sincere engagement by Algeria is critical to the success of conflict management and resolution in Mali'. He further adds that the European countries' efforts should work congruently with Algeria's instead of just 'competing with Algeria's security and diplomatic initiatives' (Boukhars, 2012, p. 04). By supporting peace in its neighbouring countries, Algeria will be able to protect and control its large borders more efficiently from unexpected terrorist attacks coming from terrorist groups at its borders with Mali and Libya. This could bring political stability and settlement to the Sahel region. Algeria has also suggested that the issue of illegal migration can be solved through the voice of young people and researchers under the projects of 'l'enterprenariat des jeunes' (youth entrepreneurship) agendas that aim at developing the socio-economic situation in Africa by increasing state-trade cooperation between African countries and foster progress and welfare (Cioameonu, 2018).

7.1.1. Discourse and Technologies of Security: Algeria's Biopolitical Response to Security Threats and Mass Migration

The start of the Arab spring in the Arab region and along with civil and political destabilisation of the Sahel region forced Algeria to adopt a new imaginary of security by adopting new measures of monitoring circulation in order to protect both its national borders and its population. The latter became a 'referent object of security' (Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01). 'The *dispositif de sécurité* refers to 'the institutional and discursive formation that has been deployed in the government of societies since the 18th century' (Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01). Therefore, security can be understood as a biopolitical practice of 'organising circulation, eliminating its danger, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by eliminating the bad' (Foucault in Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01). By the start of the world's refugee crisis in 2015, the biopolitical governmentality of the Algerian state adopted certain technologies such as border control and closure to fully manage the flow of displaced people into the country, visa prior to arrival, difficulty of family re-unification and restrictions of travelling outside Algeria. Syrians are no exception. Before 2015, Syrians were able to enter Algeria without a visa. After adopting security as a state discourse / approach in January 2015, Syrian displaced people coming from Syria were obliged to submit visa applications prior to their arrival. This state decision comes from a project of 'circulatory migration', as Aradau and Blanke (2010, p. 02) would call it, which is a new procedure to control and secure the circulation of displaced people including Syrians. If in Syria, visa applications should be submitted at the level of the Algerian consulate in Damascus, Syria, otherwise the application should be submitted at the level of the Algerian consulate where the applicant resides. If the visa application is approved, the applicant will be granted entry to

Algeria. Once the applicant arrives in Algeria, they will receive a short-residence permit which is renewable every 45 days, but they cannot leave the country and go back to it whenever they wish. I remember when I went to Baba Hassan the 21st of March 2018, I met Fateh who mentioned that he is separated from his wife by borders. In my mind I thought that she had been deported but Fateh proved the opposite and confirmed:

'my wife first came with an entry Visa in 2015, she left Algeria because she needed to go back to Syria and finish her studies at university … it is true, we took risks and hoped that she would be able to re-enter Algeria but that was never the case … now she is stuck in Syria and I am in Algeria' […zawjati dakhlet ba'ad ma hato el visa; yaani ba'ad 2015 w dakhlat b visa. L visa thasslet aliha b so'ouba w ijraat ktir mo'akada. W hiya mou ma'ei, ya'ani mou b jazai … kissatha anha nizlat la souriya la ano rahat tkamal dirassatha f souriya w halae ma andha forssa la tarjaa la Jazair la ano li ykhroj m jazair marah yakder yrjae…].

Out of Fateh's story, I understood the frustration of Syrians and concluded that holding a short-residence permit or no residency does not only prevent an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant from registering a property in their names, but this status does not give Syrians the right to apply for family re-unification, or to travel freely outside Algeria, though they are free to travel within the Algerian territory without restrictions by any means of transportation. The experience of Fateh's wife says a lot about the knowledge produced around his wife. After she left Algeria and went back to Syria, which is still unstable, his wife's reasons for leaving Algeria and going back to Syria to finish her university exams were a source of suspicion. Consequently, her visa application may take longer to be approved. It can be completely ignored if she failed to prove the reason for her trip to Syria.

It is important to mention that before January 2015 when Algeria's policy of managing refugees was led primarily by a discourse of hospitality, Syrians were granted either naturalisation documents in case they prove that they have Algerian origins, or renewable long-residence permits of two years or renewable short-residence permits of 90 days. After January 2015, in order to control the circulation of all displaced people within the Algerian territory including Syrians, they were offered short-residence permits only which must be renewed every 45 days. The procedure of residence renewal is not complicated, but it is a part of the state bureaucratic procedures. Anas, a 39-year-old Syrian male recounted his experience with visa application procedures. Before residing in Algeria, Anas and his small family used to reside in UAE where they applied for a visa to Algeria. Without any obstacles or challenges, their first application was successful, and Anas and his small family were granted access to Algeria on June 2017. What encouraged Anas and his family to quit UAE and move to Algeria was the level of tolerance and openness his friends in Algeria experienced. Wafae's experience was slightly different from Anas's and somehow challenging. Wafae, a 27-year-old Syrian housewife and a mother of a baby girl that was born in Algeria, was a successful applicant that shared her long journey to gain entry visa to Algeria. Wafae was married when she left Syria and went to Sudan where she received a long-residence permit. At that time (in 2016) Wafae's Syrian husband was living in Algeria but was not able to apply for a family reunification because his status in Algeria was not legal as he entered illegally to the country. He is a well-known self-employed maintenance man who is skilful in painting and building in the western part of Algeria in Saida which is 415km far from the capital, Algiers. Wafae's husband stopped renewing his documentation since he entered Algeria. Although the Algerian police and the immigration office know about his situation in Algeria, Wafae confirmed that 'her husband did not face any restrictions in terms of private housing or self- employment'.

Speaking about her experience with visa procedures, Wafae recounted

'… While in Sudan, I had to apply for an entry visa at the Algerian consulate in Sudan…after submitting all documentations for the first and second time, my application was denied because I needed an Algerian sponsor that would provide me with proofs of accommodation' [… El visa talabtha fi soudan mou mn souriya. kadamt maratayn bas ma wafakouli w awadt kadamt chahadat iwae aw invitation mn and nas jaza'iriyin la hata wafakouli ala talab el visa. Lhaja li lkitha s'iba fi mawdoue el visa ani lama baatli jouzi visa makdert nji la ano makan ando ikama da'ima fa makablouli talab el visa]

Pointing out to Fatima Zohra, a member of national charity organisations, Wafae stated: 'thanks to Fatima I was able to reach out to an Algerian sponsor to provide me with the necessary documents that supported my visa application' [lakin f lmara talita anas jaza'iriyin mitl Fatima homa li ba'etouli el iwae w kafala la hata kdert ahssol ala visa …]. The reason why Wafae needed an Algerian sponsor was again for state's security reasons in order to manage Syrians' circulation into the country more efficiently especially because her husband's status in Algeria was illegal. Identifying Syrians by their Algerian sponsors is a technology adopted by the state in order to govern the Syrian community through a disciplinary system of regulation and control. After Wafae lived in Algeria, Wafae gave birth to a baby girl who was not eligible for Algerian citizenship or long-resident permit, but received the same status as her mother, a short-residence permit.

In my discussion with the state official at the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib) in central Algiers, Asma, I mentioned the obligation of visa prior to arrival that Syrians have faced after January 2015. Firstly, she highlighted the importance of Algeria's national security and border

control policies in the age of migration and international terrorism. Asma also focussed on the geo-political position of Algeria and argued that most displaced people consider Algeria as a gateway and a transit point between Africa and Europe. Additionally, Asma praised Algeria's efforts to fight terrorism and extremism since the civil war in 1990s. She argued 'the visa procedure is an exceptional state decision in response to a constant threat to Algeria's national security and to the safety of their national population'. She further justified: 'not only does Algeria enact strict rules, the U.S, for instance, did that with Trump's Muslim ban which is even a worse example'.

Gibney (2011, p. 05), for instance, argues that the speech of Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president, in July 2010 after the civil riots in Grenoble focussed primarily on France's Muslim citizens when he proposed that: 'French nationality should be stripped from any person of foreign origin who voluntarily tries to take the life of a policeman, gendarme, or other figure of public authority' (Bloomberg Media, 30 July 2010). Sarkozy's speech was later followed by his Interior Minister, Brice Hortefeux, who explained that the person of 'foreign origin' targets France's Muslim community (Newsweek, 17 August 2010 cited in Gibney, 2011, p. 05). Gibney (2011, p. 05) further confirms that France's Muslim citizens were labelled as persons of 'foreign origin' in Sarkozy's speech. On the contrary, Asma argued: 'unlike Trump's Muslim ban and many other countries, Algeria's decision to close borders was not explicitly based on religion, ethnicity or race. It is rather for security reasons'.

Similar to Asma's viewpoint, during his interview with Dzair News in January 2019, Hassan Kassimi, the head of migration office at the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs, argued that not all Syrians who have tried to enter Algeria are refugees that need humanitarian support and

protection in Algeria. Some of them belong to terrorist groups that are active in Syria who try to enter Algeria with fake passports. He backed up his argument by wondering how could a refugee that needs humanitarian support and protection travel through several countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Mauritania, Northern Mali where they did not apply for asylum but choose to settle at the borders of Algeria and tried to enter the country illegally (Dzair TV, 2019). In another interview with El Arabiya, Hassan Kassimi argued that Algeria's decision to close its borders was due to a constant threat that comes from unstable countries in the Sahel region and terrorist groups at Algeria's south-eastern borders. He clarified that this decision is not applied against Syrians only but against all foreigners that try to enter Algeria illegally and are proved suspicious or belong to groups of extremists or terrorists. Refugees that need humanitarian support are, instead, very welcome in Algeria, he added (Algeria Alarabiya, 2019).

Aradau and Blanke (2010, p. 02) emphasise that the securing of certain mobilities augments the immobility of others which makes them excluded. From a biopolitical perspective, I argue that Algeria's decision to secure and control circulation of displaced people namely Syrians, can be led by state rationalities that imply the protection and the preservation of the Algerian national identity. Although the state official, Asma, explained that the reason behind the visa procedure is a part of raison d'état, I still believe that the introduction of visa is a biopolitical strategy that cares about the well-being of the Algerian national population. Thus, this strategy came to change the state's production of knowledge around Syrian displaced people that were labelled as "guests" between 2011 and December 2014 as the previous chapter shows. Turton (2003) argues that 'the language, images, categories and metaphors that we use to describe forced migrants are not innocent but are part of how we interpret and therefore act towards those who are displaced' (Turton, 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 06). In power-knowledge relations, Judge (2010) adds that discourse built around displaced communities often serve particular

parties that hold the power of instruction over social realities and social interactions in the country and that play important roles in constructing and re-constructing identities. Asma, argued that the Algerian state cannot grant access to a person that may be potentially dangerous and sacrifice the lives of more than 40 million Algerians because anyone can be a suspect until they prove the opposite. In order to better understand the biopolitical practices of the Algerian state rationalities to protect the Algerian national identity, we should investigate the openness of Algerian citizenship towards non-citizens and what it has to offer for people who wish to belong. The earlier chapters critically investigated the nature of the Algerian citizenship and Algerianness as both normative political entities. They revealed that in colonial Algeria, French governmentality produced Algerian Muslims as "subjects without rights" according to code de l'indigénat (1881) compared to Algerian Jews who were deemed "citizens" according to the Crémieux decree (1870). As stated in chapter 4, after independence in 1962, Algeria's law of citizenship on March 27th, 1963 came as a reaction to the France's colonial governmentality and automatically granted Algerian citizenship to those whose father and grandfather had Muslim status and to those who participated in the Algerian war of liberation. Algeria's colonial and post-colonial past still govern today's state's decisions regarding the naturalisation of non-citizens who wish to belong. The next section investigates the possibility of naturalisation for Syrians by critically analysing the norms of inclusion and exclusion of Algerian citizenship and conditions of naturalisation.

7.1.2. A Right or a Privilege: Governmental Rationalities of Algerian Citizenship and the Possibility of Naturalisation

Different ethnic divisions make up Algerian society and the Algerian national identity, such as Arabness and Tamazight (including its sub-divisions such as kabyles, shaoui, and twareg) and different religious beliefs. These include Islam – the Maliki school of Sunni division - that is the religion of 99% of Algerians, Christianity and Judaism are adopted by 1% of Algerians (Algeria 2018 International Religious Freedom Report, 2018, p.02). Algeria is not a secular state and Islam remains the official religion. Algeria does not adopt multiculturalism neither as criterion in naturalisation nor as a natural part of Algerian citizenship. In this regard, Perrin (2014, p. 15) argues that the most important positions in the state, for instance, such as the president of the republic of Algeria or their wives must have only Algerian citizenship and must be Muslims. The fact of deciding who is worthy and who is not worthy of citizenship is a way of controlling the level of diversity in the Algerian national identity and its capacity to include non-citizens. Perrin (2014, p. 10) further claims that in countries of the Maghreb region, 'reluctance to grant citizenship is rather based on a mix of immaturity in nation-building, of a closed and 'naturalist' - if not ethno-religious - conception of the nation, of suspicion and fear toward difference and aliens'. This does not necessarily mean that the host community in Algeria is not open to foreigners, but it does mean that the integration process in Algeria is different from the Western world. In European countries, asylum seekers may be granted a legal status if their asylum application is approved. A European state may allow them to apply for citizenship after a certain period provided that they prove that the applicant for naturalisation has a source of income and can support themselves financially and prove their assimilation into the local society. If their naturalisation is approved, they become naturalised

citizens. However, this does not necessarily guarantee that the host community will include them as new naturalised citizens that are part of the national identity. In the UK, for example, speaking English language was intertwined with British values (Blackledge and Creese, 2010, p. 08). This means that 'the use and visibility of minority languages other than English threatens this sense of national unity and common belonging (Blackledge and Cresse, 2010, p. 08)'. If Britishness is related to English language skills, mastering the language and passing the language test should allow immigrants to qualify for a British passport. Britishness is still measurable. The processes of integration and assimilation are often confused among different people. Algeria's process of integration, for example, is based on developing a strong feeling of belonging to Algeria first and naturalisation comes next. I asked the state official, Asma, whether Syrians are eligible to Algerian citizenship. Her answer was that 'they should understand the nature of citizenship which is strongly normative and nationalistic'. She added that 'a naturalised citizen should demonstrate a strong feeling of belonging to Algerianness, to Algerian society and the Algerian state'.

By law, foreigners are qualified to receive Algerian citizenship if they are married to an Algerian citizen for more than three years and have been continuously living in Algeria for at least two years. Foreigners may also receive Algerian citizenship by naturalisation provided they comply with the following conditions (Algerian nationality law, 2007, p. 03):

> Naturalisation
>
> Art. 10. A foreigner may be qualified to receive Algerian citizenship, provided they:
>
> 1° Have resided in Algeria for at least 7 years from the day of their request.

2° Have resided in Algeria during the signature of the decree granting them the certificate of naturalisation.

3° Are of age (reached adulthood).

4° Are of good morality and never been subject to any condemnation.

5° Justified that they have enough means of life.

6° Are sound in body and mind.

7° Proved their assimilation to the Algerian community / society.

Exemptions / Exceptions

Art. 11. (amended) In some exceptional cases, a non-Algerian citizen can be granted Algerian citizenship if they provide exceptional favour or service to Algeria or whose infirmity or illness was contracted in the service or in the interest of Algeria regardless the conditions of naturalisation stated in article 10.

Foreigners may also be naturalised, regardless of the conditions provided for in article 10 above, if their naturalisation is of exceptional interest to Algeria.

The spouse and children of the deceased foreigner, who in his lifetime could have entered the category provided for in the first paragraph above, may apply for naturalisation posthumously.

The Algerian law of citizenship and naturalisation do not elaborate on the idea of doing a unique favour or a specific service to the country in details. Article 11 of the nationality code remains vague as it does not say what kind of favour should a foreigner offer to Algeria and in which context. It does not explain in detail what kind of obligations are expected from a foreigner. In this regard, Perrin (2014) adds that the process of naturalisation in the great Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) is often uncertain and very complicated. ‘Although Palestinians are not necessarily naturalised in Maghreb countries, in

Algeria, for instance, among the majority of naturalised citizens since 1970 were Palestinians (Perrin, 2014, p. 09) that arrived in the country after the violent Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this case, it is not only about being Arab and Muslim, but also probably because of the historical relationship that has grown since Boumedienne's era between the state of Palestine and Algeria which has, to date, remained strong. This has again been confirmed by the Algerian president, Abdelmadjid Tebboun, in 2019, (Alghad TV, 2019). Algeria has always been a supportive and loyal ally to Palestine to the point that it does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and any Israeli passport holder will be banned from entering Algeria. Perrin (2014, p. 10) further confirms that citizenship in the Maghreb region is often 'a political gesture, intimately linked to the interstate relations and the national balance'. Speaking about the possibility of acquiring Algerian citizenship because of unique favour or specific service offered for Algeria, Macey (2012, pp. 385 & 386) argues that Frantz Fanon, for instance, 'could have been granted Algerian citizenship and an Algerian passport if he had lived after Algeria's independence in 1962 regardless of his religion or ethnicity, but in a sense that he would always have remained an honorary Algerian' for his efforts and his strong anti-colonial attitude during the Algerian revolutionary war since its start in 1954 until his death in 1961.

Regarding the eligibility of Syrians to Algerian citizenship, article 11 of the Algerian law of naturalisation was discussed during my meeting with the Algerian state official, Asma, at the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib). Asma gave an example about Algerian martyrs and war fighters (el *Moudjahidin*) that sacrificed their lives during local resistance and Algeria's revolutionary war against the French occupation. A critical analysis of Asma's discourse would confirm that the acquisition of Algerian citizenship is not designed as a right to foreigners but as a privilege granted to those that are ready to contribute to the reproduction of the biopolitical features of Algerian nationalism by proving the ability to sacrifice for Algeria's security and

national unity in case the state faces potential threats, thus enhancing the life of the Algerian population. This is due to the complex history of colonial Algeria and its struggle to gain power and sovereignty over its territory and granting rights to citizens. This is not unique to Algeria only, similarly, for example 'Hilary Clinton, the US State Secretary, mentioned that the US citizenship is a privilege. It not a right. People who are serving foreign powers … are clearly in violation … of the oath which they swore when they became citizens' (Clinton cited in Gibney, 2011, p.05).

The example offered by the Algerian state official reflects the state discourse that has remained highly nationalistic and patriotic. The state discourse is based on the national history of colonial Algeria and on paying tribute to the martyrs of the revolutionary war (1954-1962). Discourses of fear of the "unworthy" alien and security of national borders have always been powerful in Algeria's conceptualisation of citizenship along with ethno-religious criteria (Islam and Arabité). Since the Algerian civil war and during the Arab spring, Algeria's policy has approached aliens with suspicion either in terms of offering access to the Algerian territory or in terms of granting a legal status of citizenship. The state holds power to either naturalise non-citizens if they prove loyalty and possibly denaturalise them if the opposite if proven. I believe, one of the constrains that most foreigners living in Algeria and wishing to belong would face is the non-measurable conditions of Algerian citizenship. Not only Islam and Arabité but loyalty to the state cannot be efficiently measured. Unlike the British system of citizenship which offers examples of life in the UK test and English language test, the Algerian law does not offer examples of tests that measure the conditions of naturalisation that leads to citizenship.

7.1.3. Syrians' Perceptions of Algerian Citizenship

After discussing the state's perception and understanding of Algerian citizenship that is based on developing feelings of belonging and loyalty to the state and the Algerian people, I discussed citizenship, including naturalisation, and a sense of belonging with my Syrian respondents to hear more about their perception and understanding of citizenship and its values in order to bridge the gap between the state policies and practices at the level of social life. Research data demonstrated that the majority of my Syrian respondents perceived citizenship as an opportunity to extend their rights in terms of gaining access to housing and employment without the presence of an Algerian guarantor or a Syrian that holds a long-residence permit. More importantly, for Syrians, the acquisition of citizenship in Algeria was not to overcome social exclusion, xenophobia, racism or discrimination but was seen as an opportunity for freedom of mobility outside Algeria. Bigo (2002, p. 64) confirms that 'full integration of migrants and refugees will provide opportunities of freedom of travel around the world and a new understanding of citizenship in the age of cosmopolitanism'.

Outside of his working hours, Wael, a deliveryman, offered me some delicious Syrian konafa (type of oriental sweets) and invited me to a public garden where we could talk at ease. Wael owned a delivery van which was registered in his friend's name because his short-residence permit did not grant him the right to own a property or a car in Algeria. I asked what if he goes through a police checkpoint, he assured me that there would be no problem even if he was using his Syrian driving license and all his van papers are in the name of his friend. He claimed that the Algerian police knew about the legal situation of Syrians and are ordered by the state to be more understanding of Syrians' situation in Algeria. Wael assured me that he and his

Syrian fellow countrymen had been living, travelling and working in Algeria without any problems. As a short-residence permit holder,

'[He] had the same social rights such as free healthcare, free education, access to housing as an Algerian citizen, but still believed that without legal status or citizenship, the place is similar to a big prison because he could not travel outside Algeria and visit Syria and his family there…' [… mitli mitl el jazaei'ri andi hak taalim, hak l ilaj w kolo majani. Ana andi el wathaeik homa aham haja, bi doun wathaeik ka anak b sijn kbir; sijn kbir. Ya'eni mata matlaeti mn el jazaeir, ma andek lhak terja'ei liha … bidi anzil ala souriya bas mankder la ano ma andna ikama da'eima aw jinssiya …].

Yasser, for instance, narrated his experience when the Algerian police stopped him at a check point because he violated Algerian law, just by mentioning he is a Syrian the ticket was dismissed, and the case was closed'. To him, 'the fact of being a Syrian has offered him privileges at different levels: at the level of education and schooling'. For instance, Yasser appreciated how easy it was for him to register his children at schools and change them from Bordj Bou Arreridj, where he first resided before moved to Algiers for his business. He added:

'… Thanks God, I live in Algeria and there is no difference between an Algerian and a Syrian… we, Syrians have some privileges: for instance, it is easier for us to transfer school for our children than Algerians… for a Syrian, we just have to take our papers from one school to another but in the case of Algerians, they need to go through some bureaucratic procedures and they need a letter of acceptance from the recieving school…'[… hamdoullah ana a'aych houn f jazai'ir si'ri b si'er ay wahed jazai'iri. Ma fi ay tamyiiz bin wahed souri w wahed jazaei'iri niha'iyan, niha'iyan niha'iyan. Hata nahna adna chaghlat msahla ilna aktar mn jazai'iriyin mitl nakl tifl mn madrassa la madrassa okhra. Hna bark nhazo lkwaret mn madrassa w nedouha l madrassa deuxième ama ljazai'iri yelzamlo mowafaka mn lmadrassa lmostakbila w yjib bezaf awrak bch ynkol tifl ta'oo …].

Once Yasser arrived in Algeria in 2013, he went to Bordj Bou Arreridj, first, before he moved to Algiers. I asked Yasser about his experience in a different city, Bordj Bou Arreridj, in the eastern part of Algeria. He mentioned that an Algerian man supported him even before arriving to Algeria with proofs of accommodation and sponsoring letters and continued to help him during his stay in Bordj Bou Arreridj with accommodation. Yasser confirmed that he did not know his Algerian friend until he arrived in Algeria, he was, rather, a friend of his Syrian friend. Unlike Wael who perceived life in Algeria as "a big prison" because he did not have a long-residence permit or Algerian citizenship that would allow him to visit his home-country, Yasser appreciated when Algerians said to him: 'you left Syria and Algeria is, now, your first country, and Syria comes next'.

Similar to Wael, Samer, who has, now, moved to Canada where he has been granted asylum by the end of 2019, was one of my Syrian respondents that preferred holding a passport as proof of social inclusion and belonging. He considered Algerian citizenship as one of his legitimate rights and an honour for his small family to have. In his own words, Samer argued:

'…from my opinion, my pleasure to have the Algerian nationality because we spent many years here, we know the people here, I learnt the language: darija (Algerian Arabic) and I think yes, … yes, I deserve it. Because we are trying to make and add value in our business, and we have more deep connections to Algeria… my daughters were born here.… but actually, for my case, the most important part of the story is the documents. So, yes if I have the chance to get documents outside of Algeria, I will go … but I may come back only for my project…'

Although Samer was working in an Algerian company of pharmaceutical products in Algiers which was previously in Syria, he did not have a long-residence permit. 'The reason is because

Samer did not apply for a work-permit prior to his arrival', Samer's Algerian employer, Marwan (55), added. Samer confirmed this and argued that in order to apply for a work permit and a work visa, he had to be outside Algeria and apply for it, but because he received a call to join the Syrian military forces in 2013, he had to leave his country by any means. While Wael and Samer theorised successful integration in Algeria as legal recognition / documentations and citizenship, Ayman's viewpoint was very different. His theorisation of successful integration is rather based on social inclusion and openness.

Ayman is another example of a Syrian father of three children that fled Syria and went to Algeria to search for safety, security and a new life for his small family. He had chosen to go to Algeria because he used to visit it even before 2011 for business reasons. After the Syrian civil war in 2011, Ayman chose to reside in Algeria although he did not have Algerian citizenship or long-residence permit in Algeria. During our discussion about citizenship, Ayman stated:

'…Even though I do not have an Algerian citizenship, I still prefer to stay in Algeria rather than going to a European country where I need to give up on my identity, ethno-religious values (Islam and Arabité), and social values. I prioritised social inclusion over legal inclusion. I can openly share the experience of my cousin that sought refuge in Europe after the civil war in Syria. Despite all the privileges my cousin enjoys such as: European citizenship / passport and financial support from the government, he could not cope with life in Europe and social differences. That is because of social exclusion and the level of racism he faced. As a Muslim living in Europe, my cousin did not feel he belongs to the German society or any European society unless he assimilates and accepts their social values. I personally had an opportunity to travel to Belgium where my two sisters have been residing and have Belgian passports, but I preferred to stay in Algeria where I share similarities with the Algerian population in terms of religion, ethnicity, history and social values… [… ana makhamamt arouh la europa la ano fiha massawie. Ma'a kol mahassin europa fiha massawie. Matalan hounik tarbiya el ijtima'eiya sayi'a. ya'eni kad

matkoun mondabit inta fi tagharat khossoussan ma'a el atfal w lama yakbro yssir lmawdoue sa'eb. Taniyan, ana ibn bi'aa isslamiya w arabiya fa ofadil el aych ma'aa ibn bi'eti kay la ach'or b tamyiz. Halae ibn khali hakali an el ijabiyat mitl el passport, ljinssiya, drahm … bas howa hakali ala silbiyat el ijtimaeiya ano hounik fi tafakok ossari ala mostawa ktir kbir. Mawdoue salat, el imaniyat hada mawdoue chibh mon'adim … kad mahawalti tehorssi alih matkdri … kadalik el mojtamae yendroulk nadrat tamyiz; matalan anta mada taf 'al houna, fi lmostakbal lama andamij momkin, bas fi lbidaya andhom tamyiz ano hada baladna w inta jit la andna w ta'khod mn amwal el hokouma. W ba'edhom andhom nadrat ighathat el malhouf … ana andi 2 ikhwati, kano houn w raho la baljika lakin ana mahabit arouh la ano ana ibn bi'aa islamiya w ibn biaa arabiya fa fadalt ani n'ich houn ma'aa ibn bi'eti…].

Schuster (2004, p.02) claims that undocumented migrants usually face extreme practices of exclusion. However, it was not the case for Malik (21) and his wife Nora (19) that proved the opposite in Algeria. The Syrian couple have stopped renewing their short-residence permits before we met in 2018, but did not report any problems such as injustice, exclusion, discrimination or racism. Malik argued: '…I always continue to work although I do not have legal documentations apart from my Syrian passport…' […ana bchtghol … ma andi wala awrak andi bas jawazi el souri…]. The pregnant wife Nora and her Husband, like most my Syrian respondents, expressed their satisfaction regarding the treatment of Syrians in Algeria that was equal to Algerian citizens if not better, even if Syrians did not have legal documents. When I visited Nora and Malik at their house, they shared with me the video of their wedding in Algiers, where Nora dressed up in both Algerian and Syrian traditional dresses, although she is Syrian. Nora justified her choice by saying:

'… I love both countries and cultures: Algeria and Syria and that is why I wanted to wear both traditional dresses in my wedding ceremony… both my Syrian and Algerian friends joined my wedding' [ana bhab jazaei'ir wa

souriya michan hik lbast labs taklidi tabae el baladayn w takafatayn bi orssi … azamt ahbabi souriyin wa jazaei'riyin la orssi…].

In sum, research data have shown that my Syrian participants did not face major obstacles or problems at a societal level and did not experience any acts of racism or xenophobia. Next sections of the present chapter will show how legal status of these Syrian participants have affected their full integration into the Marshallian rights of citizenship in the Algerian context and played a major role of exclusion in terms of employment and difficulties in family reunifications. Conscious and unconscious exclusion from the state to Syrians at a legal level serves the state's rationalities of both securitisation and nationalism. Securitisation of citizenship rights limits the rights of Syrians in freedom of mobility and naturalisation. The majority of my Syrian respondents, although appreciating the level of integration at a societal level, typified full integration in the host state as legal recognition and a full / unconditional access of social rights of citizenship.

7.2. Security and Biopolitical Practices of Managing the Diversity of Algerianness by Limiting Syrians' Access to Employment

With a rapidly growing population of more than 41 million in 2019 (Mourad & Avery, 2019, p. 01), Algeria's provision of work opportunities is very challenging especially for youth and for graduates. A civil war in the 1990's and the reliance of the Algerian state on hydrocarbon revenues has resulted in no change or update in economic policies. In turn this resulted in a high rate of youth unemployment over the past 20 years and in social discontent which ignited

continuous social movements in Algeria particularly since February 22nd, 2019. Despite several state interventions and change in labour policies for better flexibility and development, employment is still falling. The National Statistical Office (Office National des Statistiques –ONS-) declares that one in four Algerians aged from 16 to 24 is unemployed, the highest rate that reached 26.4% compared to adult unemployment at 8.6% (Berrah, 2018, pp. 03, 14, 21, 22). In an attempt to save the situation, 'Algeria designed a five-year government plan (from 2014 to the end of 2018) of privatising and diversifying industry and economy, promoting a more market-based economy, and fighting corruption (European Training Foundation –ETF-, 2017) (ETF, 2017, p. 08)'. 'As a part of its employment policy and state's financial support policy, the Algerian government has adopted the following five schemes for better engagement to increase employability among young people, in particular (ETF, 2017, p. 08). However, it is worth mentioning that the state's schemes mentioned below under the Ministry of Employment and the Ministry of National Solidarity are available only to Algerian citizenship holders

a- Under the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Security

ANEM (National Employment Agency): DAIP ('Dispositif d'Aide à l'Insertion Professionnelle') temporary work contracts and internships for youth.

ANSEJ (National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment): creation and expansion of microenterprises by young people aged 19–35.

CNAC (National Unemployment Insurance Fund): unemployment benefits and support for the creation of micro-enterprises for unemployed individuals aged 30–50.

b- Under the Ministry of National Solidarity

ADS (Social Development Agency): public works programmes for the poor.

ANGEM (National Agency for Management of Microcredit): micro-credits to the poor'.

The state's ability to provide work permits and create job opportunities is crucial in a successful programme of resettlement and integration of displaced people including asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants. The integration of displaced people into the world of employment will have a positive impact on their experience of living in a new country (Murphy & Vieten, 2017, p. 88). Murphy & Vieten (2017, p. 88) state that in the UK, for example, asylum seekers will not have the right to work until they are granted a refugee status. In the interim, asylum seekers experienced delays in having their applications processed and decisions made. Consequently, this would have a negative impact on their lives and would make them susceptible to exploitation. In Algeria, the scene is totally different. Generally, non- Algerians can work in Algeria if they are investors or members of investing companies in Algeria. They will receive work permits and long-residence permits of two years subject to renewal. Unfortunately, due to the absence of a refugee national mechanism, asylum seekers, refugees and non-economic migrants do not have the right to work either at the state's sector or receive unemployment benefits from the state or apply for state credits. Additionally, they do not expect any final decision to be made regarding their legal status due to a gap in the Algerian law. Syrians are no exception. By law, short-residence permit holders from the Syrian cohort and those that do not hold work permits do not have the right to work in Algeria. However, law is not religiously respected when it comes to the state dealing with Syrians in Algeria and some legal restrictions have been removed to ease life and work for Syrians. Practically, all my Syrian participants confirmed that they could work at their own business, shops or co-work with Algerian citizens despite not having legal status or work permits. Rabie and his son, Leyth, worked at their shop although they did not hold residence permits and work permits. 'All we have are our expired Syrian passports', Rabie and Leyth confirmed.

The analysis of research data revealed that Syrians fall into three main categories; long-residence permit holders (valid for 2 years and renewable), short- residence permit holders (valid for 45 days and renewable) and Syrians who are registered with the UNHCR and hold certificates of registration and humanitarian protection which should be renewed every 6 months. By law, long-residence permit holders are legally eligible to receive work permits which allow them to submit job application and work within their areas of specialisation and expertise if they wish to and can apply for CHIFA cards for National Insurance. This status is offered to foreign businessmen and investors in the country including Syrians. Because the Algerian state has not yet adopted a national refugee law that specifies rights and obligations of displaced people, Syrian short-residence permit holders are registered as visitors and their residence permits are subject to unlimited renewals every 45 days, but they cannot legally apply for work permits or receive national insurance in Algeria. Syrians differ from visitors of other nationalities in being protected from illegal deportation because their lives are threatened if they go back to their country.

Access to employment is not a straightforward process and is not automatically granted to Syrians in Algeria. Most Syrians, mainly businessmen and company owners, who have work permits were those who entered Algeria between 2011 and December 2014 when Algeria adopted a hospitality approach and granted more rights to Syrians compared to those who entered after 2015. Syrians that arrived in Algeria after the world's refugee crisis in 2015 did not necessarily enjoy free unconditional access to employment and did not receive work permits to allow them to work legally in Algeria. In order to hear more about life experiences of Syrians with employment in Algeria, my research gatekeepers suggested that I pay a visit to Baba Hassan in North-western part of Algiers which is known as Baba Aleppo among Syrians.

Baba Hassan is a busy, commercial district where most Syrian businessmen who came from Aleppo reside and work. In Baba Hassan, I met Hatem, an energetic and very welcoming Syrian businessman and investor in Baba Hassan district in Algiers. Proudly, Hatem expressed how he and his fellow countrymen helped in transforming Baba Hassan from a forgotten place to the most crowded and vibrant district in Algiers known for Syrian textile production, handmade oriental decorations, and Middle Eastern sweets and pastries stores. On March 18th, 2018 and away from his crowded fabric shop, Hatem and I went to a calm café in Baba Hassan where I asked him about his experience with employment as a Syrian investor and businessman in Algeria. He confidently replied:

'I own a textile company in Algeria, and one of the benefits of investing in Algeria is having health insurance and a CHIFA card issued by the Algerian government… I pay taxation every year and my family and I receive free health services and health insurance' […ana stasmart houn bi jazaei'ir fi majal lkmach … eh, andna ri'aaya sihiya hamdoullah w adna hata daman ijtimai'i w andna bitakat CHIFA. Hamdoullah … mn chorout fath charika houn, fi el ichtirak b daman el ijtimai'i w tkhalssi mablagh kol am. Fa chtarakt w hatit kamel ai'ilati ma'ei b had lbitaka. w ana btlaka ri'aaya sihiya b had l bitaka majaniya …].

As a long-residence permit holder, Hatem confirmed:' I did not face any problems when it came to employment and work permits'. Hatem considered working with Algerians crucial especially when he first came in 2011 as he was not familiar with the Algerian context in terms of law and Algerian dialect. He added: 'I have an Algerian private driver, an Algerian female dressmaker, and an Algerian female law solicitor / counsellor that I have always trusted' […andi chauffeur jazai'iri andi ma'ah takriban 10 snin w khayata jazai'iriya w andi mohassba kanouniya jazai'iriya. Ma fina nchteghol lahalna b doun jazai'iriyin la ano byfidouna b achyae momkin ma na'arfouha w hata homa ashab thika…]. He further added that 'working with

Algerians had never made me feel inferior or raised any issues of racism or discrimination' […ma fi machakil tamyiz aw hogra…la mawsslna la hadik nokta abadan ma'a el jazaei'iriyin…]. Unlike Hatem that had a long-residence permit, short-residence permit holders did not enjoy work permits.

About a drive of half an hour away from Baba Hassan, I arrived in Sidi Yahia, a small district and a place famed of luxury and extravagance in Algiers, where I met Mohamed, a 32-year-old man at his workplace. He had been working for four years in a luxurious restaurant as a chef specialising in both Syrian and Algerian cuisine. At my first visit, Mohamed did not hesitate to take part in my research and agreed to share his experience of seeking refuge in Algeria. Without my asking and as if Mohamed was reading my mind, he mentioned the situation at work and described the atmosphere with his Algerian and Syrian co-workers:

'… I have been working with Algerians for 4 years and in our workplace, we are equal, there is no difference between us…' […fi houn souriyin am bchteghel maahom w maana jazai'iriyin. Nahna mou mokayadin nchteghel bas ma'aa souriyin. La ana andi tnin jazai'iriyin ychtghlo ma'ii houn sarlhoun 4 snin w kolayatna kif kif mafi fark…].

Having Syrians and Algerians working in the same restaurant, Mohamed appreciated this brought success, openness and good reputation among clients. To him, Pan-Arabism and Islam are the strongest bonds between them. The most recurring reasons behind Syrians' decision to choose Algeria as their first destination, were the availability of job opportunities, the state's facilities upon arrival, openness and support of the Algerian local community to Syrians as opposed to other countries such as the Gulf states, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and European

countries. Mohamed went first to Egypt where he lived for nearly two years before he decided to live in Algeria. I was curious to know why he left Egypt, even though it is still an Arab and a Muslim country. To him, 'job opportunities in Algeria are more available than in Egypt' […Lkhdma, lkhdma b jazai'ir khir mn masr…]. Practically, in this case, Mohamed confirmed the availability of job opportunities made him decide to move with his wife and two children, to Algeria.

The legal situation of Mohamed is different from Hatem's. Mohamed held a short-residence permit and a registration certificate issued by the UNHCR in Algiers. By law, Mohamed's residence permit does not grant him a work permit in Algeria and the UNHCR registration is only an assurance against illegal deportation and grants him humanitarian support. Despite the fact that law does not grant short-permit holders the right to work legally, Mohamed did not face obstacles in terms of his work. He confirmed '…the state is fully aware of Syrians who are working without legal status or even without documents, but the state is not imposing any fines against us or against our employers...' […el dawla taaref anou ma adna ikamata aw awrak la nchtghol bas ma y'akbouna aw yfrdou alina okoubat …]. For him, having or not having a work permit is not an issue in Algeria. Mohamed's life experience was different from another short-residence permit holder that found having no work permit and having a short- residence permit difficult in terms of starting a small family project.

My fieldwork revealed that in real and daily-life situations, the absence of a refugee / asylum official mechanism, creates a gap between top-down and bottom-up applications of theories and their actual practices, between intentions and their implementation, and between ideal and reality. Leyth and his father own a shop of Syrian pastries and bakeries in Bab Zouar, Algiers.

Having heard from other participants that holding a short-residence permit does not allow a Syrian to own a property, be it a house, a shop or even a car, I asked Leyth about the sweet shop his father owned. He claimed that, in reality, it is their shop but in terms of papers and contracts and by law the shop belongs to his uncle. I found this contradictory until he explained: 'since my uncle has long-residence permit and he can own a property and apply for a trade register. He helped us to open this shop and start our family business …' […bi nisba la lmahal, fatahna b asm ami bima ano mokim daim Kader ydir sijil tijari b asmo w yftah mahal b asmo…]. Leyth is a 23-year-old male, who came to Algeria in 2012 when he was just sixteen. I asked him how he managed to come to Algeria as a teenager. He expressed his gratitude to his uncle, from his father's side that helped him. I wondered about his uncles's status; Leyth smiled and said 'he is a long-residence permit holder because he has been married to an Algerian woman since 2003' […ami mokim da'im la ano motzawij wahda jazaei'riya min 2003…]. Leyth mentioned that without his uncle's status, he could not have applied for family re-unification for his parents and siblings to join him in Algeria. Since their arrival in Algeria, Leyth and his family were granted short-residence permits and could not apply for a long-residence permit because their passports were expired and refused to be renewed by the Syrian consulate in Algiers. By law, Syrians who do not hold legal ID or valid documents are illegal and may be subject to deportation. However, just like Mohamed, Leyth confirmed that 'even though I do not have legal documents or work permits, I will not face any issues with the state…' […ana jawaz safari montahi w ma andi ikama w ma andi awrak w makanch li yhassebni. Matalan ywakafni barrage aw markaz amni mabyahko maei...]. However, Leyth mentioned the obstacles he had been facing due to his undefined legal status; 'the problem of confidence', he stated. He wondered what if his uncle decides to take over their small business because, in law, he is the owner not Leyth and his father. All papers and trade register are in

his uncle's name though money is theirs. The latter is a problem that short-residence holders from my Syrian cohort raised.

The European commission (n.d) reported that migrants and non-EU migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, often face challenging obstacles of integration into the labour market. The challenges can be due to linguistic incompetence, cultural barriers, lack of legal status and papers, lack of required skills, and even due to discrimination. The scene was different in Algeria. The major challenge to successful integration into the labour market is legal status and legal recognition by the state. The gap in the Algerian immigration law, which is the lack of a national law of asylum, hinders successful integration of Syrians although they can still work without work permits or legal documents without facing legal procedures against them. The only advantage in addition to Syrians' access to social services (healthcare, education, housing and a conditional access to employment) is that they do not face deportation as the state's official at the foreigner's office, Asma, confirmed that 'Syrians, generally, do not face deportation, but they have to respect the internal law of the state'.

Murphy & Vieten (2017) argue that if asylum seekers can work while waiting for their asylum applications to be processed, their living conditions will be improved at all levels and not only their financial situation. For asylum seekers, it is all about guaranteeing dignity, pride and independence (Murphy & Vieten, 2017, p. 89). Similarly, Syrian interviewees ensured that they do not accept any humanitarian aid either from the Algerian state or UNHCR, but they prefer to work and earn money to support themselves and their families. For instance, Kamal, a 35-year-old male participant that owned a shop of oriental decorations in Kouba district in south-eastern part of Algiers, confirmed that he registered with the UNHCR, but assured me that he

did not accept any humanitarian or financial support because he was skilful enough to work, unlike some other Syrian refugees. The only reason why Kamal registered with the UNHCR is to make sure that he would not be deported illegally by the state.

After investigating the access of Syrians into employment and labour market, the question that arises here is: how can conditional and unconditional rights to employment be perceived as technologies of the state's biogovernmental strategy of securitisation and how does these state practices implicitly govern the host population (Algerians) and control their diversity? As stated earlier, there is a close relationship between the legal status of Syrian displaced people, employment and security. From a biogovernmental rationality, by excluding Syrians from legal recognition and legal employment, the state is protecting national security, and preserving the homogeneity of Algerianness. This became a vital interest for the biopolitics of the Algerian state in response to 21st century's events including the Arab spring waves, civil and political unrest in neighbouring countries, the spread of terrorist groups in the Sahel region, and to the world's refugee crisis (2015). As previously mentioned, the Algerian approach to accept Syrian displaced people and grant them access to the country went through two main phases (from 2011 to Dec 2014 and from 2015 to the present time) and adopted two different state discourses (hospitality and securitisation) and technologies to manage them and control their circulation. Mavelli argues that the 'dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of refugees have been informed by the state's biopolitical racism that redraws the boundary between 'valuable' (to be included) and 'not valuable' (to be excluded) lives according to the refugees' capacity to enhance the biological and emotional well-being of host populations'. In this respect, late comers during this phase enjoyed slightly limited rights compared to the early comers. They either have renewable short-residence permits (renewable every 90 days) or hold no documents at all due to the expiration of their Syrian passports that were not renewed by the Syrian consulate in

Algiers. This group have received free education, free healthcare, access to housing with a conditional access to employment. As illustrated in chapter 6, this phase was governed by a state discourse of hospitality that labelled them as "guests". However, Syrians that entered during the second phase (starting from January 2015) faced strict borders control policies and security measures due to potential threat to Algeria's national security. They were obliged to submit visa applications to the Algerian consulate prior to their arrival to Algeria. The visa file should include an invitation and a sponsoring letter from an Algerian citizen or a Syrian that holds a long-residence permit. Syrians who were granted entry to Algeria during this phase, received short-residence permits which are renewable every 45 days. This type of residence permit issued during the 2nd phase have allowed Syrian holders to enjoy free education, free healthcare, access to housing but conditional access to employment. A conditional access to employment means that Syrians can either work illegally at stores despite the awareness of the Algerian state or open their own businesses such as shops, restaurants but with Algerian co-owners that will help them receive their trade register from the Algerian government. This does will not grant them CHIFA cards and grant them access to the state's national insurance. If short-residence permit holders could not find Algerian co-owners, a Syrian long-residence permit holder is still eligible.

Most Syrians during the second phase belong to lower middle class or working-class families that are still skilful and not very dependent on the state or on the assistance of the UNHCR. However, this can still make them vulnerable to exploitation and domestic slavery at work especially if they do not have legal documentation. Conditional access to employment also means that the Syrian displaced community is effectively governed and managed by the state rationalities of security and values of nationalism that protects the Algerian identity and controls its legal capacity to include non-citizens. If a short-residence permit holder receives

unconditional access to employment, they will be able to start their small business without a co-owner. As such, they will have a long-residence permit which is renewable every two years and will enjoy the right to free mobility outside Algeria. In terms of Algeria's discourse of security, travelling outside Algeria for Syrians could be considered '*bad circulation'* (Foucault in Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01) that still menaces the national security of the state. By law, after 7 years of continuous residence, foreigners can apply for Algerian citizenship. If their applications are successful, they will be naturalised and, therefore, they will be Algerian citizens. However, since this does not guarantee that they have strong feelings of belonging and loyalty to Algeria including its people and the state, as strongly articulated in the argument of the Algerian state official, Asma, the state has to limit their access to citizenship by limiting their access to employment and to residence permits.

7.3. Discussion

This chapter has discussed how Algeria's biopolitical decisions aimed at both governing the Syrian community and at governing the local population, at the same time through security measures. As such, the state decides who is deemed "worthy" and who is ''unworthy / suspect / dangerous'' of inclusion into the Algerian community. 'If Foucault's biopolitics aims at caring and maximising the well-being and life of the population *as a whole*, the humanitarian government is the *politics of individual life*' (Mavelli, 2017, p. 815 italics as in original text). However, Algeria's state strategies of governing and managing the flow of Syrians have led to a state of discrimination and vulnerabilities among the Syrian community itself despite the majority of Syrians did not report that they faced acts of racism, harassment, or abuse against them by the Algerian society.

7.3.1. At the Edges of Discrimination and Vulnerability

Syrian displaced people do not share the same life-experience in Algeria. Generally, Syrian businessmen and Syrians who are married to Algerian spouses hold long-residence permits that allow them to enjoy full unconditional access to employment and training and freedom of mobility outside Algeria. Among the Syrian cohort, Wissal, a 40-year-old Syrian, has been married to an Algerian citizen since they were in Syria. Her children were born in Syria and received their Algerian citizenship because their father is Algerian. When they entered Algerian in 2012, Wissal received a long-residence permit and confirmed that she enjoyed equal rights as her husband and children. Although not guaranteed, long-residence permits still grants Syrian holders the chance to apply and probably receive Algerian citizenship after 7 years of continuous residence in Algeria. However, short-residence permit holders enjoy conditional / limited access to employment. This status does not grant its holders the right to travel outside Algeria freely or to have the right to apply for Algerian citizenship after 7 years of continuous residence in Algeria. The state's practices resulted in painful inequalities among the Syrian community: between long and short-residence permit holders, in terms of their rights (access to employment and freedom of mobility outside Algeria) and access to citizenship. For the purpose of preserving the national identity, Algerianness, 'these limitations reflect the frontiers and power hierarchies that continue to shape the relationship between citizens / non-citizens (Van Woensel Kooy, 2016, p. 09).

Conditional / limited access to employment may make some Syrians vulnerable to modern slavery such as fraudulence and exploitation at work. For instance, short-residence permit holder, Samer, was not able to register his car in his name but his Algerian friend and employer,

Marwan, registered the car in his name and Samer paid for it. According to law, Samer's car is not his, but his friend's. Fortunately, Samer and his Algerian friend, Marwan, share mutual trust and Samer did not doubt his Algerian friend. The story was totally different with Iyad (40) from Ouargla province in the Sahara Desert in southern Algeria where he works as a welder. I met Iyad during his stay in Algiers for the registration of his new-born in the Syrian consulate in Algiers. During our conversation, Iyad expressed his satisfaction about his life among Algerians in Ouargla. He stated that even if in Ouargla there is a very small community of Syrians compared to that in Algiers, he did not feel socially excluded. He appreciated how people in the Sahara region preserve their cultural customs and traditions compared to the north where people are more westernised, as Kamal claimed as well. After three days of our meeting on April 14th, 2018, I called him in order to hear more about his experience during his stay in Algiers. I was surprised to hear that his legal status made him vulnerable to a fraud.

Holding a short-residence permit, just as Samer, Iyad was not able to register his personal car in his name. He used his Syrian fellow countryman's long-residence permit to buy a car and apply for a vehicle registration (La carte grise). After 1 year of having the vehicle, Iyad was surprised to be called by the police because his Syrian friend claimed that he lent his car to Iyad, who refused to give it back to him. Legally, the car is not registered in Iyad's name because he could not, but it was he who paid for it. This act created a frustration to Iyad and his family but ended up on Iyad having to re-register the car on the name of his Algerian friend. Although there was some relief, nothing guaranteed to Iyad that the same scenario would not repeat itself with his Algerian friend. This justified why my Syrian participants were concerned about their legal status and why Leyth and his father Rabie, for instance, were extremely concerned because their family business and contracts were on the name of Leyth's uncle. What made Leyth's uncle able to apply for a trade register and register it on his name to help Rabie start his family business was because he held a long-residence permit. If, for instance,

Rabie or Leyth's status were legalised in Algeria, they could have been able to register their family business on their names rather than being susceptible for unexpected fraud from Leyth's uncle.

7.3.2. Knowledge Production: Good and Failed Citizens within the Syrian Community

The act of begging is illegal in Algeria, and the Algerian law punishes beggars (Criminal and Punishment Law, 2015, pp. 81-82). For some people who have received short-term resident permits remained vulnerable to exploitation from illegitimate organisations and scam agencies of street begging. Having different status and enjoying different rights, Syrians developed a sense of discrimination among them. Ayman was one of the Syrians who commented on the growing phenomenon of Syrian beggars in the streets of Algiers. In a very strong attitude of denationalisation, he called them 'El Arbat' and claimed that 'they are not (true) Syrians by descent by they are naturalised Syrians that have been granted Syrian passports when they immigrated to Syria'. Fateh is another respondent who shared the same view as Ayman. He argued that they are called 'El Ghajar' that are naturalised Syrians, but not true Syrians […okhrin yada'oun anhom souriyin li homa el motassawilin El Ghajar li jaw b ism el souriyin lal jazai'ir…]. When talking to both Ayman and Fateh and trying to analyse their discourse from an angle of knowledge production, I noticed that Syrians established exclusionary criteria within their own community. They excluded people that need financial support and do not work from being Syrian and classified them as previously Bedoon (stateless people) that are not true Syrians, but they are naturalised citizens. Fateh and Ayman's discourse of *denationalising*

other Syrians, that are in need for financial support, from Syrian citizenship was an attempt to change a negative sociological image drawn around Syrian war refugees in the world. 'Syrians are hard workers and they prefer to work rather than wait for financial supports' [… souriyin hirafiyin w chtghlo mayntadro wahed ysa'edhom b ay chi … w hado li am ytssawlo may'aksso sourat souri el hakiki…], Ayman stated. Anderson (2015) argues that the community of value distinguishes migrants from citizens. Yet not all citizens are good citizens; norms of inclusion / exclusion should determine that. In her exploration of this idea, Anderson argues that 'the community of value is defined from the outsider by the non-citizen (exclusion), but also from the insider by the failed citizen (failure) (Anderson, 2013, p. 4)'. A non-citizen is excluded from the local community / nation because they do not have a normative status in addition to the absence of a legal status. In contrast, failed citizens (despite legal citizens in law) such as criminals can also face exclusion because they are not worthy of membership of the community of value (i.e.), they are not hard workers; they do not contribute to the development of the nation, they are criminals. Similarly, within the small community of Syrians in Algeria, Syrians set up boundaries and norms of inclusion and exclusion of good and failed citizens. Syrian workers in Algeria defended themselves by claiming that Syrian beggars are failed citizens, as Anderson (2015) would call them, because a good citizen should work and earn money by themselves rather than begging. It can be concluded that Syrian beggars and poor people were considered as a threat to the social order of the Syrian community itself and not only to the Algerian society, as the Algerian law would consider them.

7.4. Conclusion

Migration and refugeehood have always intertwined with concerns of the state's national security. They also challenge the homogeneity of national identities especially in societies and states that do not adopt multiculturalism as their political and sociological ideologies. Within the age of globalisation, migration and refugeehood have left negative effects and consequently displaced people have been associated with illegalities that increase the level of crimes, human and drug trafficking, local and international networks of terrorists and espionage between countries. Not only does illegal displacement of migrants and refugees create risks at the level of national security but it challenges the welfare state and its capacity to provide social welfare through granting social rights (Bigo, 2002) to both local population and the displaced community of refugees and migrants.

Algeria's strategy of securitisation came as a reaction to civil and political instabilities in neighbouring countries namely: Libya and Mali. This, in turn, led to human trafficking, drug trafficking, and the spread of networks of terrorists and extremists on the Algerian borders. Reviewing the national historiography of Algeria in chapters 3 and 4 reveals how securing national territory and protecting national sovereignty have always been very sensitive subjects to colonial and post-colonial Algeria (1832- 1962 and 1962- present). On November 4th, 1848 Algerians were deprived of their sovereignty over their national territory when metropolitan France annexed Algeria to its French territory in its mission to expend its power in Africa (French Constitution, November 4th, 1848). After discovering natural resources in the Algerian Sahara, France started spreading its exploitation of oil and gas until officially nationalised after independence during Boumedienne's era. Additionally, Algeria's vast Sahara was used for

France's atomic and nuclear tests in February 1960 (Panchasi, 2019). Algeria's challenge after independence has always been the protection of a vast territory especially during the age of migration and international terrorism. Unlike some of the 'European countries that adopted deportation, detention and dispersal as their mechanisms of exclusion (Schuster, 2004, p. 01)', this scenario did not take place in Algeria. Research data revealed that even without legal documentations or renewal of their residence permits, Syrian asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants did not face deportation or detention, as in European states.

Before 2015, Syrians were able to enter Algeria without a visa prior to arrival. However, in 2015 Algeria's new strategy obliged Syrians to submit a visa application prior to arrival in response to attempts of terrorist groups to enter the Algerian territory in the name of refugeehood. The latter was clearly reflected in the viewpoint of the state official at the Foreigners' Office, Asma, that argued: 'we cannot grant entry to one person and sacrifice the lives of 40 million Algerians'. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the state's biopolitical perception was also demonstrated in the speech of the head of migration office at the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Hassan Kassimi, after Algeria's rejection to grant entry to a group of Syrians who claimed to be war refugees but were, in fact, Jihadists that flew from Syria to Turkey to Sudan until they reached Algeria's borders.

'Biopolitics deals with the population as a political problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem' (Foucault in Williams, 2015, p. 36). The state's decision to control its borders and the requirement for displaced Syrians to submit a visa prior to arrival and limit their access to legal status and legal employment should not be understood from a security perspective only. These state's technologies can also be understood

as a biopolitical decision to both care for the well-being of the local population in Algeria. Worthy Syrian refugees that were granted access before 2015, have proven their ability to enhance the economic situation in Algeria and contribute to the well-being of the local population through their businesses and economic activities. Visa requirements, conditional access of employment and the limitation of short-residence permits for Syrians who arrived after 2015 demonstrate the legal capacity and openness of Algerian citizenship which is still exclusive and conditional despite the level of hospitality among the Algerian local society and the state's strategy of hospitality between 2011 and Dec 2014. This, in turn, reflects the state's efforts to limit and manage diversity through the preservation of the homogeneity of the national identity: Algerianness. Citizenship in Algeria is not only a dynamic cultural and social process or a reflection of identity and a sense of belonging, but also a manifestation of loyalty to the state and the local population. Indeed, Hepworth (2015) concludes that threats of the state's security and political community affect the decisions around citizenship.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

8.1. Overview of Thesis

The rationale of this study was to investigate how Algeria's colonial past and post-colonial present still influence the present state's decisions on Algerian citizenship when it comes to meeting the challenges of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. From a Foucauldian perspective of biopolitical governmentality, this empirical study finds that the state technologies manifest themselves in what Algeria has offered to Syrians in terms of legal, social and civil rights of citizenship such as healthcare, education, housing, employment, mixed marriages, and freedom of movement. Additionally, closed borders, bureaucratic procedures, visas prior to arrival and guest centres are also embedded state technologies through which the state rationalities function. The nuances of conditionalities of state's technologies differ depending on the state's discourses of *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarian support*, but they serve the same rationalities of nationalism, national security, and the biopolitics of Algerian citizenship and Algerianness.

In order to achieve this task, chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis started by critically reviewing the history of colonial and post-colonial Algeria and how the imagination and conceptualisation of Algerianness and Algerian citizenship have been continuously re-invented based on different events that take place in Algeria's history such as: movements of local resistance to the French colonial power (nationality laws and rights), war of liberation, Algeria's independence,

Algerianisation of the nation (Algerian citizenship and rights, Islam and Arabness, Algeria's civil war in the 90s, Arab spring waves and contemporary threats from international terrorism to national security). Reviewing Algeria's history is important in understanding the present state's practices of naturalisation, granting citizenship rights, and border control adopted by the state when managing the flow of displaced people. Colonial power or forms of power were supported and facilitated by political technologies directed towards the target population (Matereke, 2011, p. 07). Chapter 3 of this thesis critically analysed the practices of France's colonial will to improve / civilising mission of obliterating the main principles of Algerianness namely Arabness and Islam through technologies of nationality laws, education and Algeria's annexation to France. The French colonial disciplinary power started with Code de l'indigénat in 1881 that turned Algerians into subjects and exercised power through colonial courts and tribunals and administrations. The French colonial power deprived the Algerian population of rights and executed a policy of erasure when it comes to identity and land. The discourse of colonisation started by declaring Algeria as a part of the French territory in the 19th century and its people were deemed French citizens. However, the process of offering French nationality was discriminative and was based on ethnicity, origins and religion. Europeans in Algeria and Algerian Jews were declared citizens and received French citizenship; Algerian Muslims, on the other hand, were declared colonial subjects and deprived of rights. Algerian Muslims had to wait until France enacted *Loi de Jonnart* in 1919 which offered the possibility for Algerian Muslim elites to receive legal status and rights only if they renounce their religion. Education was another means through which the French colonial power controlled the Algerian nation to re-shape its national identity in the imperial Republican mould. The project of westernising Algerian pupils at schools aimed at obliterating faith (Islam) and language (Arabic). The French Minister of Education, Jules Ferry, stated that through the French educational curriculum adopted in colonial Algeria aimed at teaching Algerian pupils French and only

French because the primary aim was not to teach them about their history or geography, but the main aim was to detach them from their mother tongue and culture (Cited in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 96).

In colonial Algeria, these colonial practices had to face local Algerian resistance and cultural, political, and armed movements that preserved the nature of Algerianness as a collective national identity. Chapter 3 stated three main figures of Algerian movements of nationalism namely El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaeir'ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj. The reason why I limited myself to these Algerian leaders is because of their significant contributions into shaping Algerianness and fostering Algerian national pride. Abdu El-Kader contributed in preserving religious and cultural attributes of Algerianness during the 19th century which established the social power of modern nationalism which was led by Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj in the 20th century.

Chapter 3 provided an overview of colonial power in colonial Algeria. Chapter 4 illustrated the state's governmentality of Algerianising the independent nation of Algeria through technologies and discourses of citizenship, nationalism, and Arabisation. These discourses and technologies aimed at serving a state's rationality of re-inventing and re-designing Algerianness as a normative and a political entity in order to foster national pride. From a perspective of power-knowledge relation, chapter 4 analysed how state discourses of post-colonial Algeria have produced the "ideal Algerian citizen". The Algerian constitution reflects the collective imagination and the role to be played by the ideal citizen.

The Algerian constitution starts with the turmoil and suffering of the Algerian nation and its will to achieve liberty. It then glorifies the Algerian revolutionary war against the French regime and its attempts to eradicate the principles and values of the Algerian nation namely: Islam, Arabism and Tamazight. The opening of the constitution also mentioned the efforts of the Algerian state to foster nationalism and social equality and protect national sovereignty and security. Section two of the Algerian constitution discussed what Algerian citizens are strictly banned from doing such as humiliating Islam and the principles of Algerian revolutionary war including the war veterans and martyrs. The most recent version of the Algerian constitution (2020) defines Algerian society in the preamble and sections as follows:

'… Knowing that the Algerian people went through foreign invasions throughout time and fought against colonial rule, Algerian people are free and remain always free and Algeria has always been the land of freedom, dignity and pride.

November 1st, 1954 was a turning point in the history of Algeria and the Algerian people during which they resisted all attempts that would have obliterated their national identity, which is Islam, Arabism and Tamazight.

Algerian society fought and will always fight when it comes to its freedom, national democracy, national sovereignty, national independence, and nationalism and always do its best to achieve them within a democratic republic that ensures social equality and justice…

Chapter One

Section One: Principles and Basics which govern Algerian Society

Rule One: Algeria is a people's democratic republican state and will never divide.

Rule Two: Islam is the religion of the state.

Rule Three: The Arabic language represents the national official language of Algeria and it always remains so. All possible efforts have to be done by the supreme council to make Arabic language used in all scientific fields and translation; it should be encouraged.

Rule Four: Tamazight is also a national official language in Algeria.

The Algerian state has done its best to develop its linguistic variations used all over Algeria.

Rule Five: Algiers is the capital city of Algeria.

Rule Six: the national flag and the national anthem are the symbols of the Algerian revolution and they are not subject to change. They represent the symbols of the republic; …

Section Two: The People

Rule 10: it is totally prohibited for associations to do the followings:

1- Acts of feudalism, regionalism, and nepotism.
2- Acts of human slavery and dependency.
3- All acts that contradict and do not represent moral ethics of Islam and the principles of the Algerian revolution.'

(The Algerian constitution, 2020. My translation from Arabic to English).

A quick look at the text extracted from the Algerian constitution that was revised in 2020 in response to the Algerian *Hirak* of 22nd of February 2019, shows us the main points around which collective identity is to be formed: the principles of nationalism and Algeria's war of liberation against the French coloniser, Islam, Arabism and Tamazight. The imagined "ideal citizen" in post-colonial Algeria has been structured in reaction to what the French colonisation intended to obliterate. After Algeria's independence, only those whose father or grandfather held Muslim personal status automatically received Algerian citizenship. As such, around '91.000 Harkis' (Algerians that served France against Algeria) (Roberts & Tucker, 2008, p.

81) Jews and Christians that used to live in Algeria, known as “pieds noirs”, found themselves excluded after Algeria’s independence and immigrated to France. The “ideal Algerian citizen” is not only a Muslim, but the free nation needed to re-connect with the rest of the Arab world and mainly brothers-in-arms namely the republics of Syria, Egypt and Iraq. In order to achieve this, president Boumedienne adopted a cultural and political policy of Arabisation; the latter aimed at boosting Arabic as a language in a new independent nation where only French was allowed in educational settings. Algeria started exchange programmes of teachers with Arab countries namely Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Prior to this and before the Algerian independence in 1962, the FLN (Front de Libération National), which was the armed force of Algerian nationalism, was backed up by Egypt where the provisional Algerian government was set up in 1958. After independence, Algeria’s ideology of Arabisation also involved supporting the Arab nation against foreign invasion under the principles of pan-Arabism.

In the case of the Arab Israeli conflict in 1967 and 1973, Algeria’s military support remains undeniable: ‘on November 15, 1988, a formal declaration of a Palestinian state was made by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat in Algiers, Algeria during a meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC)’ (Roberts & Tuckers, 2008, p. 83). To date as a symbol of loyalty to principles of pan-Arabism and support to Palestine, Algeria has not had any official diplomatic relations with Israel.

From a biopolitical perspective, social welfare offered an egalitarian form of statecraft to distribute the state’s wealth among the population. In order to enhance the well-being of the population, post-colonial Algeria offered free, full and unconditional access to healthcare, education, public housing and employment. Additionally, economically, during

Boumedienne's era Algeria nationalised its hydrocarbon industry in its Sahara and gained control over its territory and its resources like oil and gas.

The last section of chapter 4 critically questioned how discourses of Algerianness can be inclusive or exclusive to "the other" in the age of mass migration. In order to answer this question, this section offered an insight on how Algerianness / Algerian citizenship can be understood as a practice of biopolitical governmentality of the Algerian state. My claim was that since post-1962 Algerianness and Algerian citizenship were highly nationalistic and adopted technologies of exclusion, they would still be exclusive to a group of people in the age of globalisation and mass migration. However, the same technologies of exclusion might act as technologies of inclusion and offer rights for Syrians as they are Arabs and maybe Muslims, and they share the same history with Algeria since the exile of the Algerian leader of local anti-colonial resistance in the 19th century 'El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei'ri' to Damascus and the participation of Algeria in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the fact of being Arabs and maybe Muslims does not guarantee that a foreigner holds nationalistic sentiments towards Algeria. Therefore, naturalisation for non-citizens in Algeria may not be a straightforward process especially due to the contemporary threats to Algeria's national unity and security. In order to analyse these claims, I used biopolitical governmentality to approach research data from an angle that focusses on the art of governing a population including state's discourses, rationalities and technologies of governmentality. The next step examined how these state governmentalities serve a biopolitical thinking of the state. In order to understand the power game in Algeria and to understand how the state manages the flow of Syrian displaced people into the country, I adopted three levels of analysis namely: identifying technologies of governing that show the embodiment of the state's political programmes; identifying state discourses and power-knowledge relations of producing Syrian displaced people as either "guests", "potential threats" or "suffering bodies"; the third level of analysis focusses on

welfare state rationalities and how they are designed to be biopolitical strategies of governing both the Algerian population and the Syrian displaced community. In the absence of an official asylum / refugee mechanism in Algeria, the analysis of data offered an explanation for why nationalistic Algerian citizenship is highly exclusive to most foreigners and what alternatives the state has to offer to Syrians instead of naturalisation and legal recognition.

After providing research context and theoretical foundation, a review of the relevant literature in the field and a discussion of the methodology, chapters 6 and 7 presented data analysis and discussed research findings. The research findings revealed that within a state rationality of nationalism, Syrians may face exclusion because they did not fit into the box of "an ideal citizen that is loyal to Algeria" as imagined by the state. As Arabs and Muslims, Syrians were offered a higher level of tolerance and ease at a legal level and social rights of citizenship such as healthcare, education, accommodation / housing, and employment. However, access to citizenship rights has been controversial among Syrians. These controversies have created categorisation, feeling of marginality and identity crisis among the Syrian displaced community. In fact, I have divided the Syrian displaced community into two main groups: the first involved Syrians that entered without a visa or any restrictions from 2011 until December 2014; the second group arrived after Algeria obliged to submit a visa application prior to arrival in January 2015. Although during both phases, Algeria committed itself to the provide humanitarian support to Syrian displaced people, they are governed by different governmentalities with different state discourses: hospitality and securitisation, technologies, and produced different paradoxical knowledge about Syrian displaced people: "worthy guests" and "potential threats". However, they served the same state rationalities that aim at protecting the nature of Algerian citizenship.

From 2011 to December 2014, Algeria's discourse that governed displaced people including Syrians was based on principles of Arabic and an Islamic ethic of hospitality which allowed unconditional generosity and solidarity. Because of a shared history that started between Algeria and Syria since the exile of Algeria's leader of Anti-colonial resistance, El Amir Abdu El-Kader, hospitality and unconditional welcoming were considered as an ethical duty that Algeria owes to Syria. Syrians were produced as "worthy guests". Despite this openness and the guarantee of unconditional rights for Syrians in terms of healthcare, health insurance, education, accommodation, employment, legal status and freedom of mobility, they could not apply for naturalisation. The state's rationality behind precluding Syrians from Algerian citizenship is due to its nationalistic nature of Algerian citizenship and the complex history of its development. The second phase from January 2015 to the present contradicts with the state discourse of hospitality. The dominant discourse of the second phase was based on security manifested in technologies of border control, limiting access to citizenship rights such as legal employment, restricting mobility and even restricting mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians. This discourse produced Syrians as "potential threats" which again precluded them from naturalisation and Algerian citizenship. The latter remains the state's rationality. Exceptionally, during this phase, Algeria's obligation to provide humanitarian support is based on its conceptualisation of "the suffering body" whose suffering is legitimate and needs attention. This attention means access to Algeria and enjoyment of rights but not Algerian citizenship. Chapters 6 and 7 explained how these state governmentalities differ in technologies and discourses but relate to each other's by serving the same state rationalities of preserving the nature of Algerianness by precluding displaced people from Algerian citizenship.

To sum up, I would allow myself to end up by repeating Taher Djaout's quote: 'it is a tough job being Algerian' (Tahar Djaout * (quoted in Šukys, 2007: 14) in Benrabah, 2013, p. vi). The

reason why I would like to re-mention the quote at this stage of my thesis is to summarise the experience of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Despite all historical ties, Arabness / pan-Arabism and Islam, research data revealed that the nature of Algerian citizenship remains normative and nationalistic during the age of mass migration and international terrorism in the 21st century which makes it even harder to Syrians to be naturalised in Algeria.

8.2. Summary of Key Findings

8.2.1. The Politics of Alienation: Encounters with Refugeehood and Nationalistic Norms of Algerian Citizenship

Due to the absence of an official national refugee law in Algeria which may have explained the state's strategies of managing the flow of Syrian displaced people and may have legalised their status in Algeria, I offered an explanation of the state's practices through the lens of biopolitical government. The latter explained Algeria's strategies / discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian support. The term also referred to the biopolitical force of Algerianness and the political order of Algerian citizenship which have governed the level of openness of the state and society towards non-citizens. Having said that, I have argued that the state's inclusion and exclusion criteria are consciously and unconsciously informed by both historical and contemporary circumstances. My research data revealed that the state has used, alternatively, three main strategies namely: hospitality, security and humanitarian support that often conflict within the Algerian scene as they are driven by contradictory state rationalities and motives. For instance, from a hospitality viewpoint, the state welcomes Syrians as they are a part of the

community of faith (Islam) and Pan-Arabism. The discourse of security, however, denies access and precludes Syrians from enjoying full unconditional rights and classifies them as a potential source of threat to the national security of the country and its society. These state discourses promote different representations and productions of people of the Syrian community: “guests”, “brothers and sisters” or “potential threat” to the state security. Both Syrian groups are entitled to humanitarian support and war refugee rights such as registration with UNHCR, no illegal deportation and no detention.

In Addition to its commitment to provide humanitarian support for displaced people, the Algerian state also adopted hospitality as its welcoming state’s strategy. The latter have been governed by principles of Islam, Pan-Arabism and in the name of strong historical ties between Algerians and Syrians. Security, on the other hand, was governed by the state’s concerns for the safety of its national territory and population. Implicitly, these norms of securitisation of strategies of hospitality and humanitarianism are also governed by unconscious rules derived from the nature of Algerian citizenship. The latter was invented as a reaction to the French citizenship in colonial Algeria that granted rights to valuable groups, namely Jews and Europeans in Algeria, as opposed to those who chose not to renounce their Muslim personal status. Algerians whose fathers and grandfathers held Muslim personal status were deemed French subjects according to code de l'indigénat (1881) and did not enjoy fundamental rights.

Both French citizenship in colonial Algeria and post-colonial Algerian citizenship are based on exclusionary norms but serve different biopolitical state rationalities. If the Crémieux decree (1870) granted full French citizenship to Jews and allowed them to enjoy privileges and full social, legal and civil rights as opposed to Algerians of Muslim personal status who were excluded and deemed subjects, today’s Algeria’s decision, on the other hand, to grant access

only to "worthy" and "non-dangerous" people from the Syrian community still aims at boosting the well-being of the Algerian local population. Algeria's exclusionary norms at a legal level resemble the exclusion of Muslims in colonial Algeria, but today's exclusionary norms are not based on race, religion or ethnicity, they are rather based on biopolitical reasons of securitisation. Precluding a group of Syrians from Algerian citizenship is a manifestation of their exclusion at a legal level. However, biogovernmental norms of hospitality have granted conditional social rights to Syrians.

Adopting a Foucauldian thinking, I argued that the state strategies of hospitality and security are designed as biopolitical governmentalities that care for the Algerian population and control the Syrian community. State strategies of hospitality and security also provided a social representation, conceptualisation and production of both displaced people and national citizens. This could be observed through the state technologies of *exceptionally* restricting and almost banning the legalisation of mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerian in Algerian civil law, offering conditional access to employment which can only be possible with the presence of an Algerian guarantor in the contract, and restricting access to health insurance. Besides, the legal status of Syrians did not grant them access to the right of naturalisation after residing in Algeria for 7 years. By restricting access to economy, healthcare, and mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians, Syrian displaced people are legally marginalised and Algerian citizenship have treated them as "unworthy" and "invaluable" migrants whose lives do not matter. These state practices could tell a lot about the nature of Algerian citizenship and who counts as a citizen in Algeria. The discourse of nationalism remains dominant in Algeria's post-colonial state in terms of what Benedict Anderson has referred to as 'official nationalism', that is, 'something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost' (Benedict Anderson, 1983, p. 145 in Hedman, 2008, p. 360). Having said that, at a state level the Algerian citizenship was often perceived as a *privilege* rather than a right.

My research date revealed that while the state's conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship is highly normative, nationalistic and patriotic, the majority of my Syrian respondents did not express these sentiments. They perceived Algerian citizenship or the Algerian passport as a document or a piece of paper that is important for the development of their economic activities. Wael mentioned that '… if, for instance, Syrians have Algerian citizenship or at least long-residence permits, they could have brought their businesses from Syria to Algeria and register them on their own names rather than having an Algerian co-owner …' [souriyin andhom san'a, law faradan fi awrak kouna tawarna houn choghlna …]. Hatem, Businessman in Baba Hassan mentioned that '…we are importing Syrian textiles from Egypt, while we could have produced it here in Algeria if we had citizenship … even producers could have moved their businesses to Algeria because the Algerian market needs these businesses' [am njib lkomach souri min masr … Matalan law dawla wafarat ikamat aw jinssiya kouna Matalan nkder nsan'o houn aw hadou sanay'iya ynoklo choghlhoun houn la anou b jazaei'ir fi khdma bi lmokarana maa masr w boldan okhra…]. Additionally, Algerian citizenship and the Algerian passport were seen by others from the Syrian cohort as a piece of paper that would facilitate their free mobility outside the Algerian territory. Lara whose mother was in Algeria but went back to Syria argued: '… if I have legal documents such as long-residence permit or citizenship, I can go to Syria and go back to Algeria … [Matalan law andi awrak fini rouh la souriya and ahli w arjae houn].

While the majority of my Syrian respondents seem interested in legalising their status by naturalisation or through a long-residence permit, others such as Yasser did not seem very concerned about this. Yasser (45) is a Syrian restaurant owner in a northern suburb of Algiers, Bab Zouar, that left Syria and headed to Algeria in 2013. I met him in 2018 and although he did not receive a long-residence permit after five years of continuous residency in Algeria, he mentioned:

'…I discontinued to renew my short-residence permit a year and a half ago and the only reason why I would think of legalising my status in Algeria is to be able to visit my family and friends that are still in my home-country, Syria. Although I recently applied for a long-residence permit but did not hear a decision yet, without a legal status for more than five years I did not face major obstacles in terms of healthcare, education, housing or employment. There is a high level of tolerance at both the state and societal levels for Syrians in Algeria … for instance at police checkpoints … I will always continue my life in Algeria even if Syria goes back to normal' […Sah kayen hadak lkhatem li howa tajdid kol chahrayn bas ana sarli aktar mn am w nosf madertha w ay barrage yhabassni mayhawssouch 'aliya … kolchi 'adi maydirouli ay mochkila. hatit mo'akharan talab and wizarat dakhiliya ani atlob ikama da'ima michan nkder nrouh 'ala souriya w n'awed narjae w mazalni nstana. Lakin dorka ma'andi walou bas ma fi ay machakil hamdoullh rab el alamin. El ikama tlabtha michan akder arouh ala Souriya achouf ahli w akriba'i w arjae ala jazaei'eir la ani fateh choghli houn w am faker hata law khlsat el machakil fi souriya marah atrok el jazaei'ir. Ana mfaker 99% okim b jazaeir, li bado anhom ya'etouni el ikama la inzal ala Souriya zyara w arja'e ala jazaei'ir. Ama fi jazaei'ir el an, b el ikama aw bidounha rana aychin mitlna mitl ay mowatin jazaei'iri…].

Understandings and conceptualisations of citizenship were perceived by Syrian respondents differently. For Yasser, social inclusion was more important rather than just holding a passport or a legal residence permit in Algeria. He mentioned the example of his friend who had been living in Europe and narrated his experience:

'In Sweden, my friend was not satisfied with the level of inclusion at a societal level despite receiving financial support and free housing from the government… my friend has to face secularism, lost control over his children, and was not able to preserve his child's Muslim identity in the Swedish society and even at schools and educational settings' […w bedi kolak ano lhaja li khalatni ma etla'e ala europa hiya ano fakart b wladi awal chi, bas tala'ehom ala europa yetghayar kolchi; tarbiya, din, lkraya .. kolchi .. hata f lkraya ydakhloulhom afkar ano yeb'aad an dino w akiidto w an omo w abouh … ana kount ahki ma'aa rfiki fi Europa howa 'aych w kali ano ibno talab la abouh

chorta. alo ana ida ma khalitni Matalan arouh ‘ala lmantika l folaniya rah ajiblak chorta w mabtahssen tssawi li bedak yah ma’ii…].

I asked Yasser if he had any Syrian friends who sought refuge in different places in the world other than Europe, he mentioned three countries that have hosted high numbers of Syrian refugees, namely: Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Yasser told me about the life experiences of his fellow countrymen who, he says, lost their dignity, faced discrimination at all levels, found themselves marginalised, and socially excluded. Yasser was disappointed by the way the Lebanese treated Syrians and said: ‘we, Syrians, opened our houses to Lebanese during the civil conflict in Lebanon in 2006 but they are treating Syrians with discourtesy’ […Hamdoullah. Mn nahiyat karamti, houn b jazai’ir karamtna ka souriyin marfou’aa la sma kima ykolo hamdoullah w el jazai’iri yahdaflna karamtna mou mitl ba’ed el boldan el okhra li aychin fiha souriyin mitl lobnan, torkiya, el ordon … hounik el souri mahyouna karamto. Kayen ashabi Matalan fi lobnan, andhom haka tajarob w kalouli anou lma’icha fi lobnan mch mliha la souriyin w saro yemsaho b karamthom el ard ma’aa ano b harb 2006 fi lobnan nahna b souriya stakbalna lobnaniyin w fatahnalhom byoutna bessah homa daro el ‘aks lama jatna el azma fi souriya…]. By the end of our discussion, Yasser expressed his willingness to continue living in Algeria even if the political situation in Syria stabilises in the future. When he first arrived in Algeria, he considered Algeria as a transit point to reach Europe, but it was the level of social inclusion, openness and tolerance that encouraged him to stay in Algeria compared to what he heard about social exclusion of Syrian Muslim refugees in Europe, where they have faced ‘practices of deportation, detention and [where] dispersal [has] become ‘normalised’ rather than ‘exceptional’ instruments (Schuster, 2004, p. 01)’. Yasser perceived citizenship as a sense of social belonging because, to him, social inclusion is more important than just holding an Algerian passport and still being socially excluded.

8.2.2. The Visibility of Power in Algeria's Response to the Flow of Syrian Displaced People

Foucauldian view on power differentiates between repressive, normalising and regulating types of power. As stated in chapter 2 of the present thesis, power is not always negative and physically exercised, it can also be positive and psychologically implemented within a specific context. Additionally, power can either be visibly or invisibly practiced. In terms of Foucault's conceptualisation of power, within the Algerian context and through analysing the government's response to the flow of Syrian displaced people to the country, this research revealed how sovereign power was *barely* noticeable in daily lives of Syrians, but the state's response still alternates between *normalising* power and *regulating* powers. The notion of biopower is *more visible* in the state's response to the flow of Syrian displaced population. For instance, *exceptional* restrictions over mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians and difficulties to register new-borns to unmarried couples. This reflects a lack of congruency between laws and their implementations and real practices at a societal level because the Algerian law permits mixed marriages, but this option was *exceptionally* frozen due to the state's strategy of securitisation and the production of new knowledge around Syrian displaced people after 2015. In this regard, chapter 7 explained how the state produced the Syrian displaced community as a potential threat to the national security of the state and its local population. Difficulties to register new-borns of unmarried couples, on the other hand, is not only applied against Syrians, but it is equally applied against Algerian citizens. Though having different reasons, and belonging to different socio-cultural contexts, this act reminds me of Foucault's '*repressive hypothesis'* (Foucault, 1990a, p. 10 emphasis added). Difficulties to register babies to unmarried Syrian or Algerian couples can be seen as what Foucault called a

'repressive hypothesis' that supressed any discussions about sex in the 17th century among people of the bourgeois society (Foucault, 1990a). Although invisible, there is still an implication of power here because this repressive power and '*censorship*' (Foucault, 1990a, p. 17 emphasis added) supressed discourse around non-marital sexual relationships, single mothers within the Algerian society that is governed by Islamic ethics, values and thoughts. The latter can be referred to as '*episteme*' ((Foucault, 1972, p. 192, emphasis added) which unconsciously governed the thoughts of Fatima. This censorship is conducted by both the Algerian society, and the state through its institutions namely: hospitals. It can be observed through what Fatima, from the Algerian cohort, argued: '…we are Muslims … the Algerian society is a conservative society, and we should not encourage the phenomenon of single mothers …'. In addition to Fatima's argument, Hassiba (60), a midwife at Mustapha Pacha hospital in Algiers confirmed that for new-borns to be registered at the hospital, the Syrian or Algerian couple need to prove their legitimate marriage. Additionally, the state's *exceptional* response to high demands of mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians with restriction and ban remains a highly biopolitical feature of state power. This aimed at enhancing the well-being of the local population by preserving the nature of the Algerian citizenship / Algerianness, but still includes Syrians in a disciplinary system of control through, for instance, document checks and renewal of their residence permits. Institutions are a part of this disciplinary system such as hospitals, schools, the Foreigners' Office (Maktab El Adjanib). The obligation for Syrians to renew their short-residence permits every 45 days is a way of controlling the mobility of Syrians inside and outside Algeria. Bachir (25), an owner of a small family business in Algiers, stated that:

'…I have an obligation to renew my short-residence permits every 45 days… I have to go to the Foreigners' Office that will check our records… we do not have to pay money to do it…'[fi iltizamat Matalan tajdid awrak fi

maktab el Adjanib kol 45 youm lazem nrouh nkhtom … ychoufo awrakna w yjadoulna bi doun ma nkhelass drahem…].

Another manifestation of control can be observed through the obligation of Syrians to either submit proofs of accommodation or find Algerian sponsors or long-residence permit holders of Syrian origins prior to arrival to Algeria. Identifying Syrians by their Algerian sponsors that are citizens or documented Syrians that should be long-residence permit holders in the country is a state's implicit technology of control that was implemented as a part of the state's strategy and rationalities of securitisation. As stated in previous chapters (chapter 7), Wafae's visa applications were denied until she secured an Algerian sponsor, Fatima Zohra, that was able to sponsor her and provide her with proofs of sponsorship and accommodation. This means, until the state identified a way to control and monitor Wafae's circulation in the country, she was then granted an entry visa to Algeria in 2016. Although not a guarantee, the state would expect Wafae's conduct less likely to deviate from the disciplinary system because she is already a part of it, and she is still identifiable and recognized.

8.2.3. Modes of Subjectivation: Who is Biopolitically Legitimate?

In the absence of a refugee law that would have identified who might be granted a refugee status and who might be rejected, the Algerian state has to adopt specific biopolitical technologies to identify the suffering body that deserves care and inclusion. Within a biopolitical logic, in order to determine who is a genuine refugee, the refugee body is perceived as an object of politics that can be perceived either as a 'suffering body' or a 'dangerous body' (Judge, 2010, p. 15). The '*suffering body*' assesses the vulnerability of a war refugee and does

not fit in the case of political refugees (Schindel, 2016, p. 22; emphasis added). The treatment of a "suffering body" in Algeria works in parallel to norms of hospitality and solidarity in Algeria and the values of the host community. Unlike businessmen and long-residence permit holders, short-residence permit holders do not usually access the state's scheme of health insurance. This category enjoys free access to healthcare but not health insurance which made them eligible to receive free medications. However, biopolitical governmentality that governs displaced people identifies Syrian pregnant women, new-borns and people with chronic conditions as "suffering bodies" that will receive medical support and health insurance in addition to their legitimate right to free healthcare. 'Within the sector of education, pupils with mental disabilities can also be integrated into the scheme of psychopedagogy offered by the Ministry of National Solidarity, Family Affairs and the Status of Women', Salima confirmed. Salima (37), a psychologist and a mental health therapist in Algiers and a member of charity organisations in Algiers confirmed:

'…I am aware that certain groups of people can receive help in terms of medication … they should get in touch with social assistants in the state's hospitals…' […kayen des groups li t'awenhom dawla min nahiyat dawe … lazem ychoufo maa el mosa'idin el ijtimae'iyin fi mostachfayat dawla…].

However, this does not end the ordeal of Syrian displaced people as it does not qualify them to long-term residency and, thereafter, to naturalisation. Within the Algerian state discourse, these Syrians are not labelled as "suffering bodies" or "refugees", the kinship between Syrians and Algerians, moral values of solidarity, Arabness and Islam qualified them as "guests". The "guest" status is not legal, but socio-political and does not grant Syrians a legitimate right to naturalisation. For instance, analysis chapter (chapter 6 and chapter 7) illustrated how the

state's understanding of a suffering body have been constantly changing in response to certain circumstances. The socio-political scene of a group of Syrians that were trapped between the Algerian-Moroccan borders reflected a paradoxical scene of conflicting conceptualisations of the "suffering body" at a state level. One would question how the same group of people were considered as "potential danger" when they were outside the borders, as soon as they were granted entry to Algeria, they became "suffering bodies" that deserved care and were later labelled as "guests". The identification of a suffering body remains, to some extent, vague and ambiguous and subject to constant change. According to biogovernmental thinking, the analysis chapters (6 and 7) have shown that these practices certainly reflect conflicts of power and strategies in the Algerian context namely: hospitality, securitisation, and humanitarianism.

Since 2015 until the present (2021), the state production of knowledge around refugees has changed and the "suffering body" has become a "dangerous body". All Syrian displaced people are now associated with illegality and potential terrorism unless they are able to prove the opposite in their visa files. Providing humanitarian support is another governing strategy adopted by the Algerian state which offers equal social rights as the previously stated approaches. Syrians who are eligible for humanitarian support should register with the UNHCR office in Algiers. However, Nirmin was one of my Syrian respondents who registered with the UNHCR in Algiers. '…This registration is my guarantee against illegal deportation' [ana msajla fi lmofawadiya michan mayrahlouni kassran kharej el balad], stated Nirmin. What makes the three state strategies similar in rationale is that they refuse the right to Algerian citizenship as the majority of Syrians do not have long-residence permits issued by the Algerian state, except for a minority of businessmen and those who were able to prove relation by blood or marriage to the Algerian leader, Amir Abdu El Kader el Jazaei'ri, that lived in Damascus in the 19th century until his death. In terms of biopolitical governmentality, strategies and

discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian support are designed to govern the Algerian local population by limiting its diversity. The Syrian displaced community are not denied entry to the national territory of Algeria but are precluded from legalising their status which may make them eligible to naturalisation after spending seven years of continuous residence in Algeria. This is again due to the colonial past and post-colonial present that still governs the openness of Algerian citizenship and the 21st security challenges Algeria is facing in the age of international terrorism.

8.3. Final Reflections, Contribution to Knowledge and Limitations

The present thesis provides a significant interdisciplinary knowledge by contributing into different fields of research in the Algerian context. First and foremost, this research sheds light on a neglected and unresearched sociological phenomenon within the Algerian context which is human displacement. Although Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Mohamed Saïb Musette significantly contributed into the field by reporting the situation of mass migration in Algeria, I believe a deep understanding into how political and social actors are shaping the lives of displaced people is also of a paramount importance. In order to achieve this, the present thesis has adopted a Foucauldian approach to look at how the lives of Syrian displaced people are shaped by state's power and how Syrians reflect to it. This thesis analysed the power games and deduced that due to the lack of an official refugee mechanism in Algeria, the state has adopted different strategies namely *hospitality*, *security* and *humanitarianism* to regulate and govern the Syrian displaced people.

Secondly, the present thesis contributed in understanding the nature of Algerian citizenship and introduced a new perspective into looking at factors of inclusion / exclusion set by the state in the age of mass migration and international terrorism in the 21st century. It revealed that Algerian citizenship and Algerianness depend on the level of loyalty that a potential citizen should show to the nation. However, what is controversial about this point is that loyalty cannot be measured, and nothing guarantees that all Algerian citizens are truly loyal to the nation. As such and because these Syrians could not receive Algerian citizenship or legal status after spending more than 7 years of continuous residency in the country, they have been differently labelled either as 'guests', brothers / sisters in faith and Arabité', or as 'potential danger'. These labels developed an identity crisis among the Syrian community and placed it 'at the edges of citizenship' where Syrians neither feel as 'insiders' nor as 'outsiders' (Hepworth, 2015, p.09). Finally, using a Foucauldian understanding of power, this thesis introduced a new perspective of investigating power games in the Algerian context that is always portrayed as a symbol of authoritarianism in the West. Indeed, the present thesis shows how power within the Algerian context is also positive in the way it protects and boosts the well-being of the local and displaced population in Algeria.

As any academic research, the present thesis has limitations in terms of *generalisability* when viewing the findings. This means that the results presented in this research cannot be generalised to all displaced minorities in Algeria or even within the Syrian community itself. Having lived in two different cities in Algeria: Algiers and Ouargla, my Syrian respondent: Riyadh, described the mentality of people in Algiers and mentality of people in Ouargla as different if not, sometimes, contradictory. What Riyadh argued provides an interesting starting point for another research which may compare and contrast the experience of Syrian displaced people in different regions in Algeria.

Additionally, What Foucault's governmentality and the conceptualisation of power failed to cover is that within non-secular states and societies, where religion (Islam) plays an important role in the social and political life, such as the case of Algeria, there was an encounter with divine power and state power. The present research reported that within the Algerian context, there was no place for liberalism or neo-liberalism when it comes to the state meeting the challenges of human displacement, instead, in Algeria there was a constant struggle between divine power and state's power within the state's decisions of including and excluding Syrians. This was referred to as levels or nuances of inclusion. One of the examples is while in the name of Islam, Syrians should belong because they are a part of the Islamic Ummah; in the name of security, on the other hand, they were completely excluded because they have been perceived as potential threat to the nation.

8.4. Gaps for Future Research

Within a Foucauldian perspective of biopolitical governmentality, the present thesis focussed on power games behind the state discourses that have governed displaced people, but the field of migration and refugeeness in Algeria still remains underexplored and neglected by researchers. As with any empirical research, the present thesis could not cover every aspect of refugeeness in the Algerian context due to time and financial constraints and methodological limitations. Further research may adopt the same theoretical foundation of the present thesis but could shed light on other displaced communities in Algeria such as Sahrawis or Africans. However, working with the same people: i.e., Syrians, future research can investigate the experience of Syrian women in Algeria that would enrich social research related to migration and refugeeness in Algeria.

The present thesis revealed that Syrian women are not always encouraged to work or integrate into the Algerian society because most Syrian women required their male siblings to take decisions on their behalf in case they wanted to study, work or even participate in researches. The reason for Syrian males' control over Syrian females was because they believed that the Algerian society and Algerian women, in particular, are influenced by the West in terms their lifestyle and culture. This research can document the voice of Syrian women and shed light on how Syrians see the Algerian society from their perspective with a special focus on how Syrian women perceive Algerian women. It can answer questions like: do Syrian women believe they had the same rights when they were in Syria compared to women in Algiers? What do Syrian women think about the lifestyle of Algerian women, their ability to work, their involvement into the socio-political aspect of life? This research may go beyond Algiers and provide a comparative analysis between the experience of Syrian women in Algiers and the experience of other Syrian women living outside Algiers. I remember the attitude of one of my Syrian participants, Iyad, who was in a visit to Algiers on the day of our meeting but was living in Ouargla in the South. He believed that unlike people in Algiers who he felt were westernised, people in Ouargla were very conservative and they still follow an Arab and traditional lifestyle. As such, a comparative study between different cities in Algeria such as: Algiers and Ouargla, for instance, would give more information about how the Syrian community perceives the Algerian society.

Research can also focus on the employment of Syrian women in Algiers. For instance, during my fieldwork, I met only one working female, Lara, in Baba Hassan that used to work at her brother's small fabric factory. Syrian females seemed very dependent on their husbands or their male siblings. The men decide if women work or if they stay at home. Lara's small family business was opened and started to operate because her brother was married to an Algerian

citizen and held a long-residence permit which allowed him to own properties in his name. When it comes to employment and training, Syrian women, who are dependent on their male siblings, are the most marginalised group. Similarly, in Canada, for instance, within the framework of the state's neoliberal immigration policy, males are given the opportunity to be employed (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 78). In Britain, immigrant women and asylum seekers do not receive enough state support and their chances of becoming citizens are low (Basok & Ilcan, 2013: 78). Within the Algerian context, the research data revealed that a minority if not very few Syrian females worked in the fields of sewing and embroidery as assistants to their brothers, husbands or their fathers. Lara, for instance, argued that her main responsibility is to deal with female employees and female customers only. Her brother's tasks are to deal with male customers and deliver parcels to different parts in Algeria. I believe that the absence of Syrian females in the labour-market in Algeria can be traced back to a cultural barrier among the Syrian community and to the perception of female workers within the Syrian community. The gap I suggested may cover cultural issues that may hinder Syrian women from full integration into the Algerian society or obstacles that limit their access to employment in Algeria. In addition to employment, as previously mentioned, Amar was not happy with his sister's integration into the Algerian society. He criticised her of being algerianised since the time she started going to the university in Algiers. By algerianised, Amar meant that his sister started following Algerian culture and lifestyle and abandoned her Syrian culture.

Research that sheds light on the experience of Syrian women in Algeria may also shed light on Syrian female students and the challenges, perceptions or even prejudgments that they faced within their own community. Additionally, this research may also cover Syrian women that have chosen begging instead of working in order to financially support themselves and their families. Ayman, for instance, denounced Syrian people including women that have chosen

begging as a source of their income and described them as Bedoons that were not "true" Syrians but were naturalised by Assad's government to win presidential elections. In his words, Ayman called them: 'Nawar and Ghajar', by which they are known in Syria. "Nawar", "Ghajar" or "Arbat" mean gypsies or nomads that do not have a specific place to settle at, but they move from one place to another, Ayman explained. By focussing on this point, this research may provide more details about psychological and social construction of an ideal Syrian citizen and the discrimination and racism against these women within the Syrian community. In sum, most researchers within the field of migration and human displacement investigated the discrimination or racism that the refugee community would face from the host population, however, my fieldwork revealed that there is discrimination among refugees themselves. The gap I have suggested would give an insight about the possible challenges and acts of discrimination that takes place within the refugee community. Focussing on the experience of Syrian women in Algeria, is a rich gap which allows social researchers to understand more about the Syrian community and how their perceptions about women of the host community in Algeria.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Interview with the Syrian displaced community in Algiers (Probing questions may appear during the interview)

- **Social networks and social cohesion**

- Would you tell me why did you choose to come to Algeria rather than other countries?
- Do you have relatives in Algeria? Where did you stay when you first came?
- What is it like to live in Algeria? Do you feel you are isolated or marginalized?
- Are you married to an Algerian? If yes, do you have children? Do they have their papers (birth certificates, nationality)?
- What are peoples' attitudes towards you as non-Algerians? (hospitality Vs hostility)
- Do you think Syrians and Algerians are different? If yes, in terms of what (values, religion, moral principles…)? Are Algerians tolerant and open to you as a different group of people? Could you give me some examples from your own experience?

- What would you say about levels of tolerance, freedom (of thought, speech, movement…), equality, justice, solidarity, security, dignity, discrimination, denial, hatred, rejection, xenophobia, and harassment practiced towards you by the Algerian community/ Algerian authorities? Did you experience any of this since you came to Algeria? If yes, what were the cause(s) and the result(s)? Could you give me some examples of your experience?
- Are there any imposed obligations on you, as Syrian, by the Algerian local community/ Algerian authorities? What impact (positive or negative) this may have on your daily lives?
- Apart from the political rights, do you think that you have the same rights as Algerians? What kind of rights you enjoy?
- Do you think that the Algerian national community and the Algerian state have succeeded or failed in assisting and socially caring for Syrian refugees/ immigrants?

❖ **Legal procedures**

- When did you arrive? What were the checking procedures you went through once you arrived?
- Did you enter with a Visa? If yes, how many times did you apply for it? What kind of requirements that you think are strict?
- Who welcomed you upon your arrival?
- What kind of legal procedures you went through after you arrived?
- Do you have any legal papers or ID cards issued by the Algerian state? Do they tell about your status in Algeria? Have you been granted a status? What is it? Do you need

to renew your papers, or do you need to do a regular checking? What are the authorities responsible to do the usual checking?

- Do you have a right for family reunification?
- Are you free to move within Algeria? Are there any procedures you need to do before you travel from one city to another?

❖ **Belonging and National Identity**

- According to you, what and who is a citizen? What makes a good citizen?
- As a Syrian, do feel yourself a stranger to and within the Algerian society? Why? Why not?
- Can you openly and freely reveal your identity, race, religious beliefs, nationality and your ethnic division in Algeria? Why? Why not?
- After you came to Algeria, what do you feel in terms of belonging? Do you still miss Syria? Do you want to go back, or you prefer to stay in Algeria?
- Since the time you came to Algeria, do you think that the social circumstances helped you to be and maintain who you are in terms of your religious beliefs and national cultural identity? Yes/no and why?

❖ **Labour Market, accommodation, education and healthcare**

- What do you do for living? Do you have an income? Did you find any job? With whom do you work? Who helped you to get this job
- Did you change your job when you came to Algeria? Do you have a qualification?
- What do you want to do, in terms of work, in Algeria?
- Are there any restrictions on work such as the bureaucratic procedures?
- Do you receive any financial help? If yes, who is in charge of that and what do you do instead?
- Where do you live? Is it public or private housing? Are you renting? How do you come to pay?
- Do you have children, if yes, do they do to schools? How did you register them? What are the procedures?
- Do you receive healthcare? Private or public? Is it free?
- Do you receive any humanitarian aid? If yes, who is in charge of that?

Appendix 2

Interview schedule for the state official at the Foreigners' Office in central Algiers

- What are the state's facilities of reception (social welfare systems, public education, public health and housing facilities) and inclusion of Syrian refugees and Syrian immigrants or asylum into Algeria?
- Why do Syrian refugees need visa to enter Algeria? Why was this introduced? Are they more likely to receive it or not? Why and why not?
- Knowing that the Algerian authority has not yet adopted a national refugee law, how does it manage the flow of Syrian refugees and Syrian immigrants?
- Does the Algerian state determine their status? If yes, what is it? What rights and responsibilities do they have under this status?
- What are the criteria of and procedures for determining their status?
- Can they apply for the Algerian citizenship? Why and why not? What are likely to be the conditions?

- If a Syrian immigrant or refugee's application to Algerian citizenship is rejected, do they still have the right to remain in Algeria? Why and why not?
- Do Syrian immigrants or refugees have the right for family reunification? Do they have the right to leave the Algerian territory and enter freely?
- How does the Algerian state manage the flow of refugees along with the UNHCR?
- Are Syrian refugees / Syrian immigrants at risks of deportation? If yes, when are they are forced to leave the Algerian territory?
- What is the state's policy to accommodate refugees and provide financial assistance, jobs, provide healthcare and to provide education to children?
- Would you tell me more about the state's legal reception and integration policies? Which ministry/ authority is in charge of that?
- Does policy exclude those in need of international protection from reaching safety?
- Who is liable to deportation or detention? Why? In case they refuse, what would the Algeria state do?
- Do refugees/migrants have the right to stay wherever they want?

Appendix 3

Interview schedule for the state representative at the level of the Algerian Red Crescent

- Do you usually welcome refugees upon their arrival?
- Who is meant to receive humanitarian aid?
- Do you receive assistance from donors? Who are these donors? National charity organisations, NGOs or or the state?
- What sort of humanitarian aid do you provide to Syrian refugees? Emotional, financial …?
- How did you manage to cover the humanitarian crisis especially after the large flow of refugees?
- Does the absence of a national formal mechanism of granting refugee/ asylum status in Algeria affect your procedures of supporting people in need?
- Do you think that you managed to cover the Syrians' humanitarian needs?
- Do you work with the UNHCR? If yes, how would you collaborate and share responsibility to cover Syrians' needs?

- What do you think of the resources you are providing? Do they have a great impact in changing refugees' situation to the better? If no, why? How can you develop them?
- Do you ensure dignified treatment to refugees in need of humanitarian support? How would you do that?

Appendix 3

Interviews with providers of social welfare assistance / social rights

A- Interview with healthcare providers

- Do you usually receive Syrian patients in the state hospitals?
- If yes? Do they receive the same services / benefits as Algerians? Do they receive free healthcare regardless their status?
- What are the limitations / restrictions / challenges that Syrian patients usually face at the state hospitals?
- Who receives what in terms of their legal status? do they have health insurance?

B- Interview with teacher

- What kind of challenges your Syrian pupils may have experienced ?; eg. linguistic challenges, integration into the educational setting, problems with their Algerian peers … and the like.

C- Interview with property owners (private accommodation)

- Do you usually rent your property to Syrians?
- What are the legal procedures of signing the tenancy agreement?
- What if a Syrian does not have a legal status, do you rent to them?

D- Interview with employer

- Can Syrians submit job applications at your company?
- On what basis do you accept Syrian employees?
- What about their legal status and qualifications?
- Do you accept their Syrian qualifications, or they need to have Algerian qualifications?

Appendix 4

Personal communications via e-mails

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

Sarra-Menal Ferkache

Query

4 messages

Sarra-Menal Ferkache 22 February 2017 at 14:12
To: algal@unhcr.org

Hello UNHCR representatives,

It's Sarra Menal Ferkache, a PhD student in the UK. I am Algerian doing my postgraduate studies at Portsmouth university in the Uk. I am conducting a research on refugees' experience in Algeria. I have a couple of queries regarding the setting in order to get my ethical review done.
Could you just give me exact names of camps where Syrians can stay in groups in Algeria?
what is the exact number of Syrians in Algeria?
Has Algeria enacted an official law for refugees and asylum seekers or not yet!
I am looking forward to hearing from you and to meeting you in Algiers this summer
I am really thankful in advance for your collaboration.

Kindest Regards,
Sarra

http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-european-and-international-studies-research/members/current-phd-students/

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sarra_Menal_Ferkache

Sarra-Menal Ferkache 28 March 2017 at 07:45
To: algal@unhcr.org

Bonjour les représentants de l'UNHCR,

C'est Sarra Menal Ferkache, une doctorante au Royaume-Uni. Je suis une étudiante algérienne financée par le Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique pour faire mes études postuniversitaires à l'université de Portsmouth au Royaume-Uni. Je mène une recherche sur l'expérience des réfugiés en Algérie. J'ai quelques questions au sujet du réglage afin d'obtenir mon examen éthique fait.

Pourriez-vous me donner les noms exacts des camps où les Syriens

peuvent rester en groupes en Algérie?

Quel est le nombre exact de Syriens en Algérie?

L'Algérie a-t-elle promulgué une loi officielle pour les réfugiés et les demandeurs d'asile ou pas encore!

http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-european-and-international-studies-research/members/current-phd-students/

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sarra_Menal_Ferkache

[Quoted text hidden]

Aline Fautsch 25 April 2017 at 11:27
To: "sarra-menal ferkache

Bonjour Mme Menal Ferkache,

Vous trouverez les réponses à vos questions dans les documents ci-joint ainsi que dans la page internet suivante :

http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/7039

Pour répondre rapidement à vos questionnements :

- Il n'existe pas de camp de réfugiés syriens en Algérie;

- Vous trouverez en annexe le nombre de demandeurs d'asile syriens enregistrés auprès de notre bureau (à noter que dû au nombre élevé de syriens et de la position du gouvernement Algérien, le UNHCR ne procède pas à la détermination du statut de réfugié). Le nombre de syriens en Algérie est supérieur au nombre de personnes enregistrées auprès de notre bureau, nous ne détenons pas à l'interne cette information (sous toutes réserves, un estimé les considère au nombre de 40 000 en Algérie). Le Croissant Rouge Algérien a été mandaté pour donner assistance à ceux nécessitant d'aide humanitaire;

- L'Algérie n'a pas encore adopté de loi d'asile. Je vous invite cependant à consulter la documentation suivante :
  - http://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/2008/F2008036.pdf;
  - http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b52518.html.

Bonne continuation dans vos études.

Cordialement,

Aline Fautsch

Associate Protection Officer

Tél. +213 (0) 21 92 40 83 | Fax. +213 (0) 21 92 40 93
Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés
128 chemin Bachir El-Ibrahimi, Poirson, El-Biar

16000 Alger, Algérie

UNHCR
المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين

[Quoted text hidden]

3 attachments

UNHCR Algeria Operational Update - Nov. 2016 - Feb. 2017.pdf
765K

09/11/2020 University of Portsmouth Staff Mail - Query

peuvent rester en groupes en Algérie?

09/11/2020 University of Portsmouth Staff Mail - Query

Algeria 2011.pdf
238K

Fact Sheet Algeria.pdf
442K

Sarra-Menal Ferkache 26 April 2017 at 15:14
To: Aline Fautsch

Bonjour Aline,

Merci beaucoup pour votre réponse. Cela a été vraiment utile.

Cordialement,
Sarra Menal Ferkache
[Quoted text hidden]

UNHCR
المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين

[Quoted text hidden]
Join our **#WithRefugees** campaign
Sign the petition today

Gmail Sarra Menal

Demande d'information
2 messages

Sarra Menal · 31 janvier 2019 à 22:11
À : Hocine

Bonsoir Monsieur Houcine,

J'espère vraiment que vous allez bien.

C'est Sarra Menal Ferkache, une doctorante au Royaume-Uni. Je suis dans ma troisième année et j'ai vraiment besoin de votre aide en termes de documents officiels concernent les etudiants etrangers en Algerie. J'écris au sujet des étudiants étrangers en Algérie et de la manière dont ils parviennent à trouver des offres pour poursuivre leurs études aux universités algériennes.

Existe-t-il une documentation approuvée par le ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique qui énonce ses droits, ses devoirs et s'il paie ou non les frais de scolarité? eseque il sont les memes droits ainsi que les etudiants Algeriens?
J'attends de vos nouvelles et Merci d'avance.
Cordialement
Sarra

Hocine 3 février 2019 à 10:33
À : Sarra Menal

Bonjour Mlle,

Les dossiers des étudiants étrangers proposés pour poursuivre des études supérieures en Algérie, nous parviennes par le biais du Ministère Algérien des Affaires Étrangères, qui les reçoit par l'intermédiaire de leur Ambassade en Algérie et les transmettre au Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique Algérien, ces candidats sont proposés soit dans le cadre du :

* Programme de coopération internationale.
* Programmes d'échange entre les deux pays,
* des enfants des diplomates accrédités en Algérie.

Les étudiants admis ont les mêmes droits et devoirs que les étudiants algériens:

- Bourse d'études
- Transport.
- Restauration.
- Hébergement.

Et bénéficieront de la couverture sociale et des services de santé.

Cordialement.

[Texte des messages précédents masqué]

Appendix 5: Authorisation Letter

الجمهـــوريـة الجـزائريـــة الديمقراطيـــة الشعبيـة
وزارة التعليم العالي و البحث العلمي

مديرية التعاون و التبادل ما بين الجامعات
نيابة مديرية التكوين و تحسين المستوى بالخارج و الإدماج.

رقم : 363 م.ت.ت.ب.ج. **الجزائر في : 2018/04/24**

ترخيص لجمع معلومات تدخل ضمن متطلبات التحضير لشهادة الدكتوراه

يشرفني أن أعلمكم أن الآنسة **فرقاش صارة منال** طالبة بجامعة **طاهري محمد بشار**، بحاجة لجمع معلومات وقيام بمقابلات مع مكتب المسؤولين المعنيين بشؤون الاجانب واللاجئين المقمين في الجزائر الموجود على مستوى ولاية الجزائر، إضافة الى الهلال الأحمر الجزائري مع العلم أن المعنية بالأمر إستفادت من منحة دراسية وطنية لتحضير شهادة الدكتوراه (**Ph.D**) بالمملكة المتحدة (بريطانيا) في إطار البرنامج .

وعليه أرجوا منكم التفضل و التدخل على مستوى الجهات المختصة لمصالحكم لغرض تسهيل عملية بحث الآنسة **فرقاش صارة**.

سلمت هذه الشهادة للمعني(ة) بالأمر للإدلاء بها بما يسمح القانون.

Appendix 6: Letters of Authorised Absence (Fieldwork trips)

(Personal details such as passport number and date of birth were hidden for my personal privacy)



UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

28th February 2018

To Whom It May Concern

Re: Student conducting research overseas

The university has authorised the student named below to conduct research overseas between the following dates:

Start Date: 5th March 2018
End Date: 15th May 2018

Please note that the following student is being sponsored by the University of Portsmouth (SLN 926WMQQ73):

Name: MISS SARRA MENAL FERKACHE

Course Name: PhD School of Social Historical and Literary Studies

Should you wish to confirm any of these details or need further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or by emailing our UK-VI Student Compliance Team (ukvi-student-compliance@port.ac.uk).

Yours sincerely,

Katherine Ross
Postgraduate Centre Officer
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Tel: +44 (0)2392 84 6037
Email: Katherine.ross@port.ac.uk

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

4th July 2018

To Whom It May Concern

Re: Student conducting research overseas

The university has authorised the student named below to conduct research overseas between the following dates:

Start Date: 12th August 2018
End Date: 08th September 2018

Please note that the following student is being sponsored by the University of Portsmouth (SLN 926WMQQ73):

Name: MISS SARRA MENAL FERKACHE

Course Name: PhD School of Social Historical and Literary Studies

Should you wish to confirm any of these details or need further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or by emailing our UK-VI Student Compliance Team (ukvi-student-compliance@port.ac.uk).

Yours sincerely,

Katherine Ross
Postgraduate Centre Officer
Department of Student and Academic Administration (HSS Faculty)
Tel: +44 (0)2392 84 6037
Email: Katherine.ross@port.ac.uk

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

13th November 2018

To Whom It May Concern

Re: Student conducting research overseas

The university has authorised the student named below to conduct research overseas between the following dates:

Start Date: 19th November 2018
End Date: 22nd December 2018

Please note that the following student is being sponsored by the University of Portsmouth (SLN 926WMQQ73):

Name: MISS SARRA MENAL FERKACHE

Course Name: PhD School of Area Studies, History, Politics and Literature

Should you wish to confirm any of these details or need further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or by emailing our UK-VI Student Compliance Team (ukvi-studentcompliance@port.ac.uk).

Yours sincerely,

Katherine Ross
Postgraduate Centre Officer
Department of Student and Academic Administration (HSS Faculty)
Tel: +44 (0)2392 84 6037
Email: Katherine.ross@port.ac.uk

Appendix 7: Favourable Ethical Opinion

Professor Matthew Weait,
BA (Hons) MA MPhil DPhil FAcSS
Professor of Law and Society
Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

T +44 (0)23 9284 6012
E matthew.weait@port.ac.uk

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Park Building
King Henry I Street
Portsmouth PO1 2DZ

T: +44 (0)23 9284 8484
port.ac.uk/fhss

FAVOURABLE ETHICAL OPINION (with conditions)

Name: Sarra Menal Ferkache

Study Title: The Community of Values and its Openness to Foreigners: Documenting Syrian Refugees/Immigrants Experience in Algeria

Reference Number: 17/18:32

Date: 06/02/2018

Thank you for resubmitting your application to the FHSS Ethics Committee and for making the requested changes/ clarifications.

I am pleased to inform you that FHSS Ethics Committee was content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis described in the submitted documents listed at Annex A, and subject to standard general conditions (*See Annex B).*
With this there are a number of ethical conditions to comply with, and some additional advisory notes you may wish to consider, all shown below.

Condition(s)[1]

1. Lone researcher safety: it is a condition of the FEO that the researcher puts into place strategies to ensure their safety as a lone researcher.
2. 2. Participant withdrawal: a time period which is consistent across the documentation must be provided with clear guidance as to how this relates to the withdrawal from research before the process begins, or withdrawal after data collection has commenced.

Please note that the favourable opinion of FHSS Ethics Committee does not grant permission or approval to undertake the research/ work. Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host organisation, including the University of Portsmouth or supervisor, prior to the start of the study.

Wishing you every success in your research



Chair

Dr Jane Winstone

Email: ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk

[1] A favourable opinion will be dependent upon the study adhering to the conditions stated, which are based on the application document(s) submitted. It is appreciated that Principal Investigators may wish to challenge conditions or propose amendments to these in the resubmission to this ethical review.

Annexes

A - Documents reviewed

B - After ethical review

ANNEX A - Documents reviewed

The documents ethically reviewed for this application

Document	*Version*	*Date*
Application Form	2	17/01/2018
Participant Information Sheet	2	11/12/2017 17/01/2018
Consent Form	2	11/12/2017
Supervisor Email Confirming Application	2	11/12/2017
Interview Questions / Topic List	2	11/12/2017
Script for Oral Consent	2	11/12/2017
Risk Assessment Forms	2	11/12/2017

ANNEX B - After ethical review

1. This Annex sets out important guidance for those with a favourable opinion from a University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Please read the guidance carefully. A failure to follow the guidance could lead to the committee reviewing and possibly revoking its opinion on the research.

2. It is assumed that the work will commence within 1 year of the date of the favourable ethical opinion or the start date stated in the application, whichever is the latest.

3. The work must not commence until the researcher has obtained any necessary management permissions or approvals – this is particularly pertinent in cases of research hosted by external organisations. The appropriate head of department should be aware of a member of staff's plans.

4. If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study beyond that stated in the application, the Ethics Committee must be informed.

5. Any proposed substantial amendments must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for review. A substantial amendment is any amendment to the terms of the application for ethical review, or to the protocol or other supporting documentation approved by the Committee that is likely to affect to a significant degree:

(a) the safety or physical or mental integrity of participants
(b) the scientific value of the study
(c) the conduct or management of the study.

5.1 A substantial amendment should not be implemented until a favourable ethical opinion has been given by the Committee.

6. At the end of the work a final report should be submitted to the ethics committee. A template for this can be found on the University Ethics webpage.

7. Researchers are reminded of the University's commitments as stated in the Concordat to Support Research Integrity viz:

- maintaining the highest standards of rigour and integrity in all aspects of research
- ensuring that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards
- supporting a research environment that is underpinned by a culture of integrity and based on good governance, best practice and support for the development of researchers
- using transparent, robust and fair processes to deal with allegations of research misconduct should they arise
- working together to strengthen the integrity of research and to reviewing progress regularly and openly.

8. In ensuring that it meets these commitments the University has adopted the UKRIO Code of Practice for Research. Any breach of this code may be considered as misconduct and may be investigated following the University Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research. Researchers are advised to use the UKRIO checklist as a simple guide to integrity.

Appendix7: FORM UPR16: Research Ethics Review Checklist

FORM UPR16

Research Ethics Review Checklist

Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information			**Student ID:**	802496
PGRS Name:	SARRA MENAL FERKACHE			
Department:	SCHOOL OF EDUCATION AND SOCIOLOGY	**First Supervisor:**	Dr. NAHEEM JABBAR	
Start Date: (or progression date for Prof Doc students)	**03 rd OCTOBER 2016**			
Study Mode and Route:	Part-time ☐ Full-time ☒	MPhil ☐ PhD ☒	MD ☐ Professional Doctorate ☐	

Title of Thesis:	At the Edges of Citizenship: Documenting Life Experiences of Syrian Displaced People with Biopolitical State Strategies of Hospitality and Security in Algeria
Thesis Word Count: (excluding ancillary data)	84,619

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University's Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

UKRIO Finished Research Checklist:
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/)

a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame?	YES ☒ NO ☐
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged?	YES ☒ NO ☐
c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship?	YES ☒ NO ☐
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration?	YES ☒ NO ☐
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?	YES ☒ NO ☐

Candidate Statement:	
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s)	
Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from NRES/SCREC):	17/18:32
If you have *not* submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 'No' to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so:	
Signed *(PGRS)*:	**Date:** 14th December 2020

UPR16 – April 2018

	Sarra-Menalferkache	